Legacy after the bid? The impact of bidding to host Olympic Games on urban development planning

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Abstract: This project examines the urban development impacts of bidding to host Olympic Games. While there is a well-developed scholarship on legacy in Olympic host cities, less is known about the urban legacies of unsuccessful Olympic candidatures. The study addresses this by analyzing land use legacies of bidding in Olympic applicant and candidate cities, during host city elections over a twenty year period (80 bids for Games between 2000 and 2020). It draws on content analysis of bidding documents, and spatial analysis of land use change in bid cities using historical planning documents and maps. The study demonstrates that bids to host Olympics, even when unsuccessful, provide a means for formalizing local development strategies. Likewise, bid plans are often implemented to some degree regardless of a candidature's success because local stakeholders leverage one sports development plan for use in multiple Olympic and non-Olympic bids, engaging in incremental and speculative investment along the way. The study identifies policy processes that facilitate or hinder urban development legacies after the bid, concluding with recommendations for building local capacity to coordinate across various bids, and for monitoring the urban impacts of unsuccessful bids in cities that bid for the Games multiple times.

Keywords: bidding, land use, legacy, urban planning

Executive summary

Each time a city wins the rights to host an Olympic Games, it leaves behind several unsuccessful competitor cities which also bid on the Games. Bid committees representing these unsuccessful cities also develop extensive, high-quality urban planning proposals. The long term impacts of these plans are often unknown, but unsuccessful bids like these represent the majority of Olympics urban planning on a global scale. While there is a robust scholarship on legacy planning in host cities, less is known about long-term planning outcomes in unsuccessful bidding cities.

This project examines the urban development impacts of bidding to host Olympic Games: in applicant/candidate cities that have not secured a hosting contract, and in those cities which made unsuccessful bids before eventually becoming a host city. Globally, the urban development 'footprint' of Olympic planning is much larger than that in the host cities. In fact, 57 cities placed 80 bids to host Summer or Winter Olympic Games between 2000 and 2020, and many went on to implement part of their bid proposals even though the bids were unsuccessful. As such, there is a pressing need to understand the urban development impacts of these unsuccessful bids, and to design strategies for ensuring that even unsuccessful bids produce positive urban legacies.

This study catalogues the land use legacies of bidding, and identifies some prominent policy processes that facilitate or hinder sustainable development legacies after the bid (Section 3). This report concludes that the Olympic bidding process is itself an important component of urban development planning, and city leaders are increasingly recognizing its value as a planning exercise. The study catalogues the legacies of Olympic planning in unsuccessful bid cities, by tracing the land use impacts of bidding across a comparative, 20 year sample (80 bids from 57 cities, to host Olympic Games between 2000 and 2020). Unsuccessful Olympic bids can have legacies for three reasons:

1) Bidding to host Olympic Games provides a means for formalizing local development strategies. Olympic bids often generate a political catalyst for pursuing broader planning strategies, and can act as a base project from which planners can launch bids to host other major sport events. Bidding opens event-specific forms of finance through projected event revenue and unique types of public-private partnerships, and allows local planning stakeholders to access international networks of urban development expertise (especially the IOC's knowledge management programs). (Section 4.1)
2) Bid plans are often implemented to some degree regardless of whether a city wins its bid: This occurs partly because bid committees claim ongoing public works projects – or projects associated with other megaevents – as part of their bid regardless of their specificity to an Olympics. It also occurs as cities bid on multiple events over time, incrementally building sports infrastructure along the way. In some cities, bidding provides a catalyst for action: while Olympic bids by necessity reflect pre-existing urban visions, the bidding process provides an opportunity for formalizing those visions, clearing the way for action on them. In other cities, bids are used as part of ongoing development strategies, drawing on urban investment plans already in place as part of broader development strategies, and leveraging the bids as a way to gather political support for these broader strategies. (Section 4.2)
3) Linking Olympic bids to ongoing local development planning presents an opportunity for cities to synthesize local development visions with global expertise. Olympic bidding

provides a means of accessing international expertise, and the IOC has played a major role in sharing knowledge across bid cities. However, it is also a process of negotiation between local urban development goals, the technical standards required for delivering a Games, and the business ventures of event stakeholders. The competitive nature of the candidature process provides incentives for local planners to outbid other cities, and these attempts at outbidding competitors may not necessarily be an efficient use of local resources. (Section 4.3)

Because the bid process extends to so many cities, there are significant opportunities to expand Olympic urban legacies in unsuccessful bid cities. In addition to general best practices on legacy planning – especially integrating a Games plan with the city's long term planning objectives, and planning for legacy from the very beginning of the bid process – the study findings lead to the following recommendations (Section 5):

(1) **Encourage cities to form a long term 'bid coordination' organization.** Many cities field multiple bids – not just for the Olympic Games, but also for a variety of other sporting events. There is a risk, however, that temporary bid organizations will either dissolve after an unsuccessful bid or transition into an organizing committee after a successful bid. An institution that exists independently of any one bid or event would be better equipped to couple Olympic bids to a long term urban development strategy, and to coordinate across bids for multiple types of megaevents. A bid coordination organization could also become a platform for coordinating public conversations about the role of an Olympic bid in the city, even if it is unsuccessful.

(2) **Monitor ongoing urban impacts of bids, especially among high frequency bidders.** Cities that bid on the Games multiple times often pursue parts of their bid plans before securing an Olympics hosting contract (Section 4.3). This presents an opportunity to pursue Olympic legacy during and in between bids, and maintains a long term local conversation on bid legacy goals. Towards these ends, when a city bids for the Games multiple times the IOC should request documentation on legacies of the city's previous bid(s).

(3) Add a follow-up seminar, after the host city elections, for all of the applicant and candidate cities. The proposed seminar would be separate from but similar to the debriefing the IOC already provides for future host cities. It would play two roles: helping the future host city learn from the best practices of its former competitors, and advising unsuccessful bidders on ways to implement their bid legacies. The latter should emphasize making strategic long term decisions about whether or not to bid in a future elections round, and on selecting proposed projects from within the bid that would still benefit the city. Such a seminar could be integrated into the existing Olympic Games Knowledge Management framework, as a debriefing similar to the bid cities orientation seminars.

1) Introduction

In September 2013, the *Tokyo 2020 Bid Committee* secured a contract to host the 2020 Summer Olympic Games. In securing this contract from the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the bid committee and its public-private partners are now able to implement their USD 4.35 billion investment plan, and will benefit from nearly a decade of access to global networks of expertise on urban planning for 'megaevents' like the Olympics. However, the election of Tokyo as host city leaves behind four other competitor cities (Baku, Doha, Istanbul and Madrid). Bid committees representing these cities also developed extensive, high-quality urban planning proposals (although shortlisted candidates – in this case Istanbul and Madrid – have the opportunity to design more fully-developed plans those which were not shortlisted). The fate of these plans often unknown, but unsuccessful bids like these represent the majority of Olympic urban planning on a global scale.

While there is a robust scholarship on legacy planning in host cities, less is known about long-term planning outcomes in unsuccessful bidding cities. This project examines the urban development impacts of bidding to host Olympic Games. [1] While opportunities and challenges of Olympic legacy planning are well known in host cities, less is known about the legacies of unsuccessful Olympics candidatures: in applicant/candidate cities that have not ever secured a hosting contract, and in those cities which made unsuccessful bids before eventually becoming a host city. Globally, the urban development 'footprint' of Olympic planning is much larger than that in the host cities. In fact, 57 cities placed 80 bids to host Summer or Winter Olympic Games between 2000 and 2020 (Figure 1), and many went on to implement part of their bid proposals even though the bids were unsuccessful (Section 4).[2] As such, there is a pressing need to understand the urban development implications of these unsuccessful bids, and to design strategies for ensuring that even unsuccessful bids produce positive urban legacies.

The analysis which follows argues that the Olympic bidding process can be an important component of urban development planning even if the bid itself is unsuccessful. City leaders are increasingly recognizing its value as a planning exercise: Bidding to host sporting megaevents – most notably Olympic Games – often provides a means for formalizing local development strategies, because it generates a political catalyst for pursuing planning strategies, it opens financing options for implementing the plans, and it allows local planners to access transnational networks of planning expertise (like the IOC knowledge management programs). In Section 2 this argument is situated with regard to urban studies scholarship and the Olympic Movement; it is linked to the project's methodology in Section 3.

Section 4 analyzes the ways in which bid plans are often implemented to some degree regardless of whether a city wins its bid: This occurs partly because bid committees claim ongoing local land investment projects as part of their bid regardless of their specificity to an Olympics. It also occurs as cities bid on multiple events over time, incrementally building sports infrastructure along the way. In some cities, bidding provides a catalyst for action: while Olympic bids by necessity reflect pre-existing urban visions, the bidding process provides an opportunity for formalizing those visions, clearing the way for action on them. In other cities,

[1] "The impact of Olympic Games bidding on sustainable development projects in candidate cities," 2013 Postgraduate Research Grant Programme, International Olympic Committee/Olympic Studies Centre

[2] Host city elections for Olympiads between 2000 and 2020 (elections date 1991-2013); This includes 49 bids from 34 cities to host the Summer Games, and 32 bids from 24 cities to host the Winter Games.

megaevent bids as part of ongoing development strategies, bids draw upon urban investment plans already in place as part of broader development strategies, and leverage the bids as a way to gather political support for these broader strategies (Section 4.2). The role of the bid in formalizing local development strategies is particularly important: Olympic bids often generate a political catalyst for pursuing broader planning strategies, and act as base projects from which planners can launch bids to host other major sport events. Bidding likewise opens event-specific forms of finance through projected event revenue and unique types of public-private partnerships, and allows local planning stakeholders to access international networks of urban development expertise (especially the IOC's knowledge management programs) (Section 4.1).



Figure 1: Bids to host Summer and Winter Olympic Games
Bids for Games 2000-2020, with host city elections dating 1993-2013
Map includes both applicant and candidate cities; this includes 48 bids from 33 cities to host the Summer Games, and 32 bids from 24 cities to host the Winter Games.

In this sense, linking Olympic bids to ongoing local development planning presents an opportunity for cities to synthesize local development visions with global expertise. Olympic bidding provides a means of accessing international expertise, and the IOC has played a major role in sharing knowledge across bid cities. However, it is also a process of negotiation between local development goals, the technical standards required for delivering a Games, and the business goals of event stakeholders. The competitive nature of the candidature process provides

incentives for local planners to outbid other cities, and these attempts at outbidding competitors may lead to inefficient use of local resources (Section 4.3). The planning gaps which emerge from this dual challenge – bidding to win and planning for sustainable Olympic legacies – is an issue of increasing concern in the Olympic Movement (Section 2.3). The report concludes with three recommendations for improving the legacy outcomes of unsuccessful Olympic bids: they focus on building local institutional capacity for integrating bids into ongoing urban development, monitoring bid legacies in cities that bid multiple times, and extending the IOC's knowledge management program to unsuccessful applicant/candidate cities (Section 5).

2) Study overview

2.1) Host city elections

Planning an Olympic Games requires almost a decade of preparation, starting with what the IOC terms 'host city elections'. The bid selection process takes place over a two year period, concluding with an election of the host city by IOC voting members 7-8 years before the actual event (thus the bid process for the 2020 Summer Games occurred from 2011 to 2013). Before the bidding formally commences, local public and private stakeholders interested in organizing a Games will form a temporary corporation or non-profit organization, usually called a 'bid committee'. This committee petitions the National Olympic Committee (NOC) in its country for sponsorship, and gathers financial and legal support from local public and private stakeholders. Approximately nine years before an event, the IOC releases 'candidature acceptance procedure' documents: contracts, technical manuals, and a survey to guide bid committees on technical requirements and bid document standards. After the relevant NOC nominates a candidate city and the bid committee pays an application fee (USD 150,000 in the host city elections for the 2020 Summer Games), the committee is granted access the IOC's proprietary knowledge management systems. These systems were developed in the 1990s as part of a series of IOC reforms and initiatives, and Olympic urban planning knowledge initiatives have been closely linked with Olympic marketing initiatives throughout this history (Section 4.3).

There are two phases in contemporary host city elections: the 'applicant' phase is open to all bid committees nominated by a NOC. Applicant committees attend an IOC seminar and prepare a short (75-100 page) 'applicant' file, which is evaluated by a working group of experts appointed by the IOC Executive Board. The committees are invited to attend the *Olympic Observer Programme*, a knowledge sharing program in which staff from bid committees and upcoming organizing committees are invited to a series of seminars and debriefings during the current Games. For instance, during the London 2012 planning, observers from Rio de Janeiro 2016 and the 2020 bid committees (Istanbul, Madrid, and Tokyo) participated in the program.[3] Approximately 10-12 months after the beginning of the applicant phase, the IOC Executive Board will invite a smaller number of bid committees to advance to the 'candidature' phase of the elections. The candidate committees eventually submit a formal 'candidature file' to the IOC, a 300-500 page technical document detailing the committees' plans for designing, financing, and implementing infrastructure, the event, and event legacy. During the subsequent months the IOC's commission of experts visits each candidate city, and each city has an opportunity to present its proposal to meetings of the IOC and other international sporting federations (e.g. events like the SportAccord Convention and the annual meeting of the Association of National Olympic Committees).

The evaluation commission assesses each candidature file via a panel of industry experts. They are aided by the IOC's technical documents and tools like 'OlympicLogic', an analytical hierarchy process for comparing each bid on based on a set of criteria chosen by the IOC Executive Board. OlympicLogic was introduced during the elections for the 2008 Summer Games, and is used to establish consistent comparisons of each candidate city on each evaluation category (11-15 categories are used, corresponding to the sections of the candidature file in each host city election cycle). Each member of the evaluation commission ranks a candidate on each

[3] IOC press release (5 August 2012). "2020 learns from 2012." < http://www.olympic.org/news/2020-learns-from-2012/170857>

category, and then a proprietary algorithm is used to weight the categories and stabilize scores across evaluators, categories, and cities. The end result is a set of rankings that informs the evaluation commission recommendations.[4] Relying on these expert opinions and commission recommendations, the final step of voting for a host city takes place during the annual IOC Session seven years before the Olympiad.

2.2) Bidding as urban policymaking

While hosting Olympics and other sporting 'megaevents' has long been recognized as a catalyst for urban development (see Smith, 2012, chapter 3 for an extensive history of megaevents legacy policy), bidding to host is itself an important component of urban development planning. Hosting an Olympic Games is obviously the most direct route to achieving legacy. However, as documented in Section 4 unsuccessful bids can also have significant long-term impacts. Bidding to host a Games is rarely a one-off affair because cities often bid multiple times for the Olympics, and use their Olympic plans to bid on other events. In fact, the IOC's planning protocol are a benchmark standard for many other large sporting events (e.g. regional events within the Olympic Movement like the Asian or Pan American Games, and comparable multi-sport events like the Commonwealth Games).

While it is by definition a temporary and speculative exercise, bid writing is often a productive form of urban policy experimentation. Bids are a means of formalizing urban planning strategies and visions: Bid committee finance site analysis and design, build relationships with experienced Olympic planners (Cook & Ward, 2011; González, 2011), and modify pre-existing planning templates for local use (Kassens-Noor, 2012). As documented in Section 4, unsuccessful Olympic bids are often implemented to some degree, because they reflect ongoing plans, because they are repurposed for subsequent Olympic bids or bids for other events, and because simply formalizing a site plan can be a sufficient catalyst for implementation regardless of a successful bid. This investment legacy of unsuccessful bids has been observed in Berlin (Alberts, 2009), Doha (Scharfenort, 2012), Istanbul (Erten, 2010), New York (Moss, 2011), and Toronto (Oliver, 2011). However, the author is unaware of any previous comparative studies of this phenomenon. Indeed, the goal of this research is to determine what types of impacts the bids actually have, and identify best practices for ensuring they have sustainable legacies.

It is common to integrate Olympic bids into long term urban planning (Andranovich & Burbank, 2011; Bilsel & Zelef, 2011) and national development policymaking (Black & Peacock, 2011; Pillay & Bass, 2008; Scharfenort, 2012). In their frequently referenced discussion of this 'mega-event strategy', Andranovich and colleagues (2001) explain this general dynamic in urban politics by suggesting that

> city leaders see the Olympic Games in strategic terms, providing opportunities to gain regional, national, and international media exposure at low cost. Even submitting a bid package to the national Olympic committees is enough to warrant media exposure and provide some claim to Olympic symbols to unify disparate stakeholders, however transitory these claims might be. (127)

[4] IOC (18 August 2000) *Candidature Acceptance Procedure for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad 2008,* Lausanne: IOC

Broadly speaking, urban legacy has been an explicit objective of Olympic planning since at least the Barcelona 1992 Summer Games (Garcia-Ramon & Albet, 2000). The specific types of legacy envisioned, however, are historically and geographically variegated. Some dominant legacy themes revolve around using Games planning to pursue urban regeneration (Garcia-Ramon & Albet, 2000; Smith & Fox, 2007), city 'branding' (Chalip & Costa, 2005; Gold & Gold, 2008), environmental sustainability (Holden, MacKenzie, & VanWynsberghe, 2008; Mol, 2010), social inclusion (Edelson, 2011; van Wynsberghe, Surborg, & Wyly, 2012), or community development (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011; Pillay & Bass, 2008). While these various legacy initiatives are progressive objectives, it is important to note that the language of legacy planning is often at risk of being co-opted (Davidson, 2010) for less idealistic ends: for example, problematic references to 'social inclusion' as rhetoric to garner political support for exclusive, privately-held real estate projects (Boykoff, 2014; van Wynsberghe, et al., 2012).

Integration of an Olympics plan into the strategic visions for the host city is, in the broadest of strokes, a core component of any legacy planning initiative. Such integration has temporal and geographical elements: In temporal terms, one single event is rarely the entire catalyst for integrating sports and urban planning strategies. Many cities bid on Olympics multiple times (e.g. all of the 2020 candidate cities had bid in at least one prior host city election) and simultaneously bid on other major sport events (e.g. Doha has bid on the 2016 and 2020 Olympics, as well as hosting the 2006 Asian Games, 2011 Pan Arab Games, and 2022 Qatar World Cup). To focus narrowly on the 1992 Olympic Games, for instance, overlooks some of the core elements of the much acclaimed 'Barcelona Model': Barcelona's Olympic redevelopment successes are usually attributed to the integration of the Games plan into the city's existing strategic master plan. However, the Games were only one of a century-long history of using events as a tool for urban development, including the 1888 Universal Exhibition and the 1929 World Expo (Smith, 2012, pp. 123-133). The IOC has long recognized the importance of this type of continuity (in hosting, but not necessarily in bidding), requiring candidate cities to document previous hosting experience into consideration since the elections for the 2008 host city.[5]

Integration also has a geographic dimension: On a global scale the geography of Olympic bid cities has become increasingly diverse over past decades (Figure 2). This geographical expansion of planning and bidding stakeholders has also expanded the scope of planning and development goals. Concomitantly, new definitions of 'legacy' enter into conversations of megaevent planning: post-industrial regeneration may be a common legacy goal in European and North American cities (Gold & Gold, 2008), but pro-poor development (Pillay & Bass, 2008) or independence from extractive industries (Scharfenort, 2012) may be more appropriate in an African megacity or an oil-dependent city-state in the Arabian Gulf (respectively). One area of convergence remains around the imperative for a bidding city to articulate its 'world class' status (Black & Peacock, 2011; Gaffney, 2010). Bidding on a Games can, in itself, be a way to articulate a city's claims to the global stage. Commenting on the upsurge in Olympics hosting interest from 'developmental' states – which play outsized, well-financed roles in development implementation – Black and Peacock have argued that

> Between the nation-based structure of international sport (that largely mirrors the United Nations or other formal international organisations) and the highly visible and broad-based attention it gathers,

[5] IOC (24 February 2000) *Questionnaire for cities applying to become Candidate Cities to host the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008*. Lausanne: IOC

> authorisation to enter the Olympic family and associated structures offers powerful symbolic legitimacy with real effects. While participation in global sporting structures legitimises the existence of a state, however, hosting sporting mega-events legitimises and ritually represents the truly modernised 'arrival' of a (developmental-turned-developed) state. (2011, p. 2277)

As cities increasingly play dominant roles in global diplomacy (Acuto, 2013), and since Olympic Games are explicitly urban affairs (unlike other megaevents like FIFA World Cups), bidding is also a means for city governments to make direct claims to the world stage.



Figure 2: Bids to host Summer and Winter Olympic Games, 1980-2020
Bids date 1973-2012; 141 bids from 89 cities

There is also a local geographic dimension to the integration of Olympic plans with urban development strategies. Olympics planning increasingly relies on multi-level planning coalitions that have both local and global business and political networks. Indeed, megaevent planning coalitions often take the form of

> a *selectively transnationalized* local growth machine: its primary function is to balance the traditional political power of locally-based growth coalitions with the need to respond to extra-territorial actors and coalitions—a growth machine diaspora…[which is] a group of dispersed actors in various selected locales that is bound together through common interests and beliefs in specific forms of urban growth and development; beliefs made more attainable through the vehicle of the mega-event. (Surborg, VanWynsberghe, & Wyly, 2008, p. 342) (my emphasis)

This reflects historical shifts in urban planning towards 'multi-level' or 'multi-scalar' governance strategies (Allen & Cochrane, 2007; Healey, 2006). Multi-scalar planning coalitions mobilize local, regional, and national stakeholders through metropolitan scale development politics (Cox, 2011) or institutions that develop strategies for the 'city-region' (Harrison, 2010). They reflect increasingly reciprocal relationships between municipal and national governments, as national states focus their efforts on cities and cities intervene in national policy (Brenner, 2004; MacLeavy & Harrison, 2010). Likewise, urban policy is increasingly 'mobile' between cities on an international scale as peer cities learn from each other (McCann & Ward, 2011), as planning templates, models, and best practices migrate through transnational city-to-city networks and evolve along the journey (Peck, 2011). The IOC's 'Olympic Games Knowledge Management' programme is a good example of how planning standards move between cities but also evolve with changing stakeholders. Other documented examples in megaevents planning include site visits between professional networks of planners (González, 2011), 'policy tourism' programs (attendance at events like the Olympic Observer Programme) (Cook & Ward, 2011), and the translation of planning templates to local contexts (Klauser, 2011).

2.3) Implications/contributions of the study

This research contributes to academic debates over urban development politics by analyzing the role of temporary projects in long term planning strategy. By definition, the concept of 'sustainable development' – including Olympic legacy – implies a long term outcome. Much of the work of actually implementing sustainable development, however, is accomplished through temporary initiatives: pilot projects, temporarily 'special' financial or legal districts, or fixed-term financial strategies. Despite the centrality of temporary initiatives in development implementation, relatively little is known about the processes that link temporary projects to long term outcomes (Bishop & Williams, 2012, chapter 1). Bidding to host events like the Olympic Games is one of the most prominent examples of using a temporary planning project (the bid/event) to pursue long term legacy. This study is well positioned to make both a novel empirical contribution – since temporary dimensions of sustainable development planning are relatively under-researched – and a conceptual contribution to understanding the dynamics of urban change. Such a conceptual contribution allows a new understanding of the nature of city-to-city competition or 'entrepreneurial urbanism' (Lauermann & Davidson, 2013; MacLeod, 2011). It highlights the ways in which city-to-city competition is often highly speculative – as city governments pursue a variety of strategic ventures via Olympic bidding – and explicitly accounts for failure. Indeed, candidate cities rarely win the Games on the first bid, and building on/learning from failed bids is an integral part of the planning process.

The project contributes to the Olympic Movement by examining the relatively under-researched implications of unsuccessful Olympic candidatures. As discussed earlier, the Olympic planning footprint is much broader than that in host cities (57 cities bid on Games between 2000 and 2020) and knowledge about Olympic planning is used to plan many other types of megaevents (Section 4.1). Because the bid process extends to so many cities the opportunity for building Olympic legacy in unsuccessful bid cities is much broader than pursuing legacy in host cities alone. To address this, the study catalogues the land use legacies of bidding, and identifies some prominent processes that facilitate or hinder sustainable development legacies after the bid. The findings signal to opportunities for expanding Olympic legacy by more fully integrating unsuccessful bidders into the Olympic Movement. This could be mutually beneficial for the

Olympic Movement and local planners: Local planners are already using unsuccessful Olympic bids to pursue urban development strategies and could benefit from IOC legacy planning guidance. In the process, the IOC could make bidding more financially sustainable, and open to a broader group of smaller cities. As documented in Sections 4 and 5, Olympic bidding provides financing to develop the plans, it generates a political catalyst develop a planning strategies, and it allows local planners access to transnational networks of planning expertise (especially the IOC's knowledge management programs).

However, over the study period bids have increasingly entailed larger financial commitments (Preuss, 2004 chapter 4) as they are more closely integrated with ongoing urban development investments (Section 4.2). This presents challenges to bid cities because distorts the relationship between what bid committees and IOC voting members regard as a competitive bid, what the IOC has identified as technical necessity for hosting a successful Games, and the scale and scope of a city's actual needs. The IOC has increasingly expressed concerns over this disconnect. In fact, the Evaluation Commission for the 2020 Host City Elections recently summarized this tension, noting that

> Throughout recent bid processes, the IOC has witnessed a growing tendency by cities to try to go above and beyond IOC requirements. Whilst such offers may appeal to a certain client group or represent 'nice to haves', the future OCOG [organizing committee of the Olympic Games] inevitably finds itself facing additional costs to deliver services that have not been requested by the IOC. Throughout the 2020 bid process, the IOC has underlined the efforts it is making to manage the cost, size and complexity of organising the Olympic Games. The Candidate Cities were reminded that IOC requirements are actual requirements and should not be interpreted as minimum requirements. Cities were instructed that should proposals be made which go beyond requirements a clear case would have to be made demonstrating the rationale for this – operational reasons, legacy considerations, etc.[6]

This challenge highlights the need for local democratic deliberation over investment priorities, as early as possible in the bid stage. A consistent conclusion of scholarship on Olympic legacy is that legacy initiatives are most successful when they are planned from the earliest possible stages (Smith, 2012, chapter 10). This is illustrated, for instance, in the Vancouver 2010 bid committee's programming for 'legacies now', which delivered a series of investments and programs during the bid itself.[7] However, it becomes difficult to change planning priorities after event implementation timelines have been established and contracts have been finalized (Raco, 2014). Maintaining public conversations about a bid during the applicant/candidate phase is a way to spur democratic debate about the role of the bid (even if unsuccessful) in long term urban development strategies. Section 5 presents three recommendations for doing so: they pertain to local institutional capacity for planning bid legacy, monitoring bid legacy in cities that bid multiple times, and expanding the IOC's knowledge management programs to assist unsuccessful applicant/candidate cities.

[6] IOC Host City Evaluation Commission (19 April 2013), *Report of the IOC 2020 Evaluation Commission*, Lausanne: IOC, p 6

[7] Joseph Weiler & Arun Mohan (2009) *Catalyst, collaborator, connector: the social innovation model of 2010 Legacies Now – case study*, 2010 Legacies Now Society. <www.2010andbeyond.ca/media/pdf/Catalyst_ Collaborator_Connector_The_Social_Innovation_Model_of_2010_Legacies_Now.pdf>

3) Methodology

The core research question of the project was: To what extent does Olympic Games bidding influence ongoing sustainable development planning in bid cities, during and after the bid? To answer this, the research focused on the land use plans proposed in Olympic bidding documents, comparing them to (i) related bids for other Olympiads and non-Olympic megaevents, and to (ii) ongoing land use change in the bid cities. Note that this project is part of a doctoral dissertation research initiative which considers the broader impacts of bidding to host megaevents (not only Olympics) on urban governance strategies (not only land use planning).

Land investment proposals provide a discrete object of analysis: the origin of a site plan can be traced to determine whether it was part of ongoing urban planning projects or was specific to an Olympic bid. There are obviously many facets to bid legacy, but this focus allows comparative and longitudinal analysis: land use investment projects can be compared across cities and over time using public records and historical satellite imagery. The unit of analysis is an indicator of project completion: whether the project was completed as planned, completed using a comparable (but not identical) site plan, completed using a different site plan, or not completed. The outcomes of the project were verified using municipal records and historical satellite imagery of the project sites. Qualitative interpretation provides a wider range of indicators about the sustainability dimensions of the bid legacy: the types of technologies and design practices used on site, the ways in which the project was or was not integrated into urban strategic plans, or site-specific social and environmental impacts.

The primary data sources are candidature files submitted by the bid committees; applicant city files are included where relevant to broaden the dataset. These files were used because they present the most detailed record available of bidding plans, stakeholders, and funding, especially since most bid committees are temporary entities which dissolve after a bid. IOC documents on election procedure (e.g. candidate city questionnaires) and relevant technical topics (e.g. technical manuals on planning standards) were used to standardize this information across host city election periods. The total bid dataset includes 80 bids from 57 cities, to host Summer or Winter Olympic Games between 2000 and 2020 (48 Summer Games bids from 33 cities, and 32 Winter Games bids from 24 cities). The dates of the sample, covering host city elections since 1993, were chosen to predate the 1994 addition of environmental concerns to the IOC charter.[8] These various documents were collected from archives at the Olympic Studies Centre in Lausanne and the LA84 Olympic Legacy Foundation in Los Angeles. Other data were collected from municipal records, local media archives, map databases (satellite imagery from Google Earth and the Digital Globe Foundation, open source map data from OpenStreetMap), and by request from relevant institutions.

Data analysis entailed three components: First, *content analysis* of the candidature files was used to identify investment projects and interpret their fit with broader urban planning initiatives. Again, the emphasis was on land investment projects because they provide a unit of analysis which can be compared across cities and over time. Qualitative content analysis interpreted the types of technologies and design practices used on site, the ways in which the project was or was not integrated into urban strategic plans, and site-specific sustainability issues. Second, quantitative and qualitative analysis of *land use change* focused on evaluating whether

[8] International Olympic Committee & United Nations Environmental Programme (2012) *Sustainability through sport: implementing the Olympic Movement's Agenda 21*. Lausanne: IOC

investment projects were completed as planned, completed using a comparable site plan, completed using a different site plan, or not completed at all. Planning outcomes were verified using municipal records, other bidding documents (e.g. when a city placed multiple Olympic bids and constructed some projects in the interim) and historical satellite imagery of the project sites.

Third, these individual bids and bid legacies were contextualized through a *network mapping* of the megaevents planning industry. Network mapping is a technique for tracing out and interpreting institutional relationships across cities and over time (Haberly, 2011). In this case, it involved mapping how actors in individual bid cities interact with and learn from other Olympic cities, sport franchises, and private sector consultants. The goal was to interpret how and why policy models, planning templates, and best practices move between bid cities and are implemented locally. This mapping is based on the broader doctoral dissertation research of which this project is a part: the analysis benefited from ongoing research on other types of megaevents also pursued by Olympic bid cities (see Figure 3 in Section 4.2), in depth case studies of selected bid cities, and expert interviews with megaevents industry stakeholders and analysts (local planners, private and non-profit stakeholders in international sport, academics, and staff within event franchise agencies including the IOC and FIFA).

The analysis has several limitations, and the author welcomes feedback on ways to improve it. First and most broadly, Olympic bids are by definition speculative policy projects, and thus it is not always possible to identify outcomes of the bids (especially when working with failed bids). Likewise, there are often challenges in isolating what elements of land investment proposals are explicitly attributable to an Olympic bid: bid committees often claim ongoing infrastructure projects as part of their own plans (especially around transportation projects) and failed bids are often repurposed into other urban planning projects. Caution was exercised when this issue arose, and whenever a bid legacy project could not clearly be identified as such it was excluded from the final analysis. Second, there are ongoing challenges with the disconnect between bid proposal and actual legacy implementation (discussed in Section 2.3). The tendency for planners to systematically underestimate costs of future projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002) and to overestimate their capability to deliver legacy outcomes effectively (Flyvbjerg, 2008), are well known problems in urban planning (not only Olympic planning). In this sense, the core data are unreliable because they are provided by the planners themselves. The data are, however, unreliable in the same direction: the tendency is to underestimate costs and overestimate capabilities, so the bid documents present a 'most conservative' estimate of bid impacts. Since this project is concerned with identifying *if* bids have legacies, a most conservative estimate is acceptable. Third, because the IOC's host city election standards have evolved over time, there is some inconsistency in the data (e.g. sustainability planning standards evolved over the study period, thus terminology and planning objectives vary across the sample period as well). In general these inconsistencies were resolved by interpreting bid documents with reference to IOC policy and technical manuals.

4) Bid legacies: key findings

The Olympic candidature process is an important component of urban development planning even when the bid is unsuccessful, and city leaders are increasingly recognizing its value as a planning exercise. The analysis that follows considers three aspects of Olympic bidding legacy: First, bidding to host Olympic Games formalizes local development strategies: it generates a political catalyst for pursuing planning strategies, provides financing to develop the plans, and allows local planners to access transnational networks of planning expertise (Section 4.1). Second, bid plans are often implemented to some degree regardless of whether a city wins its bid: this is partly because bid committees claim ongoing public works projects – or projects associated with other megaevents – as part of their bid, regardless of their specificity to an Olympics. However, the importance of formalization afforded by a candidature should not be understated (Section 4.2). Third, the linkage of Olympic candidature and ongoing local development planning presents an opportunity for cities to synthesize local development visions with global expertise. However, the competitive nature of the candidature process also provides incentives to outbid other cities; these attempts at outbidding competitors may not necessarily lead to an efficient use of local resources (Section 4.3).

4.1) Bids as a means to formalize urban development strategies

Olympic bids provide a means for formalizing local development strategies: they generate a political catalyst for pursuing planning strategies, provide financing to develop the plans, and allow local planners to access transnational networks of planning expertise (especially the IOC's knowledge management programs). Writing an Olympic bid requires planners to design site plans and implementation strategies; this can provide a transition from abstract planning visions into a concrete, operable plan. First, bids provide a temporary platform for building political coalitions around a planning vision. In the 2020 host city elections, for example, bid committees were required to secure financial and legal guarantees in 53 separate categories.[9] The exercise of collecting several hundred letters in support of a bid requires bid committees to conduct years of extensive political coalition-building, and these coalition networks often remain in place even if the bid is unsuccessful. As temporary public-private corporations, bid committees are particularly effective at building bridges across sectors. Their ability to transition into other entities (e.g. into an organizing committee if the bid is successful) ensures institutional flexibility, but does present challenges to integrating bids into long-term urban governance.

As part of this coalition building, Olympic bids often form a base project from which planners can launch bids to host other major sport events. While Olympic Games top the international sports calendar, cities routinely pursue a variety of specialty multi-sport events (World Student Games, Youth Olympic Games), and regional multi-sport events hosted by Olympic continental associations (All Africa, Asian, European, and Pan American Games) or other organizations (e.g. Commonwealth Games). Olympic bids often provide the basis for these multi-event bidding strategies: most of these events base their bid protocols on those used by the IOC (e.g. even Commonwealth Games, which are not part of the Olympic Movement, use the same template for candidature files), and many bid committees draw on the same network of consultants and experts who advise Olympics bid committees (Section 4.3). Over the study period 109 cities placed a total of 170 bids to host one or more of these events. 17 of these cities

[9] IOC (May 2012), *2020 Candidature procedure and questionnaire: Games of the XXXII Olympiad*, Lausanne: IOC

were particularly active on the global bidding circuit, planning three or more bids on multiple types of events (Figure 3). An additional 27 cities bid at least twice (on the same event, or for different events).

This 'high frequency' bidding is more common in cities that have long-term institutions for coordinating a sports/urban development strategy. Individual Olympic bids are planned by temporary bid committees, which often dissolve after an unsuccessful bid or transition into an organizing committee if the bid is successful (the latter is also an important institution, but one that is focused on implementing an event, not bidding for other events). Cities with high bidding frequency, however, often have sports planning institutions that exist independently of any individual bid or event: a national Olympic committee (e.g. the Qatar Olympic Committee was involved in the Asian Games, two Olympic bids, and offered support for the 2022 Qatar World Cup bid; the Indian Olympic Committee managed the 2010 Commonwealth Games and was involved in bids for an Asian Games), a government agency (as documented by Andranovich et al. [2001] and Black & Peacock [2011]), or an independent public-private institution (e.g. the Istanbul Olympic Games Preparation and Organisation Council has operated with its own nationally-funded budget since 1993). The benefit of these organizations is that they are able to design a holistic sports development strategy for the city, rather than planning for only one event. The risk, however, is that these long term organizations can engage in speculative urban land investment, lobbying for sports venues and other infrastructure before a hosting contract is in place (Section 4.3).

The second way in which bids serve to formalize abstract planning visions is by financing site design: Bidding opens event-specific forms of finance through projected revenue, unique types of public-private partnerships (e.g. bid committees), or special public funding. For example, over the course of Tokyo's 2016 and 2020 bids, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government established a USD 4.5 billion 'Hosting Reserve Fund'.[10] In Istanbul – a city which has launched five Summer Olympic bids – a national 'Turkish Olympic Law' has used lotteries to fund the bids, secure most of the real estate sites proposed in the bids, and build the 'Olympic' stadium which had been planned in the bids. [11] Many of the large budget, high frequency bidders do their bidding within the context of a broader, ongoing development strategy. These projects are often driven as part of 'developmental' agendas by strong, well-financed national states that intervene directly in development investing (Black & Peacock, 2011; Klink, 2013; Müller, 2011; Scharfenort, 2012).

[10] Tokyo 2020 Olympic Bid Committee (2012), *Tokyo 2020 Olympic Candidature File*, v1 pp 66-67

[11] Republic of Turkey, Turkish Olympic Law, *Official Gazette # 20219*, 5 May 1992; translated and reprinted in Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee (1992) *Istanbul 2000 Olympic Candidature File* (v1, pp54-63)



Figure 3: High frequency megaevents bidders
Bidding coalitions that have placed more than three bids to host multiple types of major sporting events; in total 56 bids from 17 cities
Constructed from bid documents and event franchise holders' media materials (annual reports, newsletters, press releases)

This is the case for two particularly large-budget bidders, committees in Baku (Azerbaijan) and Doha (Qatar). Bid committees in both cities have placed bids to host the 2016 and 2020 Olympics, along with bids for a number of over megaevents (e.g. Qatar will host the 2022 World Cup, and Azerbaijan will host the 2015 European Games). The Doha bidding committees proposed USD11.71 billion in the 2016 bid and USD58.76 billion in the 2020 bid. Of that, 90.9 and 85.5 percent (respectively) was already budgeted through the national government's transportation expansion programs. Both bids were part of five national strategic plans that consider megaevents to be part of a broader government investment portfolio for diversifying the Qatari economy away from hydro-carbon industries.[12] Bids on behalf of Baku were similarly planned and financed via a national development agenda, in this case Azerbaijan's *Presidential Vision 2020*. The Baku Olympic bids budgeted USD 5.34 billion for 2016 and 15.73 billion for 2020 (80.5 and 78.3 percent budgeted through transportation programs, respectively), and the CEO of the 2020 bid committee announced openly that "what is most important to us is that we ensure our 2020 Games plan is integrated into Baku's long-term objectives - not that we change our city to adjust to the 2020 Games."[13] The IOC, however, was less convinced by this approach. A panel of IOC experts declined to advance Baku and Doha from applicants to candidates in the 2016 and 2020 host city elections, citing feasibility concerns.[14] Recalling the 2020 *Evaluation Commission Report*, there is likewise an increasing concern that the practice of attaching unrelated megaprojects to an Olympic bid can endanger the IOC's credibility, especially when such projects go over budget or fall behind schedule (Section 2.3).[15]

Finally, Olympic bidding provides a means to formalize planning visions by allowing local planning stakeholders to access international networks of urban development expertise. Megaevent organizers often host representatives of aspiring bid committees for the purpose of city-to-city knowledge transfer or 'policy tourism' (Cook & Ward, 2011; González, 2011). Within Olympics planning, this type of knowledge transfer between bid cities is accomplished with IOC knowledge management resources like the Olympic Observer Programme, applicant/candidate city seminars, and the Olympic Games Knowledge Management extranet network. The IOC started developing knowledge sharing procedures in the early 1990s, with a questionnaire for bid committees used in the preparations for the 1996 Summer Games.[16] This was later formalized through *Olympic Knowledge Services* – a joint partnership between the IOC, the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee, and Monash University. This venture went through several mergers and splits, and eventually was used to develop the IOC's *Olympic Games Knowledge Management System*, a database of technical documents, studies, and planning materials available for reference by bid and organizing committees.[17] More broadly, these IOC initiatives have helped launch a small industry of

[12] The *Qatar National Vision 2030*, *Qatar National Master Plan 2032*, *Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016*, the national *Transport Master Plan*, and the *Qatar Sport Venue Master Plan*; Doha 2020 Olympic Applicant File (2011, p 88), see also Lauermann, John (2012, July 20) "Doha's failed Olympic Bid" *Jadaliyya* <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6081/dohas-failed-olympic-bid>

[13] Baku 2020 CEO Konul Nurullayeva (11 May 2012), interview with Marc Sibbons published in *iSportConnect*, www.isportconnect.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11754&Itemid=330

[14] IOC Host City Evaluation Commission (5 April 2012), *Games of the XXXII Olympiad 2020 Working Group Report*, Lausanne: IOC

[15] *Report of the IOC 2020 Evaluation Commission,* ibid note 6; and interview with IOC planning director, 20 August 2013

[16] Letter from Gunnar Ericsson introducing the questionnaire to IOC voting members (1 June 1990), printed in the *Report of the Study and Evaluation Commission for the Preparation of the Games of the XXVIth Olympiad*. Lausanne: IOC.

[17] Huet, John (22 July 2012) "The knowledge Games." *Olympic News* <http://www.olympic.org/news/the-knowledge-games/168760>

international megaevent planning consultants (Section 4.3). These private-sector consultants play an important role in internationalizing Olympic urban planning policies and models, since many bid committees rely on them for technical expertise while preparing Games master plans (The Atlanta-based Helios Partners, for instance, was founded by former IOC marketing staff and has consulted for the Beijing 2008, Vancouver 2010, Sochi 2014, and PyeongChang 2018 bid committees, as well as for numerous other non-Olympic event bids).[18]

4.2) Land use investment during and after the bid

Formalizing urban planning visions through Olympic bids provides a catalyst for land use change. Bid plans are often implemented to some degree regardless of whether a city wins its bid. This occurs partly because bid committees claim ongoing land investment projects as part of their bid, regardless of their specificity to an Olympics. It also occurs as cities bid on multiple events over time, incrementally building sports infrastructure along the way. While Olympic bids by necessity reflect pre-existing urban visions, the bidding process provides a catalyst for action by formalizing those visions (as discussed in Section 4.1), clearing the way for action on them. Megaevent bids help facilitate ongoing development strategies, as bids draw upon urban investment plans already in place as part of broader development strategies, and local stakeholders leverage the bids as a way to gather political support for these broader strategies.

Between 1993 and 2013, 17 cities were particularly active in global bidding competitions, placing 56 bids for various major sporting events (Figure 3 in Section 4.2). However, these high frequency bidders do not develop new plans for each bid. Rather, committees that bid frequently for multiple sporting events tend to either (a) develop a city master plan in tandem with event planning, building on past event plans to formulate new ones, or (b) base the various bids on a pre-existing infrastructure plan. Istanbul represents the first strategy: developing a city master plan gradually around various event bids. Stakeholders in the city have bid five times to host the Summer Olympics since 1992, though plans for Olympics and international exhibitions were part of the city master plan as early as 1937 (Erten, 2010; Bilsel & Zelef, 2011). Doha (Qatar) represents the second strategy: city planning takes place around Qatar's *National Vision 2030* master plan (Scharfenort, 2012), which seeks to establish economic alternatives to circumvent dependence on petroleum extraction. A short list of successful bids includes bids for the 2001 World Trade Organization Summit, 2006 Asian Games, 2011 Pan-Arab Games, 2012 United Nations Conference on Climate Change, and the 2022 FIFA World Cup (also unsuccessful bids for the 2016 and 2020 Summer Olympics). These various bids were all planned around the National Vision strategy, and rely on the same infrastructure investment plans: for instance, 20 of the 23 venues (and all of the transportation infrastructure investment) cited in the 2020 Olympic applicant file were slated for construction regardless of a successful Olympics bid outcome.[19]

These are not the only ways in which bids are used in tandem with urban development strategies, nor are they mutually exclusive. They do highlight, however, an important policy implication: city-level stakeholders exercise increasing autonomy in making decisions about Olympics-related investment projects. One of the policy changes implemented in the IOC's 2002 reforms to the host city elections process (Section 2.1) was a shift of risk regarding

[18] Helios Partners corporate materials (www.heliospartners.com); Terrance Burns, CEO of *Helios Partners* (16 February 2012), interview with Marc Sibbons published in *iSportConnect* trade journal <http://www.isportconnect.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10544&Itemid=327>

[19] Lauermann, "Doha's failed Olympic bid", op cit. note 12

capital investments (defined as real estate and construction costs for physical infrastructure). Prior to the reforms (bids for Games up until the Winter 2006 Olympiad), organizing committees could share some of the responsibilities for investments in the built environment. While local governments and/or private businesses were responsible for many of the largest infrastructure projects, and would provide financial guarantees for the Games in case of cost overruns, it was not uncommon for bid/organizing committees to budget a portion of Games revenue to permanent infrastructure costs. Following the reforms, bid committees were prohibited from including capital investment spending in their budgets: all permanent infrastructure and venue investment costs are now budgeted as 'non-OCOG' expenditures in bid budgets (non-Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games, meaning government or private sources rather than the organizing committee or the IOC).[20] In effect, this allocates any risk associated with capital investment – for instance, the risk of cost overrun, or failure to find a post-event usage – onto local stakeholders. Local stakeholders increasingly recognize this burden of risk, and in response they tailor their Olympics bids more explicitly to local needs.[21] A review of investment budgets in the bid proposals highlights two impacts of this shift of responsibility to local stakeholders, both of which indicate that bids are increasingly integrated with local development goals:

First, the "growing tendency by cities to try to go above and beyond IOC requirements" in their bid proposals – or what critics have termed the 'financial gigantism' of the Games (Preuss, 2004, p. 28) – occurs as early as the bid phase, not only in host cities.[22] Much of this gigantism is caused by bid committees including marginally-related investment projects in their bid budgets, indicating a tendency for Olympics planners to base their bids on ongoing local development agendas. Analysis of candidature files during the study period (Table 1) indicates that there is a significant increase in the total scale of proposed capital investment over the 20 year period, defined as construction and real estate costs for permanent or temporary infrastructure (primarily by non-Organizing Committee sources). The total capital investment budgets for bids in the second half of the study period are significantly larger than those in the first half, at a 95% level of confidence.[23] However, there is a tendency for bid committees to claim ongoing, marginally-related transportation mega-projects in the bid. This produces large-budget outliers (in the 2008 competition this was caused by bid committees from Beijing and Osaka, in 2020 this was caused by the Baku and Doha bid committees). Removing transportation projects from the bid budgets controls much of this variability, leaving the tendency towards financial gigantism less pronounced. Again, however, the same statistical evidence of financial gigantism remains: capital investment budgets in the second half of the study period are significantly larger than those in the first half, at a 95% level of confidence.[24]

[20] IOC (24 February 2000) *Questionnaire for cities applying to become candidate cities to host the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008*, p 9

[21] Interview with CEO of a London-based real estate consultancy, 14 November 2013

[22] *Report of the IOC 2020 Evaluation Commission,* ibid note 9

[23] One-tailed t-test for two samples defined as bids from 1993-2003 for Olympiads 2000-2010 (n=42) and 2005-2013 for Olympiads 2012-2020 (n=29); degrees of freedom = 46; p-value = 0.95

[24] One-tailed t-test for two samples defined as bids from 1993-2003 for Olympiads 2000-2010 (n=42) and 2005-2013 for Olympiads 2012-2020 (n=29); degrees of freedom = 44; p-value = 0.95

Table 1: Summary of capital investment budget proposals, for Host City Elections 2000-2020
Constructed from financial statements obtained from bid committees and IOC archives
Sample includes 73 out of 80 applicant and/or candidate bids
All financial values inflation adjusted to 2012 USD, in millions

Olympiad (host city election year)	**# bids in sample**	**Mean capital budget**	**Mean capital budget (non-transportation)**
Summer Games			
2000 (1993)	7	4120.86	1449.47
2004 (1997)	11	6509.75	2674.07
2008 (2001)	5	15702.33	3158.76
2012 (2005)	8	8412.67	3224.83
2016 (2009)	7	8003.83	2667.69
2020 (2013)	5	19510.20	4604.24
Subtotal	*43*	*9298.7*	*2856.94*
Winter Games			
2002 (1995)	9	949.51	676.13
2006 (1999)	6	2094.41	823.55
2010 (2003)	5	3036.89	915.16
2014 (2007)	7	6041.17	1327.53
2018 (2011)	3	3682.74	1677.02
Subtotal	*30*	*2987.76*	*943.66*
All bids	***73***	***6705.16***	***2070.66***

The degree to which bid committees include ongoing land investments on their bid budgets varies based on existing local infrastructure; and there is some inconsistency in bid budgets due to evolving accounting standards. For example, before the IOC reforms of the host city election process (Section 2), bid committees did not consistently document the distinction between Games-specific and other ongoing investment projects, and occasionally accounted only for venue investments and nothing else. In depth case studies are required to parse the degree to which this increase is caused by the pressures of the host city competition (wherein committees claim more investment dollars on their bid budgets to keep up with competing bidders) or reflects an increasing integration of Olympic bids into ongoing urban investment strategies (wherein committees are better able to work with planners to synthesize long-term sports and urban development strategies).

Second, a subset of land investments proposed in Olympic bids are implemented even when the bids are unsuccessful, indicating that bids provide an avenue for speculative investment by local planners. Concern for brevity precludes the type of in-depth case studies needed to analyze the role of speculative investment through Olympic bidding, but Table 2 details the land use impacts of Olympic bidding in the four highest frequency bidders, committees that have placed three or more bids to host Olympic Games (in addition to a number of bids for other major sporting events, see Figure 3 in Section 4.1). Analysis of sport venue investment proposals provides a more direct view of speculative investment pursued during a bid: the completion of proposed sports venues is verifiable through municipal records and local media archives, historical satellite imagery, and a comparison of candidature files (e.g. if a venue is completed over the course of bidding, it will be identified

as ‘proposed’ in an early bid and ‘existing’ in a later bid). Sports venues are also arguably the most speculative type of land use investment that Olympic bidders can pursue: while other types of infrastructure investments serve multiple functions, it is more difficult to find legacy reuses for sporting facilities designed to Olympic technical standards. Two of these cities (PyeongChang and Rio de Janeiro) have eventually gone on to secure Olympic hosting contracts and will implement the full extent of their plans, and all four have simultaneously bid on and/or hosted other major sporting events. However, what this analysis reveals is that high frequency bidders often engage in large scale speculative investment over time, as a small percentage of proposed venues are constructed in between each Olympic bid. This highlights again an important policy insight: that all bid committees should have an ‘unsuccessful bid’ legacy plan in place, and high frequency bidders should be especially careful to integrate incremental investment into ongoing local development strategies.

Table 2: Investment in venues, by frequent bidders without an Olympic hosting contract
Constructed from bid documents, local news archives, and municipal records; verified with historical satellite imagery. All financial values adjusted to 2012 USD, in millions; ‘capital investment’ figures include all infrastructure projects except transportation projects
N = 337 sports venue investment proposals

Bid committees from:	**Placed bids to host Olympics in:**	**Average venue investment proposed in bids**	**Venue investments completed over the city’s range of bids**
Istanbul	2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2020	1374.02	222.75 An additional 1003.03 million has been approved and funded through the Housing Development Administration of Turkey’s 2012 *National Sports Plan*, to be constructed from 2013 to 2019.
Madrid	2012, 2016, 2020	1195.93	784.52 The *Madrid 2020 Bid Committee*’s marketing program emphasized that 80% of proposed venues were already constructed, but many of these were constructed in speculative fashion during previous Olympic bids.
PyeongChang	2010, 2014, 2018	542.95	271.67 At the time of the bid for the 2018 Games (which was eventually successful), 962.12 million had already approved and construction was already underway for athletes villages and media centers. Winning the 2018 hosting contract secured additional approval for a total of 550.31 million in new venues and permanent renovations to existing venues.
Rio de Janeiro	2004, 2012, 2016	892.03	245.02 Maracanã Stadium received 171.44 million in upgrades for the 2007 Pan American Games. It, along with four other Olympic stadiums, received a 27.42 million upgrade for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and will receive another 20.48 million upgrade for the 2016 Summer Olympics.

4.3) City-to-city knowledge transfer

Linking Olympic bids to local development planning presents an opportunity for cities to pursue local planning goals using global expertise. Indeed, the use of a bid to formalize planning visions can be a significant catalyst for urban land investment (Section 4.1.), even when the bid is unsuccessful (Section 4.2). Likewise, Olympic bidding provides a means of accessing international expertise, and the IOC has played a major role in sharing knowledge across bid cities. However, it is also a process of negotiation between local urban development goals, technical standards required for delivering a Games, and business goals of private sector stakeholders. The competitive nature of the candidature process provides incentives for local planners to outbid other cities, and these attempts at outbidding competitors may not necessarily lead to an efficient use of local resources.

The parallel histories of the host city election process and the IOC's marketing programs illustrate this tension. Facing a financial crisis in the early and mid-1980s (Horne & Whannel, 2012, chapter 3) the IOC hired a Swiss-based sports firm, *ISL Marketing*, to build the Olympic brand; this eventually resulted what is now known as *The Olympic Partner* (TOP) programme. This project of brand building in the early 1990s was closely bound up in changing the ways in which bid and organizing committees plan for the Games.

The reform of Olympic marketing provided an impetus for professionalizing the bidding process. This was necessary in part because the increase in revenue brought about by TOP allowed the Games to grow into a more technically complex urban planning project. The IOC's first director of marketing has also argued that, for him, the bidding process was a way to negotiate both marketing and technical planning issues with local governments:

> Now cities bidding for the Olympic Games are put through an extremely tough series of challenges to plug all loop holes long before they are elected. Time and experience has taught the IOC to take full advantage of the competitive dynamics of the bidding process and to apply maximum leverage to all stakeholders to get their houses in order. Once a city is elected, all leverage from the IOC and the local organisers evaporates. (Payne, 2006, p. 154)

Regardless of the motivation, the outcome was a professionalization of the bidding process: standardizing and increasing transparency in design standards, accounting practices, and land use regulation. This professionalization was accomplished in two ways: First, the IOC developed its own knowledge management programs, especially the *Olympic Games Knowledge Management* program (Section 2.1). These programs have had a major impact on planning practices in a wide range of both Olympic and non-Olympic cities, as evidenced by the replication of this type of program by other types of megaevents organizers (Cook & Ward, 2011; González, 2011).

Second, the IOC's institutional ventures – which drew on both marketing and knowledge management initiatives – launched a small industry of international consulting firms which specialize in megaevent bidding and planning (Figure 4). This network does not represent the full diversity of consulting in support of Olympic planning – numerous local and international firms provide specific technical expertise on various aspects of event design and management. It does, however, represent the major international 'bid consulting' firms which have advised many bid committees since the early 2000s. These are defined as consultancies which specialize in advising bid committees and local governments on how to articulate their planning concepts and business models at the bid stage (with services ranging from brokering corporate sponsorships for the bid committee to writing the entirety of the bid documents). These firms have gone on to advise not only Olympic bid committees but a much broader group of megaevent bids (e.g. bids to host Commonwealth or Pan American Games).



Figure 4: Network mapping of the Olympic bid consulting industry
Constructed from corporate records, bid candidature files, and IOC archives (*Olympic Review,* IOC media releases*, IOC TOP Bulletin, and IOC OGKM Bulletin*)

Building on its partnership with ISL Marketing, in 1996 the IOC helped form *Meridian Management*, *SA*. This firm was charged with running all aspects of The Olympic Partners (and the IOC maintained a 50% voting share in the venture).[25] By the time it dissolved in 2004, Meridian had played a significant role in expanding the program. It also launched the careers of several CEOs in the bid consulting industry. In a parallel move, in 2001 the IOC began formalizing its knowledge management programs with another private venture: *Olympic Knowledge Services*. This was initially a research partnership with Monash University and the Sydney 2000 organizing committee, but was absorbed by the IOC after the 2000 Summer Games. Parts of the firm were also spun off (in 2005) as a private Swiss consulting firm, *Event Knowledge Services* (Figure 5).[26] Sydney 2000 was the first organizing committee required to produce mechanisms for knowledge transfer, and developed a series of videos, manuals, and workshops to disseminate best practices learned during the Games. Today the *Olympic Games Knowledge Management Programme* performs the same function: this proprietary online clearinghouse contains technical documents and manuals, and a real-time checklist for the IOC and organizing committees to communicate over Games preparation benchmarks.

[25] IOC (2000) *Final Report on the XXVIIth Olympiad: 1997-2000 (Financial Statements)* <http://www.olympic.org/ioc-interim-and-final-reports/documents-reports-studies-publications>
[26] IOC press release (12 August 2004). "Olympic Games knowledge services becomes IOC fully owned company." <http://www.olympic.org/content/news/media-resources/manual-news/1999-2009/2004/08/12/olympic-games-knowledge-services-becomes-ioc--fully-owned-company/>



Figure 5: An institutional timeline of Olympic knowledge management programs
Assembled from *Olympic Review*, IOC media releases, and IOC special publications (*TOP Bulletin* and *OGKM Bulletin*)

Access to this type of knowledge was crucial for ensuring urban legacies after unsuccessful bids because it connected bidders to industry experts and required the bids to be much more explicit in their technical plans (making it easier to reuse a project after a failed bid). Likewise, the professionalization of Olympic bidding has transformed the ways in which megaevents are planned beyond the Olympics, both for major events affiliated with the Olympic Movement (like the Pan American Games, which uses a candidature file template that closely follows the Olympic candidature files) and in organizations like the Commonwealth Games Federation and the International Federation of Association Football.[27] Host city elections are also, however, a process of negotiation between local development goals and the business goals of private sector stakeholders. This negotiation is one that should be approached carefully, in ways that democratically balance the role of business strategy in urban planning, especially planning which involves public resources or public spaces.

More broadly, it is important to recognize that contemporary challenges the Olympic Movement faces with regards to host city elections – the "growing tendency by cities to try to go above and beyond IOC requirements" noted by the 2020 Host City Evaluation Commission, or recent voter rejections of bids in cities like Munich – is bound up the requirement for bids to plan usable urban spaces (often with public-sector funding) and design an event that is profitable for contractors and sponsors. Debates over legacy are particularly contentious around this negotiation, since private-sector stakeholders focus on relatively short term affairs but land use change has decades-long implications. When negotiated democratically, a balance between urban planning and business strategy is certainly possible; however, it becomes much more difficult for the public to deliberate planning priorities after public-private partnerships are formalized (Boykoff, 2014) and event delivery timelines are finalized (Raco, 2014). The policy implication is that this local political conversation should take place as early as possible in the bid process, since Olympic legacy is possible even after unsuccessful bids (Section 4.1 and 4.2) and should be planned for accordingly. The conclusion to this report (Section 5) makes several recommendations for encouraging such a conversation.

[27] Interviews with International Federation of Association Football staff, 22 March 2013 and 10 June 2013

5) Conclusions and recommendations

This study has explored urban development legacies of unsuccessful Olympic bids, and has assessed policy options for pursuing them sustainably. It demonstrates that the Olympic bid process is an important component of local development planning even when the bid fails, for three reasons: First, bidding to host Olympic Games provides a means for formalizing local development strategies. Olympic bids generate a political catalyst for pursuing broader planning agendas, and act as a base project from which planners can launch bids to host other major sporting events. Bidding opens event-specific forms of finance through projected revenue, unique types of public-private partnerships, and special public funding (Section 4.1). Second, bid plans are often implemented to some degree regardless of whether a city wins its bid: While Olympic bids by necessity reflect pre-existing urban planning goals, the bidding process provides an opportunity for formalizing those goals, clearing the way for action on them. This occurs partly because bid committees include marginally-related projects – which have non-Olympic planning and funding arrangements already in place – in their bids. It also occurs as cities bid on multiple events over time, incrementally building sports infrastructure along the way. Bids draw upon urban investment plans already in place as part of broader development strategies, but local planners can also leverage the bids as a way to gather political support for these broader strategies (Section 4.2).Third, linking Olympic bids to local development visions allows planners to apply global networks of expertise to those planning goals. Olympic bidding allows local planning stakeholders to access international networks of urban development expertise, and the IOC has played a major role in sharing knowledge across bid cities (especially through its knowledge management programs). However, bidding is also a process of negotiation between local development goals, technical standards required for delivering a Games, and business goals of private sector stakeholders. The competitive nature of the candidature process provides incentives for local planners to outbid other cities, and these attempts at outbidding competitors can lead to inefficient use of local resources (Section 4.3).

This study catalogues the land use legacies of bidding, and identifies some prominent policy processes that facilitate or hinder sustainable development legacies after the bid. The project contributes to the Olympic Movement by examining the relatively under-researched implications of unsuccessful Olympic bids (Section 2.3). The Olympic urban planning footprint is much wider than that in host cities (including 57 separate cities bidding to host Summer or Winter Games between 2000 and 2020). Likewise, knowledge about Olympic planning is used to plan other types of major sport events. The bid process presents opportunities for the Olympic Movement: Because it extends to so many cities, the opportunity for building Olympic legacy in unsuccessful bid cities is much broader than pursuing legacy in host cities alone. Furthermore, increasing democratic dialogue during the bid process represents a major opportunity for incorporating more cities into the Olympic Movement. Maintaining public conversation about a bid during the applicant/candidate phase is a way to spur broader conversations about the role of the bid (even if unsuccessful) in long term urban development strategy.

In addition to general best practices on legacy planning – especially the imperative to integrate a Games plan with the city's long term planning objectives, and to plan for legacy from the very beginning of the bid process (Smith, 2012, chapter 10) – the study findings lead to the following recommendations:

(1) **Encourage cities to form a long term 'bid coordination' organization.** Many cities field multiple bids – not just for the Olympic Games, but also for a variety of other sporting events. There is a risk, however, that temporary bid organizations will either dissolve after an unsuccessful bid or transition into an organizing committee after a successful bid. (An organizing committee is also an important and necessary institution, but one that has a fundamentally different function than a bid committee and which is less able to coordinate other bids.) High frequency bidding (on three or more bids for multiple types of major events) is often coordinated by institutions which exist outside the context of individual bid committees. These event-independent institutions are diverse, ranging from departments in local or national government to public-private partnerships. However, the general model – of an organization that prepares bids, coordinates with local planning strategy, but is institutionally independent of any one event – would offer a clear institutional pathway for coupling individual bids to a long term urban development strategy. If constructed to represent a diverse group of stakeholders, such organizations could become platforms for coordinating public conversations about what an Olympic bid (as well as other event bids) should entail for the city even if it is unsuccessful.

(2) **Monitor ongoing urban impacts of bids, especially among high frequency bidders.** Cities that bid on the Games multiple times – especially high frequency bid cities – often implement parts of their bid plans before securing an Olympics hosting contract (Section 4.2). Much of this investment was already planned as part of non-Olympic initiatives, but the bids themselves provide a catalyst for new urban land investments (investing in a sports facility, for example, on the assumption that the city will eventually be an Olympic host). This presents a significant opportunity for planning and pursuing Olympic legacy during and in between bids, and for maintaining a long term local conversation on bid legacy goals. It also presents challenges to Olympic legacy, in that bid legacy investments must be planned for two contingencies: that a bid is unsuccessful and that a future bid may be successful. When a city bids for the Games multiple times the IOC should request documentation on legacies of the city's previous bid(s). The abovementioned bid coordination agencies could play a leading role in implementing and documenting bid legacies, and this monitoring would help ensure accountability and transparency within those agencies.

(3) Add a follow-up seminar, after the host city elections, for all of the applicant and candidate cities. The IOC already runs post-election debriefings for the future host city, managed through the IOC Coordination Commissions. The proposed seminar would be an additional, separate event. It would ideally play two roles: helping the future host city learn from the best practices of its former competitors, and advising unsuccessful bidders on ways to implement their bid legacies. The latter should emphasize making strategic long term decisions about whether or not to bid in a future elections round, and on selecting proposed projects from within the bid that would still benefit the city. Such a seminar could be integrated into the existing Olympic Games Knowledge Management framework, as a workshop similar to the bid cities orientation seminar (held at the beginning of a host city elections round).

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