




## CHAPTER 9

# German-American Identity and the Demise of National History

*Thomas Kühne*



When I was close to graduating as a double major in history and literature from the University of Tübingen in the mid-1980s, I attended a seminar on autobiographies. My final paper was about the historian Friedrich Meinecke. Nowadays known mainly for his 1946 book, *Die deutsche Katastrophe* (*The German Catastrophe*), he was one of the most influential national-liberal German historians of his time and embodied the grandeur of the Second Empire. The 1946 book famously explained away the “German catastrophe” as a mere “aberration” from the true path of German history and its authoritarian, militarist, and imperialist traditions.<sup>1</sup> This book was not the focus of my inquiries, however.

Sidelined by the Nazis in 1935, Meinecke published the first part of his autobiography in 1941, which sophisticatedly embedded personal experiences into the glory of the German nation-building process. On one of the first pages, the reader learns that Meinecke’s Protestant ancestors and their deep “commitment to the Prussian state” had already laid a fertile ground for his career as a nationalist historian before he was born. Shortly after, it was his “first own, entirely authentic historical remembrance” that determined his vocation irrevocably. The event that originated this remembrance—“the roots of my historical work”—was a pompous visit by the Prussian king William I and his prime minister Otto von Bismarck (who shortly after engineered the foundation of the German nation-state) to Meinecke’s hometown, Salzwedel, in 1865. He witnessed this at the age of three.<sup>2</sup>

Meinecke’s life impressed and disturbed me. Such a powerful career, I thought, and yet quickly almost entirely forgotten after it ended.<sup>3</sup> I was intimidated by his straightforward professional trajectory, aware of my own life being quite the opposite and anticipating that I might never be able to equip it with such consistency. But then, doubts of a different type provided a silver lining of sorts, amid all that confusion. What if Meinecke had simply invented all that consistency? The 1865 visit of Bismarck and William I was a historical fact, no doubt. But did Meinecke really attend it, and even if

so, what did he see and feel at the age of three? No evidence was given in the autobiography, nor for many other details. Eventually, I found some comfort in writing a paper on fictitiousness, fiction, and factuality in Meinecke's autobiography.

Years later, I read Pierre Bourdieu's illuminating critique of the "biographical illusion."<sup>4</sup> When we tell the life stories of others or write an autobiography, Bourdieu says, we assume that the life under consideration "constitutes a whole, a coherent and oriented ensemble, to be understood as a unitary result of a subjective and objective 'intention.'" We select events, experiences, decisions, successes, and failures and arrange them in meaningful ways. When we narrate our biography, we do so as "ideologues of our own life." And yet, as even Bourdieu evinces in his acid critique, autobiographical thinking cannot altogether renounce the search for some consistency, some ideas of causes, consequences, or telos, if it does not want to end up with "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing," as Macbeth mourned at the advent of modernity, the era that mandated individuals to ponder the unique, mundane meaning of their own lives.<sup>5</sup>

Autobiographical thinking cannot make do without establishing meaning. Mine cannot either, despite or because of the fictional ingredients of any such writing. The reader needs to be aware of these ingredients. In what follows, I will try to navigate through the jungle of events and experiences that shaped my life as a historian, before and after my transfer to America.<sup>6</sup> Unlike other German historians who attended American institutions early in their career as undergraduate or graduate students, I did so late, after defending my *Habilitation*, the second academic thesis required in the German university system as a precondition for any full professorship, in 2003. Retrospectively, I have mixed feelings—not so much about the transfer but about having missed the formative American experience. These regrets shape the autobiographical thinking in this essay. I will address my academic upbringing and training before the big move; then, what eventually made me leave Germany; how I perceive my "Americanization" and the kind of Germanness that I have kept; and the ways in which the transfer to America has influenced my work as a historian and my take on German history, the field in which I trained. At last, some consistency may emerge, although fragile, that is unavoidably defined by German-American hybridity.

### Growing Up Pacifist

At the time I wrote the paper on Meinecke, I had decided to pursue a PhD in history, but the road to that decision was twisted. When I graduated in 1977 from *Gymnasium*, the German upper-level middle and high school, I was not much interested in history at all. The history teacher I faced as a sixth or seventh grader was an old guy, who devoted some time to the Third Reich (during which he must have been trained) but exclusively on the heroic deeds of the German men around Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg, whose attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944 failed. After

that, the Third Reich, let alone the Holocaust, was never discussed again in school. Instead, our history classes focused on ancient and medieval history, and then on Imperial Germany, taught by a leftist teacher who introduced us to Bismarck and Wilhelmine imperialism. He did so without much enthusiasm about the discipline of history and its purpose. Instead, I was under the spell of a brilliant and charismatic literature teacher and devoured everything from Goethe to Kleist to Fontane to Kafka and Brecht, the Mann brothers, Canetti, Celan, Frisch, Johnson, and the like.

Never doubting that, after graduating from *Gymnasium*, I would enroll in the University of Tübingen, close to my Swabian hometown Nagold, I was less sure about what to study. Psychology fascinated me vaguely, but after being advised that studying it in Tübingen was mainly about statistics and that psychology was a breadless endeavor anyway, I settled on German literature, a safe track for me, at least in intellectual terms. The usual way to study humanities back then was to enroll in the track for the first state examination for school teachers (*Erstes Staatsexamen*), a prerequisite to later become a state official (*Beamter*). It was not a very promising career at that time either, yet it offered the prospect of making a living at some point. The truth is that this concern—how to make a living at some point—was not one that troubled me at that time and not for a while. But the *Staatsexamen* track required two fields, and I chose German literature and philosophy. This choice was inspired by another gifted *Gymnasium* teacher, who required us to read the major German philosophers from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who started his career in Tübingen, to Ernst Bloch, who ended his career there.

While I had no illusions about meeting Hegel in Tübingen, I was drawn to the idea of studying within the orbit of Bloch, whose books *Der Geist der Utopie* (*The Spirit of Utopia*) and *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (*The Principle of Hope*) had left a deep impression on me in high school.<sup>7</sup> But this too turned out to be an illusion. Bloch, whom I remember from the early 1970s in an overcrowded seminar room on the Tübingen campus (much like Meinecke seeing Bismarck and William I), was already long retired, of course, and he died at the age of ninety-two, a few months after I graduated from *Gymnasium*. For this reason, among others, my arrival at Tübingen University was less than breathtaking. While I knew that some sort of intellectual line of work was the only way for me to forge a satisfying life, I lacked the motivation to engage in my studies wholeheartedly. I also missed my close high school friends, who had decided to take a gap year and were traveling the world.

My gap year materialized in a different way. My parents, both born in 1925, had grown up in Nazi Germany in different milieus, my father in a social democratic family in Braunschweig, my mother in a conservative Catholic family in the village of Krojanke (now Polish Krajenka) in what was, after the Versailles Treaty, the Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen (Posen-West Prussia border mark). While my mother joined the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel, BDM) voluntarily as early as possible at the age of ten, my father managed to avoid the Hitler Youth altogether, although it was near-compulsory for boys of his age. At eighteen, he was nonetheless drafted into the National Labor Service (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*), and then into the Wehrmacht, much to his

disgust, to serve as a foot soldier on the Eastern Front from spring 1944 on, eventually ending up in Soviet captivity after the surrender of his division in the Courland Pocket to the Red Army in May 1945. At that time, my mother and her family had already fled the invading Red Army and arrived in the Braunschweig region, where my parents met after my dad was released in July 1946, sick with tuberculosis, from Soviet captivity. Except for anecdotes or “screen memories,”<sup>8</sup> neither of my parents were willing to talk about what happened to them or what they did during the Third Reich, the war, their flight, or captivity.<sup>9</sup> What was left to both was the remembrance of the horror of war. My father fended off requests for details about his war experience by simply declaring that it was the worst part of his life. I never knew him other than as full of the utmost loathing for any type of uniform, not only those of the new West German army, the Bundeswehr, but also those of policemen and even firefighters. To him, a uniform, and certainly the military one, embodied the institutionalized betrayal of humankind. My mother, though less bothered by uniforms, was sufficiently traumatized by the flight from and the fear of the Red Army to be put in a state of aghast paralysis when Soviet tanks crushed the Prague Spring in 1968. (We lived in West Germany.)

When I reached the age of eighteen in 1976, I was mustered for military service. Years before, I had decided to claim Article 4.3 of West Germany’s Basic Law that allowed for conscientious objection. Given my upbringing, this was an almost natural decision, endorsed also by years of engagement in the pacifist movement. Being acknowledged as a conscientious objector entailed sixteen months of alternate service or *Ersatzdienst* (later called *Zivildienst*, or civil service). I fulfilled this obligation at a nursing home for the elderly from fall 1978 to spring 1980. I embraced that time—a break from what I wanted to do in mid- and long-term perspectives, yet exactly what I needed to ~~recharge~~ intellectual batteries.

### Happy Years in ~~in~~ Tübingen, Distance to America

I returned to Tübingen in spring 1980, committed more than ever to study literature. I replaced philosophy with history as my second field. The university was blessed with a large literature department, including many big shots and excellent instructors. And yet, I gradually discovered that I was more interested in facts than in fiction and redefined my priorities. Tübingen’s history department was in a process of decline at that time. It still had a few professors, who excelled less in their publication record than by inspired teaching and mentoring. Bernhard Mann, who taught nineteenth-century Germany with a focus on Imperial Germany, ran an illustrious graduate colloquium that gathered an ideologically diverse group of students. One of them became the chief editor of the liberal newsmagazine *Der Spiegel*; another, an ardent worshipper of Ernst Jünger, became a journalist with the conservative weekly *Welt am Sonntag*; while a few others pursued academic careers or became schoolteachers or archivists. Likeminded friends and I discussed transferring to a university with a stronger history

department—Bielefeld was the place to go at that time—but discarded the idea, each of us for different reasons. In my case, private ones dominated. A series of mishaps and calamities had shaped my life from the 1970s on. Friends died in car wrecks, motorcycle accidents, and even a shootout. My mother, having battled cancer for many years, eventually succumbed to it in 1984, after being treated in clinics at the University of Tübingen. In the midst of more turmoil than I felt able to handle, I craved one thing more than anything else—stable ground under my feet, in emotional, social, and not least financial terms. The setting in Tübingen offered it. A generous grant from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) provided, in 1988, the basis for a dissertation project on elections and suffrage reform in Prussia in Imperial Germany. And in Bernhard Mann’s colloquium, I met the woman who later became the mother of my two children. Not least, the intellectual dimension got a boost when Tübingen’s history department started hiring a new generation of historians, such as Dieter Langewiesche, who further enhanced the vivid culture of our academic colloquia.

Moving to America, be it only for a year—as many German students did, including a close friend who studied psychology—was simply out of the question, and not only for private reasons. America offered little intellectual attraction for students of German history or literature, or so I and my kind thought. And then there was the embarrassment of the Reagan era, which had penetrated the pacifist mindset throughout most of German academia at that time and certainly mine. Moving to America after my “career” as a pacifist, after marching against the arms race—for example, against the NATO Double-Track Decision in Bonn in 1981 next to three hundred thousand others—would have felt like treason.<sup>10</sup>

Things changed only much later, long after I had finished my dissertation in 1992. My thesis inquired into the three-class suffrage that ruled state and party politics in Prussia from 1849 to 1918; and by extension, from 1871 on in Imperial Germany, given Prussia’s hegemonic role in the empire. I sought to contribute to the debate on Germany’s *Sonderweg* and the constitutional monarchy’s questionable potential to advance into a parliamentary democracy or at least a parliamentary monarchy. I wanted to do so by elucidating why the Prussian three-class electoral law, a barrier to democracy and widely condemned as socially unjust and politically unfair at the time, nonetheless survived until 1918. The three-class franchise governed Prussia’s state and local elections from 1848 to 1918; this indirect electoral system grouped voters by district into three classes depending on their tax payments. Whereas from 1871 on a universal male suffrage for the national Reichstag spurred political mobilization in all parts of German society. Working against the grain of top-down analyses of this issue, which pointed to the intransigence of the conservative elites, I focused on bottom-up politics and political mindsets in rural and small-town Prussia. I argued that the voting system was backed by a consensus-oriented “electoral culture” that met the political mentality of conservative, liberal, and Catholic voters across class gaps in those locales better than the one-man-one-vote system that ruled the simultaneous Reichstag elections.

Prussia's three-class suffrage reinforced older political and cultural traditions that ultimately went back to the days of the ancien régime but continued to resonate with Prussia's rural and small-town populace up through World War I. At the same time, the Prussian state elections worked to contain the mobilizing effects of the Reichstag elections by facilitating sophisticated compromises between competing parties on the local and regional levels.

The dissertation was published in early 1994 in one of the series edited by the German Commission for the History of Parliamentarism and Political Parties.<sup>11</sup> It was well received, won the German Bundestag Prize for Research in Parliamentarism, and garnered praise in some forty reviews, including a particularly generous one by Margaret Lavinia Anderson, whose inquiries into political Catholicism in Imperial Germany I had adored from early on—and who would later support my transfer to America in many ways.<sup>12</sup> But in the 1990s, America was still beyond the compass of my visions. My dissertation work had drawn the attention of, and from early on been supported by, a working group of the commission on the history of German parliamentarism led by the late Gerhard A. Ritter, arguably the most influential and most inspiring historian in the field at that time.<sup>13</sup> A while before I finished the dissertation, Ritter offered me a position at his *Lehrstuhl* (chair) at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU). It would have enabled me to take the next step essential for an academic career in Germany—working toward a *Habilitation* thesis. It was a generous offer. I felt deeply honored and was certainly drawn to Ritter and the LMU. But I declined, despite plenty of mixed feelings, not least because I did not have and did not anticipate ever getting many, if any, other options. A few were in the air in Tübingen, but none were to materialize; and even if they had, after having spent all my undergraduate and graduate studies there, I felt the urge to move on—away from the place despite its intellectual radiance, but also away from the nineteenth century and Imperial Germany. Munich would have allowed a change of place but not a change in subject matter. Ritter wanted me to focus on the origins and early stages of Bismarck's social policy, work with him on a big edition of related primary sources, and beyond that to move my studies further back into the eighteenth century. By then, I had become interested in Germany's "Age of Extremes," Eric Hobsbawm's term for the twentieth century.<sup>14</sup>

### **Gender Studies, Military History, and Somber Career Prospects**

When I defended my dissertation in February 1992, my professional future did not look rosy. But I was lucky, quite surprisingly. Ute Frevert, well known for an authoritative book on women in modern Germany and a groundbreaking inquiry into the social meaning of dueling in nineteenth-century Germany, had accepted an offer from the University of Constance for their chair in modern history and advertised the position of a *Wissenschaftlicher Assistent*, an academic researcher and teacher with a doctoral degree who was supposed to be working on the *Habilitation*.<sup>15</sup> I applied, not only because I

needed a job but also because I was enthusiastic about the idea of following Frevert's pioneering work on the history of masculinity, then still a wasteland in Germany and only sparsely farmed in the Anglophone world. Next to academic considerations, my growing up pacifist and my *Ersatzdienst* experience as a nurse, a decisive stance against militarized concepts of masculinity, certainly nurtured this interest.<sup>16</sup> Enthusiasm alone is not a guarantee for success, however. I assumed, as did most of my colleagues, that the job would go to a female candidate, for many good reasons. Frevert decided differently, and I began another exciting period of academic work, still located within German history but on different issues and periods—the Third Reich and its war of annihilation.

Retroactively, it puzzles me that the darkest period of Germany history only this late caught my interest. Efforts to rationalize my disinterest remain meager: the holder of the twentieth-century history chair in Tübingen barely taught it and only in a thoroughly boring way, or so I found. The silence about the Nazi period and World War II cultivated by both my parents and my larger social environment may have factored in too. A few exceptions—*Altnazis*, or old Nazis, who would not hide that the best times of their lives had been before 1945—aroused disgust but no investigative interest. And not least because of these encounters, I was unimpressed by the generally apologetic views on German society under Hitler that still prevailed even in the 1980s, as the newly fashionable *Alltagsgeschichte*, or history of everyday life, focused more on the dissent, resistance, and nonconformity of ordinary Germans than on their complicity in the workings and crimes of the Nazi regime.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, Christopher Browning's 1992 inquiry into group conformity as the oil of "ordinary men's" complicity in the Holocaust sparked my interest and motivated my *Habilitation* project. It was to become an inquiry into the discourse, experience, and practice of the military concept of comradeship during the Nazi war on Europe and especially in the East. Unlike Browning in his book on core Holocaust perpetrators, I wanted to focus on ordinary soldiers, inspired by the photo exhibition on the Wehrmacht of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, first shown in 1995. This exhibition exposed in spectacular fashion the willingness of the Wehrmacht, a broad part of German society, to support, applaud, or actively engage in German mass crimes in the East. The desire to explore the subjectivities of the historical Other that had driven my work from the outset informed the new project as well. In my dissertation work, it was the seemingly outdated mindsets of Prussian bottom-up conservatism. Now it was the mindset of Hitler's soldiers—not exactly a nearby topic for a pacifist, as I still considered myself then. When I told my father about it, he could not believe that I would waste my time on such nonsense as the concept of comradeship.<sup>18</sup>

Considering how warfare radicalized into genocide in Nazi Germany, on the one hand, and the continuation of pre-Nazi democratic and peaceful traditions after 1945, on the other, my study asked how the mythical *Leitbild* (model) of comradeship, the epitome of military male bonding, shaped the pursuit of the Nazi war, how the latter was discursively prepared for, how it was experienced by soldiers and civilians, and finally, how it was remembered after 1945. To this end, the study explored the en-

tire period from World War I to the close of the twentieth century.<sup>19</sup> Comradeship, I eventually argued, “combined” male bonding through criminal means (terror against others) with in-group solidarity and, indeed, an idea of “humanity,” thus giving perpetrators and bystanders a sense of being good guys while participating in mass murder. Comradeship demanded conformity and complicity and allowed comrades to dismiss feelings of guilt about misdeeds of every kind. And yet, thanks to its altruistic as well as egalitarian dimensions, it also allowed the conformers, the “comrades,” to locate themselves within the same moral frameworks that informed the societies of both German states after 1945. The cement of all male communities, comradeship also meant to affiliate women in patriarchal fashion as junior partners to the men. Comradeship served to harmonize gender conflicts.<sup>20</sup>

Collecting and analyzing the diverse primary sources necessary for this project made for an exciting and sometimes challenging journey. It entailed meetings with leaders of Wehrmacht veterans’ associations and former Waffen SS officers, several weeks of research at the then still private monumental diary archive of the writer Walter Kempowski,<sup>21</sup> deep conversations with him about Germans in the Third Reich, and no less intense contacts with established and newly emerging academic associations in the fields of military history and men’s studies. The academic interactions resulted in several conferences and edited volumes, including one that spurred the historical study of masculinities in Germany and another that laid groundwork for a new military history that would not exhaust itself in stories about battles, generals, militarist ideologies, and war economies but focus on the mindsets, actions, and choices of ordinary soldiers.<sup>22</sup> Thanks to a propensity to get lost in too many simultaneous projects, the conclusion of the *Habilitation* thesis on comradeship dragged on longer than necessary.

When I submitted it in 2003, now to the University of Bielefeld, where Ute Frevert had transferred in 1998, the career prospects in German academia had become ever darker. This was the consequence not only of the inveterate “overproduction” of scholars aiming at tenured professorships, but even more of a misguided regulation of university careers launched by a social-democratic federal government and its minister of education, a former schoolteacher and career politician. Instead of increasing the flexibility of university careers and incentivizing individual initiative, it did the opposite, implementing restrictions on most of those paths that would not speedily be crowned with a tenured professorship. Disgusted at such efforts to regulate and standardize career paths, I worried about my mental health and my family’s material wellbeing. Following the model of German peers and the advice of a few senior friend-colleagues in North America, I became willing to at least consider moving there, whether for a time-limited fellowship or a teaching position, or for permanent employment. One of those friend-colleagues, Michael Geyer, history professor at the University of Chicago, who eventually supported my transatlantic transfer decisively, spoke about my gloomy prospects in Germany, as he saw them. They were gloomy due to the constriction of career paths and opportunities in general but also specifically because of my profile in gender and masculinity studies; the expertise in military history, at that time in Ger-



many still not considered a genuine academic field, would not help much either, he commented. I took his advice.

### The Big Move and American-German Contrasts

In fall 2002, I had applied for one-year fellowships at a few US research institutions. One of them, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) at Princeton, offered me membership for the academic year 2003–04. I accepted the invitation and flew to the US on 3 September 2003, a few weeks after a less than pleasant defense of my *Habilitation* thesis at the University of Bielefeld and even less pleasant encounters with advocates of the above-mentioned federal reform of university careers. The last years in Germany, through 2003, had been strenuous in many other regards, privately and professionally. In 2002–03, I held a one-year visiting professorship at a small college for schoolteachers in Weingarten, close to Switzerland—a beautiful place with wonderful colleagues and students. The downside was that the *Habilitation* thesis needed to be finished, no matter what. I did so that year, in addition to a 5/5 teaching load. When I arrived in Princeton, together with several oversized suitcases and two adventurous children, seven and nine years old, curious about life and schooling in America (their mom was to follow later), I was fed up with Germany, burned out, and ready for a change. On that 3 September 2003, bright blue sky hailed us in Princeton, and maybe because of that I knew the change would happen, although I did not know what direction it would take.

The IAS is a Garden of Eden for academics, and Princeton University (institutionally separated from the institute) only adds to the paradisaical radiance of the place. Nonetheless, there was no doubt that Princeton was exceptional, and that vast social and political fractures were unsettling American society outside of Princeton’s “small world.” I was drawn to America anyway, pretty much from the first moment on, and I entertained the idea of a big transatlantic move at a time when it seemed highly unlikely that it would ever materialize.

Why America? Probably like that of most German immigrants of the past few decades, my American experience has been a mixed bag. The heyday of the George W. Bush administration coincided with my year in Princeton. America—or, more precisely, major parts of it—indulged, as it looked from a German perspective, in a bizarrely outdated patriotism, fueled by the war on terror and the fictitious weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The omnipresence of this type of patriotism even at a place like Princeton, not exactly the typical American Main Street, did not go unnoticed by my then nine-year-old daughter who, together with her seven-year-old sister, attended Princeton Elementary School during that year. Shopping for groceries and loading our car in a strip mall a while after we had settled in one of the institute’s beautiful apartments, my daughter stared at the stars and stripes pennants that decorated most cars on the parking lot and said, “Dad, you know, what I don’t like about America is that they always think they are the best in the world.”

She spoke in German, of course. At that time, and for a few more months, she and her sister struggled to learn basic English, supported by one of their school's ESL (English as a second language) teachers, with whom they fell in love. In their first months in school, they were practically unable to communicate in English with classmates or teachers. And yet, they came home one day, and we were chatting as we always did about how it was going in school, and my younger daughter remarked in passing but in obvious relief: "Here, in school, the kids don't exclude." They meant, of course, that kids did not exclude as they do in Germany, as my two girls had observed there before their departure to America, when they already knew that they would spend a year abroad, in a country far from home. (In the course of that year, they also learned in and outside school that American inclusiveness is not spread all over the country.)

At that time, in fall 2003, I had already learned about Clark University's search for the Strassler Chair in Holocaust History and was encouraged to apply by Michael Geyer. I did not then know much about the higher education system in the US, and I knew even less about small private liberal arts universities like Clark, the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, or the city of Worcester in Massachusetts. In a phone conversation with Geyer, I learned more about this place, including its decisively liberal tradition and that Worcester is not pronounced the way Germans pronounce it, as in Worcestershire sauce, but "Woosta." Not yet much interested in the city, I gathered a little more knowledge about the ups and downs of Clark's standing in American academia. Founded in 1887 with an endowment from Jonas Clark, a Worcester entrepreneur, the university opened in 1889. It suffered from conflicts between the benefactor, who planned to establish a college for low-income male youths of the city, then one of the richest and fastest growing industrial places in the country, and the institution's first president, G. Stanley Hall, who held a more elitist vision of Clark as the foremost graduate school in the United States. Hall attracted attention even in Germany.<sup>23</sup> In 1909, Sigmund Freud delivered his famous "Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis" at Clark, the only time Freud lectured in America.<sup>24</sup> But financial restraints and related resource conflicts led to the departure of prominent scholars already in 1892 and were to impede the school's flourishing ever since.<sup>25</sup>

Nonetheless, by the 1990s Clark was again thriving. David Strassler, former chairman of Clark's Board of Trustees, and his family endowed the Strassler Center and the Strassler Chair. David Strassler, inspired by the Holocaust scholar Deborah Dwork (who would become the first director of the Strassler Center) envisioned a PhD program in Holocaust Studies which would help revitalize graduate education at Clark.<sup>26</sup> Initially, I was not too optimistic about my chances of getting this job. Why would they hire a German with no roots or training in America for a Holocaust position? And despite my scholarship on male bonding in the Nazi war of annihilation, my scholarly profile was less focused than that of more typical Holocaust or Third Reich scholars, including the inaugural holder of the position, Robert Gellately, who had moved to Florida State University, Tallahassee. But, having decided to stay in America if at all possible, and intrigued by the prospect of contributing to an innovative and growing

doctoral program, I spent weeks of my precious time in Princeton on the application and then, after being invited for an on-campus interview, on rehearsing for it. It was a challenge for an academic from Germany, where job talks imply only the actual talk and a Q&A, two hours instead of two days. Luckily, another North American friend, James Retallack, had initiated me into the secrets of a two-day job talk a while before I toughed out the one at Clark. The spontaneous support and advice I received from my few North American friend-colleagues and from other fellows at the IAS contrasted sharply with almost everything I had experienced in Germany and added to the precious parts of my mixed bag of American experiences.

As it turned out, Clark had only invited Germans for the interview but wanted one who was likely to stay in America instead of using the job as a temporary bridge. Regarding the latter expectation, my walking like an American factored in, as I was told later, though I never really understood what that meant. I hoped that the professional parts of my performance and profile carried some meaning too. Although the chair was for a specialist in the Holocaust, the position also had to meet the history department's need for a historian of modern Europe. And gender studies were also in strong demand at Clark. I accepted the offer, although the decision was tied to turmoil and changes on the private side (including the dissolution of my marriage). But the prospects in Germany seemed too somber to seriously consider forfeiting the opportunity. And I gauged the quality of life of an academic in Germany versus one in America: on a scale of one to ten, America scored eight, Germany two.

I still see it that way, for a variety of reasons. As is probably the case for most European immigrant academics, I found the working conditions in the American higher education system, as far as I had a chance to learn about and use them, extraordinarily intriguing. Such conditions at Clark provide me more freedom, space, and time to pursue research and book projects. In Germany, I was fortunate to teach at elite schools and to smart students. And yet, the level of motivation and the work ethic of undergraduates as well as graduates here, at least at a private institution like Clark (which is still less selective than the better-known private elite schools), is considerably higher than I ever faced in the public system in Germany. Teaching at German universities is a burden, even if it provides satisfaction; at Clark and many other schools in America, where I have been fortunate to guest lecture, I have always found it a pleasure.

But then, the professional part of life is just one dimension. Immigrating to America in my mid-forties came with the challenge of adjusting to a social culture that works rather differently than in Germany or Europe. One of the favorite topics of casual conversation among European immigrants in America is the concept of friendship. As Europeans joke, a friend in America is someone you know. A best friend is someone you know and also like. I was fortunate to have a few before I came to America, and I needed years to establish friendships of the deep type I was used to in Germany.

And then there is the political culture. As observers of both countries often comment, German and American politics could not differ more, at least within the range of democratic options. On the German side, there is a public school and university

system that may not generate much enthusiasm but serves as a solid machine of social mobility for many, and most of all, a still well-functioning welfare state and health system that takes care of—and micromanages—its citizens. On the American side, there is the omnipresence of homeless people, an almost cynical healthcare system, a dilapidated K–12 system, and a higher education system that ranks highest in the world but leaves too many of its beneficiaries financially hamstrung for much of their lives. All of this is the price tag for a society that hails individual efforts, personal responsibility, and above all, choices, even if they often fail to come to fruition. There are political antagonisms in the representational democracy of Germany too, to be sure. But in the “consensus country,” they are contained by an unquestioned voting system, by centrist political agendas, and by established traditions of compromising across the political aisles, all of which guarantee the stability of its democracy. The German consensus culture has no equivalent in the United States, with its tradition of gerrymandering and biased, often arbitrary, and thus heavily contested restrictions on voting rights; its deeply emotionalized grassroots campaigns; and its cultural cleavages, political antagonisms, and first-past-the-post rule in elections, which generates the two-party system and the winner-takes-all rule—all of which work against coalition-building and the routines of compromise that continental European multi-party systems produce by default.<sup>27</sup>

As with most people politically at home in blue America, I have been worried about the state of US democracy for a long time. Yet, my concerns did not prevent me from seeking citizenship as soon as I could and arranging my life and my career without seriously considering a return to Germany. Adhering for the better part of my life to some sort of vaguely defined old-school liberalism has eased some of my concerns about the dark sides of America’s radical individualism and its distrust of the public sector. But the crucial reason for choosing to stay has to do with another, already mentioned difference from Germany, at least the way I perceived it when I came to the United States and later: blue America’s embrace of diversity. My daughters’ encounters at Princeton’s elementary school with people who not only willy-nilly accepted but embraced difference was extended and intensified when I came to Clark, a small place with some 200 faculty, 500 staff, 2,000+ undergraduates, and 800+ graduate students. As mentioned, Clark’s founding donor wanted to establish a place to educate lower-class boys.<sup>28</sup> Since then, the school has prided itself on a tradition of diversity and inclusiveness. Clark’s president during the interwar and World War II period, Wallace W. Atwood, did not always hide his antisemitism, especially when it came to faculty hires. Yet the school, always in need of tuition revenue, welcomed Jewish students at a time when the Ivy Leagues tended to limit them.<sup>29</sup> When I came to Clark, women held half the tenure lines in my department,<sup>30</sup> all of them raising or having raised children—by no means a matter of course when I left Germany. I was intrigued by the daily interaction of White students, faculty, and staff with Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) students and colleagues.<sup>31</sup> Recently, the university welcomed a new president, David Fithian, together with his husband, Michael Rodriguez.

To be sure, these are anecdotal, subjective, and thus biased impressions. In 2004, when I arrived at Clark, women still represented a minority of faculty in history and other college and university departments in the US, and while this share has increased since then, the change has been slow.<sup>32</sup> White males, including myself, may be too optimistic and sometimes simply naive when enthusing about random signs of diversity, unlike members of those groups who have suffered and are still suffering from exclusion at many levels of society. The ongoing struggles of individuals with this type of emotional and intellectual blockage, and the battles at most institutions of higher education in the United States, including Clark, with implementing an effective culture of diversity and inclusion are all too obvious.<sup>33</sup> Neither Clark nor most other university campuses are havens of diversity. But then, the subjective experience of contrasts within one individual are the subject of these lines, not hard data. At the core of mine is the encountering of passionate concern and debate about diversity, including its insufficient practice, which penetrates intellectual life in America at places like Clark and in major media, and the (maybe never-ending) learning processes these concerns engender. How to realize ideas about diversity and inclusion is today the most discussed issue at my institution and many others.

This concern also shapes the historical discipline. In terms of personnel, it is still dominated by White people, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. However, since I came to the US, memory conflicts—fights about how and whether at all to acknowledge past and present violence, racism, and genocide—have kept the country busy on a daily basis, ideologically polarized as it is, with about half the nation denying or obfuscating that part of its past, and the other half striving for ever sharper critique of it. To be sure, memory politics have never been simply consensual in Germany either. But the contrast to the American disputes was sharp when I left Germany and remains so years later. Germany has enjoyed the international adoration of its “negative memory,” the decisive acknowledgment of the genocide of the Jews, and its status as “world champions” in “the cultural reproduction of their country’s versions of terror,” as the British historian Timothy Garton Ash once said.<sup>34</sup> Overcoming its complacency when looking at its violent and evil pasts is an ongoing process in Germany, and much has changed since the early 2000s. But it is not by accident that these changes gain momentum from the *outside*. Recently, the African Achille Mbembe, the Australian Dirk Moses, and the American Michael Rothberg initiated a heated discussion of racist, colonial, and genocidal strands of German history and the limitations of a memory culture focused only on the Holocaust.<sup>35</sup>

Honoring Konrad H. Jarausch in Potsdam some fifteen years ago, Michael Geyer elaborated on the differences between German and American academia and explained why in the twentieth century Germans lost their hitherto internationally leading position to America. It was not only the brain drain caused by the Nazis. Geyer rightly pointed to America’s success in democratizing a formerly elitist culture, something Germans struggled with for much longer and maybe still do.<sup>36</sup> I would add that the diversification—not only in terms of personnel but also in terms of content, topics,

approaches, research, and teaching foci—marks yet another and maybe even more powerful difference between the two national academic systems.

I have experienced my own learning curve in America. The first lesson, brought to me in a gentle way by a close colleague, Deborah Dwork, even before I started the job, was on the definition of Holocaust history, the field I was hired to research and teach. I had researched the Nazi war since the 1990s for a lengthy literature review and, most of all, for my *Habilitation* project on male bonding in Hitler's army and the social meaning of comradeship in Germany's twentieth century. While there may have been some excuse, although still lame, for neglecting the Jewish (or other) victims of the genocidal direction of this war or Jewish perspectives on the concept of comradeship, there was no reason to overlook these perspectives in that review article, which addressed all kinds of issues—just not, or barely, the issue of non-German victims of the war.<sup>37</sup> Both products contributed to the then dominant Third Reich history, German style, which I easily equated with Holocaust history. I was wrong, of course. But I only realized my misunderstanding thanks to the daily exchange in America with Jewish historians and historians of Jews, who taught me the inadequacy of any history of violence that omits the victims. In this regard, Holocaust history has changed internationally and so too in Germany since I left. In other words, I might well have gotten that lesson, had I stayed in Germany. Or so I hope. But *I* got it in America.

### The Demise of National History

In America, I do not work as a historian of Germany but as one of the Holocaust, other genocides, and wars. While I could certainly claim academic freedom at Clark and study whatever I want, studying entirely different subject matters would require a significant amount of compartmentalization that I have dodged so far.<sup>38</sup> I was hired to work on, and have been comfortable with, advancing a PhD program in Holocaust and genocide studies that accommodates students interested in German history but also many who are not. This is the result of the development of Holocaust history since the breakdown of communism in Europe, the subsequent opening of East European and Russian archives, and the political repercussions of the expansion of the European Union, including efforts to establish a shared European identity. Consequently, non-German collaboration in and non-German victimization by the German genocidal project have drawn more attention than before. At the same time, older ideas about the uniqueness of the Holocaust have been discarded, and a narrow concept of genocide has yielded to complex and comparative views on a broad range of processes and events of mass violence around the globe. If time were not a limited resource, I would have long ago learned languages to enable me to move my research interests beyond the Holocaust and especially the German perspective on it. But time is a limited resource, and because of job responsibilities in my program, I have confined my own research to projects that focus on the Holocaust but include global or transnational perspectives

on it. At the same time, my teaching agenda addresses mass violence at various places across the world. Courses on memory and mass violence, and on gender, war, and genocide, started out with a focus on Germany and the Holocaust. Responding to student feedback, it quickly changed and covered events and problems around the globe. Last but not least, I am committed, also administratively, to growing the program into one that addresses all regions of the world. The interaction with students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels has played a significant role in this reorientation. At Clark, students are not satisfied with nationally limited perspectives, whatever their own national, racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural identity is.

They are right. Most antagonisms in American society and beyond are not reconcilable, and they were not reconcilable historically. Our discipline needs to acknowledge these rifts in the way we practice history. National histories, that is, nationally or linguistically defined histories such as German history, tend to eo ipso harmonize or hide such antagonisms. One may regret that American universities have begun to cancel positions in German or central European history and to replace them with positions on the Global South and with thematically, not regionally, defined professorships. To be sure, modern history, including that of Germany, has been driven for over two hundred years by the concept of the nation, by national identities, and by nationalist movements, and as a historical concept, the nation will preserve a dominant role in historical research and teaching. Concepts of nation, nation-building processes, and nationalism need to remain high on the list of subjects of historical study, especially in times of new nationalist movements and authoritarian governments' revitalization of old or newly invented national myths. At the same time, the organization of history as an academic profession and discipline around national identities—what has been called, and criticized as, “methodological nationalism”—needs to be reconsidered, questioned, and eventually changed.<sup>39</sup> As social scientists first, and more recently also historians, have understood, this “entails the re-examination of the fundamental concepts of ‘modern society,’” such as family, class, public, democracy, justice, and memory,<sup>40</sup> which are tied into a national frame and obscure “any lived reality beyond a national conceptual frame.”<sup>41</sup>

The field of modern German history is a particularly disturbing example of the dysfunctional results of “the national obsession of the discipline.”<sup>42</sup> Decades of debates on an alleged *Sonderweg* of Germany's path into modernity or on the supposed uniqueness of Germany's genocide of the Jews point to the aberrations stimulated by the paradigm of national history. In an academic world that is resource constrained, it is time to consider the shortfalls and the waste of resources this paradigm has produced.<sup>43</sup>

Friedrich Meinecke's career is an anecdotal reminder of that aberration. He owed his role in the Wilhelmine and Weimar profession to his endorsement of the Prussian-German nation-state and its success in overcoming the cosmopolitan society of the eighteenth century, as he argued in his influential 1908 book, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (*Cosmopolitanism and the National State*).<sup>44</sup> While this work is now shelved away in an archive of “forgotten books,”<sup>45</sup> this nationalist stance shaped generations of histo-

rians of Germany including many students of his, such as Felix Gilbert, Hajo Holborn, Hans Rosenberg, and Hans Rothfels. They fled the Nazis, emigrated to the USA, and established the transatlantic tradition of German history.<sup>46</sup> It is indeed this: history. National histories can no longer dominate the discipline as they did in the past. It is time to move on. I might have come to a different conclusion had I stayed in Germany, but I do not regret having learned this lesson in America.

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## Notes

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1. Friedrich Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen* (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1946), 9.
2. Friedrich Meinecke, “Erlebtes 1862–1901” (1941), in Meinecke, *Autobiographische Schriften*, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1969), 6 and 13–15.
3. The history department of the Free University of Berlin (FUB) was named after him in 1951, and recently his academic impact and political thinking has been the subject of inquiries; see Gisela Bock and Daniel Schönplugh, eds., *Friedrich Meinecke in seiner Zeit: Studien zu Leben und Werk* (Munich: Steiner, 2006).
4. Pierre Bourdieu, “L’illusion biographique,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, vol. 62–3 (June 1986): 69–72, 69 for the following quotes. The translations are mine.



5. William Shakespeare, “Macbeth,” act 5, scene 5, in *The Annotated Shakespeare*, vol. 3, ed. A. L. Rowse (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1978), 460.
6. For a similar try with a rather different focus, see Thomas Kühne, “A Father, a Perpetrator, a Son: Autobiographical Thoughts on Mystery and Curiosity,” in *On Being Adjacent to Historical Violence*, ed. Irene Kacandes (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2021), 340–60.
7. Ernst Bloch, *Der Geist der Utopie* (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1918); and Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959).
8. Sigmund Freud, “Über Deckerinnerungen,” in Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. I (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1953), 531–54.
9. Only after retiring in 1994 did my father write down scattered memoirs and share a diary from his POW time with me.
10. See Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann, “Führen alle Wege nach Moskau? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss und die Friedensbewegung—eine Kritik,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 59:1 (2011): 81–100.
11. Thomas Kühne, *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preußen 1867–1914: Landtagswahlen zwischen korporativer Tradition und politischem Massenmarkt* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994).
12. Margaret Lavinia Anderson, review of *Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preußen, 1867–1914: Landtagswahlen zwischen korporativer Tradition und politischem Massenmarkt*, by Thomas Kühne, *Journal of Modern History* 68:4 (1996): 1019–21.
13. Thomas Kühne, “Parlamentarismusgeschichte in Deutschland: Probleme, Erträge und Perspektiven einer Gesamtdarstellung,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 24:2 (1998): 320–35.
14. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).
15. Ute Frevert, *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation* (New York: Berg Publishers, 1990), German original 1986; and Frevert, *Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel* (London: Polity, 1995), German original 1991.
16. Heinz Bartjes, “Der Zivildienst als die modernere ‘Schule der Nation’?” in *Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945*, ed. Thomas Kühne (Münster: LIT, 2000), 128–43.
17. Thomas Kühne, *Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s Community, 1918–1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
18. Thomas Kühne, *The Rise and Fall of Comradeship: Hitler’s Soldiers, Male Bonding and Mass Violence in the 20th Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3–4.
19. This approach was initially inspired by the German historian Reinhart Koselleck’s thinking about experiences and expectations. See Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 255–75, German original 1975; and Koselleck, “Sluices of Memory and Sediments of Experience: The Influences of the Two World Wars on Social Consciousness,” in Koselleck, *Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018), 207–24, German original 1992. See also the German-Austrian-American sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); and the early utilizing of this sociology by the American Lloyd B. Lewis, *The Tainted War: Culture and Identity in Vietnam War Narratives* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).
20. Thomas Kühne, *Kameradschaft: Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2006).
21. Thomas Kühne, “Die Leiden der Deutschen am NS-Krieg und die Nicht-Einheit der Geschichte: Walter Kempowskis ‘Echolot’ Teil II,” *Neue Politische Literatur* 46 (2001): 7–14.
22. Thomas Kühne, ed., *Männergeschichte-Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1996); and Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann, eds., *Was ist Militärgeschichte?* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000).

23. Georg Simmel, "Die Clark-University in Worcester [18.7.1889]," in Simmel, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 17: *Miszellen, Glossen, Stellungnahmen, Umfrageantworten, Leserbriefe, Diskussionsbeiträge 1889–1918 / Anonyme und pseudonyme Veröffentlichungen 1888–1920*, ed. Klaus Christian Köhnke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), 234–38.
24. William A. Koelsch, "Freud Discovers America," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 46:1 (1970): 115–32; and Rand B. Evans and William A. Koelsch, "Psychoanalysis Arrives in America: The 1909 Psychology Conference at Clark University," *American Psychologist* 40:8 (1985): 942–48.
25. William A. Koelsch, *Clark University, 1887–1987: A Narrative History* (Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, 1987).
26. Thomas Kühne and Mary Jane Rein, introduction to *Agency and the Holocaust: Essays in Honor of Deborah Dwork* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 1–10.
27. The different governance systems and political cultures are routinely addressed by American media and have been widely discussed in political science. See, for instance, Max Boot, "America Would Be Much Better Off If Our Elections Were as Boring as Germany's," *Washington Post*, 27 September 2021; or the voice of a German American, Josef Joffe, "Post-Merkel Germany's Race for the Center," *Wall Street Journal*, 23 September 2021; or James E. Campbell, *Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); or Steven L. Taylor et al., *A Different Democracy: American Government in a Thirty-One-Country Perspective* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).
28. Shelly Tenenbaum, "The Vicissitudes of Tolerance: Jewish Faculty and Students at Clark University," *Massachusetts Historical Review* 5 (2003): 6–27, 6.
29. *Ibid.*, 16–17; on Attwood, 18–20; on the students, 23.
30. Not across campus, however.
31. The term BIPOC was not yet used in 2004.
32. Karen Hagemann and Donna Harsch, "Gendering *Central European History*: Changing Representations of Women and Gender in Comparison, 1968–2017," *Central European History* 51:1 (2018): 114–27.
33. See Audrey Williams and Brian O'Leary, "How Many Black Women Have Tenure on Your Campus?" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 27 May 2021, at: [www.chronicle.com/article/how-many-black-women-have-tenure-on-your-campus-search-here](http://www.chronicle.com/article/how-many-black-women-have-tenure-on-your-campus-search-here) (accessed 20 August 2022).
34. Timothy Garton Ash, "The Stasi on Our Minds," *New York Review of Books*, 31 May 2007, at: [www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/05/31/the-stasi-on-our-minds/](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/05/31/the-stasi-on-our-minds/) (accessed 20 August 2022); and Reinhart Koselleck, "Forms and Tradition of Negative Memory," in Koselleck, *Sediments of Time*, 238–49.
35. "Forum: The Achille Mbembe Controversy and the German Debate About Antisemitism, Israel, and the Holocaust," *Journal of Genocide Research* 23:3 (2021): 371–419; Dirk Moses, "The German Catechism," *Geschichte der Gegenwart*, 23 May 2021, at: [geschichtedergegenwart.ch/the-german-catechism/](http://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/the-german-catechism/) (accessed 14 May 2024); Jennifer Evans, ed., "The Catechism Debate," *The New Fascism Syllabus*, May–June 2021, at: [newfascismsyllabus.com/category/opinions/the-catechism-debate/page/3/](http://newfascismsyllabus.com/category/opinions/the-catechism-debate/page/3/) (accessed 14 February 2022); and Michael Rothberg, "'Multidirektionale Erinnerung': Missverständnisse und gezielte Verschleierungen," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 14 February 2022. For major contributions to the public debate, see *The New Fascism Syllabus* at: <https://newfascismsyllabus.com/our-team/#> (accessed 20 August 2022). On earlier efforts to include Germany's colonial past in the memory canon, especially by Jürgen Zimmerer, see Thomas Kühne, "Colonialism and the Holocaust: Continuities, Causations, and Complexities," *Journal of Genocide Research* 15:3 (2013): 339–62.
36. Michael Geyer, "Betrachtungen zur deutschen und amerikanischen Wissenschaftskultur: Festrede anlässlich der Verabschiedung von Konrad H. Jarausch," *Potsdamer Bulletin für Zeithistorische Studien*, no. 38/39 (2006/2007): 12–15.
37. Thomas Kühne, "Der nationalsozialistische Vernichtungskrieg und die 'ganz normalen' Deutschen: Forschungsprobleme und Forschungstendenzen der Gesellschaftsgeschichte des Zweiten

- Weltkriegs, Erster Teil,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39 (1999): 580–662; and Kühne, “Der nationalsozialistische Vernichtungskrieg im kulturellen Kontinuum des 20. Jahrhunderts: Forschungsprobleme und Forschungstendenzen der Gesellschaftsgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Zweiter Teil,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 40 (2000): 440–86.
38. For one such option, pursued in 2010–11 but not concluded, see my profile at the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation: [www.gf.org/fellows/all-fellows/thomas-kuhne/](http://www.gf.org/fellows/all-fellows/thomas-kuhne/); and my profile at the Institute for Advanced Study: [www.ias.edu/scholars/thomas-kuhne](http://www.ias.edu/scholars/thomas-kuhne) (both accessed 14 February 2022).
  39. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Science, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (2003): 576–610.
  40. Ulrich Beck and Nathan Sznaider, “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda,” *British Journal of Sociology* 57:1 (2006): 1–23, 6.
  41. Glenda Sluga, “Nationalism as Historical Method,” *American Historical Review* 127:1 (2022): 364–69, 365.
  42. *Ibid.*
  43. For diverse views on the decline of the nation as the primary locus of historical scholarship, see “Central European History at Fifty (1968–2018). Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of Central European History and Central European Studies: Taking Stock of the Journal and the Field,” special commemoration issue, *Central European History* 51:1 (March 2018): 1–163, especially Shelley Baranowski, “The Future of Central European Studies,” in *ibid.*, 155–58; and Charles S. Maier, “How Did Germany Go Right,” in *ibid.*, 134–36.
  44. Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates*, 7th. ed. (1908; reprint, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1928).
  45. See the website of the London-based publisher Forgotten Books: [www.forgottenbooks.com/en/books/WeltburgertumundNationalstaat\\_10327607](http://www.forgottenbooks.com/en/books/WeltburgertumundNationalstaat_10327607) (accessed 14 February 2022).
  46. Gerhard A. Ritter, ed., *Friedrich Meinecke: Akademischer Lehrer und emigrierte Schüler. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1910–1977* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006).