

**Campaign Finance in Municipal Elections:
The 2007 Worcester City Council Candidates**

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Abstract:

Like many American cities, Worcester, Massachusetts has nonpartisan municipal elections. Yet the nonpartisan nature of these elections can mask the types of alliances that exist between candidates and individual contributors or groups. In this paper we draw upon the contributor files for candidates for city council and mayor in the 2007 Worcester municipal elections to identify trends in the types of individual who contribute to city candidates, and we supplement these data by interviewing the candidates in order to better understand the ways in which candidates seek to create their own networks of contributors and supporters. We also draw upon these interviews to seek to understand how money is used by municipal candidates. This paper seeks to add to the growing body of literature on campaign finance in local elections, and it seeks to use the relatively accessible nature of local politicians to explore candidates' views on the nature of their financial support.

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For the most part, our understanding of the role of money in elections is drawn from studies of candidates for high-profile offices – candidates for the United States House of Representatives, the United States Senate, the presidency, or for state office. Data on the fundraising practices of these candidates have been available for more than three decades, and there is a substantial body of literature on how money is raised and spent in campaigns for these offices. Yet the human element is often missing from such studies. This is an important omission for two reasons. First, candidates for these offices tend to be seasoned campaigners, and they tend to use veteran campaign operatives in their campaigns. We can know what money buys in part because these candidates make few mistakes. They know how to raise and spend money efficiently; there is less room for a good but underfunded candidate to triumph, or for a well-funded candidate to stumble. In these studies, we may know how important money is in general, but we have less insight into how a good campaign can overcome the lack of money. Second, while we can know a lot about these campaigns in the aggregate, we cannot necessarily speak to the candidates themselves about their fundraising in any systematic way. It would be futile, for instance, for a researcher to expect to talk to all members of Congress about their fundraising, or even to expect a representative sample of candidates to speak frankly about how they ran their campaigns.

As residents of a medium-sized city, all of us have been struck during campaign season by the volume of activity in races for municipal office. During a Worcester, Massachusetts, election, the candidates tend to be highly visible, and it is evident that it is the candidates themselves, not their surrogates, who are actively doing most of the campaigning and fundraising. Some of these candidates clearly know what they are doing; others seem to be learning as they go along. In this paper, we seek to measure the effects of fundraising on elections for at-large city council seats in Worcester during one particularly contentious election. Understanding the effect of money on local campaigns is important for its own sake, and Worcester is a city that provides campaign finance data to the public in a manner that can allow one to draw conclusions about the role of money in its elections. Yet by looking at local campaign finance, we are also able to address the human element – to incorporate the views of most of the candidates and to draw conclusions not only from the raw dollar amounts, but from the comments of the candidates on how they raised their money and how important money was to them in their campaigns.

In this paper, we begin by summarizing what is known about local campaign finance, both through studies that directly address local elections and through studies of other types of candidates that provide testable propositions about local candidates. Second, we explore the aggregate campaign finance data for Worcester's 2007 city council elections and place them in the context of Worcester's electoral system and the politics of its council elections. Third, we explore the comments of nine of the twelve candidates for citywide council seats. And fourth, we draw some conclusions about the

role money plays in Worcester's elections. It is our hope that these conclusions can be generalized to cover elections in similar locales.

Literature on Urban Campaign Finance

Most studies of urban campaign finance practices use research on congressional elections as a starting point. It is easy to see why this is so; these elections feature a large number of candidates who can be compared in any given election year or across time, and data on campaign contributions to congressional candidates have been publicly available for over thirty years. Research on congressional candidates' fundraising practices yields several basic trends which can be used as a baseline for analyzing other types of elections. For instance, it has been established that incumbent members of Congress tend to substantially outraise their opponents (see, e.g., Jacobson 2004, 41-49). Incumbents tend to have the support of many nonideological contributors, who, expecting incumbents to win, use their contributions as a means of securing access to elected officials. Businesses, and individuals connected with businesses, for instance, tend to favor incumbents and not to be particularly partisan. More partisan donors, on the other hand, tend to concentrate their resources on a small number of threatened incumbents or to give to the equally small number of viable challengers or open seat candidates. Contributors to these candidates tend, unsurprisingly, to be predominantly wealthy, white, and male (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox 2003, 30). In general, incumbents tend to receive a larger number of large donations, although particularly ideological candidates of all types often can develop effective strategies for targeting small donors; the Internet has facilitated this type of approach in recent years. Candidates of all types often raise money through intermediaries, bundlers, or through fundraising events that can draw donors because of the chance to meet the candidate or well-known supporters of the candidate. And candidates vary in the geographic sources of their contributions; some types of candidates can effectively raise money from outside of their constituencies, while others tend to focus primarily on those who will have an opportunity to vote for them.

While Congressional studies provide a large number of testable hypotheses for looking at local candidates, they also have many drawbacks. First, it is not clear that money plays as large a role at the local level as it does at the federal level. Krebs (1998) contends in his study of Chicago aldermanic candidates that money plays less of a role in determining the vote share of incumbents than it does for open seat candidates and challengers; he argues that incumbent aldermen can frequently develop personal ties with constituents that make campaign spending unnecessary. Kushner, Siegel, and Stanwick (1997) concur, although they note that money is more important in large municipalities than in smaller ones; the importance of paid voter contact, in the form of advertisements, yard signs, direct mail, and so forth increases with the size of the constituency represented. Fleischmann and Stein (1998) contend that one's status within a local

government is less of a determinant of fundraising because city councils tend to be small enough that power is more widely dispersed than it is within Congress. And Lieske (1989) argues that candidates face diminishing returns from their campaign spending relatively quickly in local elections. It is hard to gauge what sums of money are typical in urban elections; cities vary enough in their size and in the size of their council districts that such numbers would tell one little. As a result, many studies tend to consider the cost per vote of election campaigns; Gierzynski (2007) presents data from a variety of studies indicating that council elections can cost anywhere from two dollars to eight dollars per vote.

Another problem in making broad claims about municipal campaign finance is that there is wide variation in political institutions and election laws at the local level, and it is difficult to do more than compare individual jurisdictions. Hence, Fleischmann and Stein's (1998) study of St. Louis and Atlanta, two cities of similar size but with different types of governments (weak mayor, partisan elections and strong mayor, partisan elections respectively) is intended to measure the relationship between these two systems and the propensity for candidates to raise funds from outside the city or from particular types of business interests. Similarly, Austin and Young (2006) analyze campaign spending and contribution sources in Toronto, which has strict contribution limits, and Calgary, which does not. And Krebs (2004) provides a similar comparison of corporate and labor contributions in Los Angeles, a city with contribution limits, and Chicago, which does not have limits. Kushner, Siegel, and Stanwick (1997) compare several Ontario cities, which vary in size but operate within a uniform set of campaign laws set at the provincial level. Gierzynski (2007) compares spending levels and election results in Albuquerque, which has had a public financing component, to those of similar cities that do not have public financing. Kraus (2006) limits his study of public financing to elections in New York, but provides a comparison across time. All of these studies make valuable claims about individual cities, but it is unclear how applicable these claims are across different types of cities. In particular, there is a natural bias towards the study of large cities; it may be important, for its own sake, to know about the financing of elections in Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, or Toronto, but it is not clear how one might apply this knowledge to elections in other, smaller cities. Nor is there an easy way to assess the effects of district size, city size, council structure, and so forth on campaign finance.

Nonetheless, most studies of municipal campaign finance agree on several important issues. First and foremost, corporate interests, and more particularly, the interests of developers, tend to dominate (Krebs 2004, Fleischmann and Young 1998, Austin and Young 2006). Second, contribution limits tend to limit the influence of such interests. Third, contributions matter in determining voting, at least up to a point; Lieske (1998) argues that there is a logarithmic effect to campaign funds. In his study of council elections in Cincinnati, money made a difference in vote share until candidates had raised about \$20,000; after that point, additional funds did not produce more votes. And fourth, race and income matter, and they interact with districting rules; Arrington and Ingalls (1984) contend in their study of elections in Charlotte, North Carolina, that there is a racial pattern to giving, with African-American donors giving small amounts but

concentrating on African-American candidates, while white voters give more diffusely to whites and blacks. As a result, a majority-white city may have well-financed minority candidates if council districting makes minority candidates viable. As far back as Banfield and Wilson's (1963, 41) study of city politics, it has been argued that at-large elections work to the disadvantage of minorities while councils with district councilors, particularly for councils where the districts are relatively small, tend to be more diverse.

The 2007 Election

Worcester

We do not contend that looking at Worcester city council elections solves any of these problems in the municipal campaign finance literature, but we do see two merits to looking at campaign finance in Worcester, apart from the fact that we all live here. First, Worcester is clearly a different kind of city from New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago; few of the cities mentioned above seem to compare easily with Worcester, although we would argue that Worcester represents a particular type of city (medium-sized, older, somewhat ethnically diverse) that is worthy of study. That is, it is hard to compare elections in Worcester with those of New York, but it may well be that knowing something about Worcester elections can help inform studies of places like Providence, Dayton, Chattanooga, Rockford, or Little Rock (all of which have populations less than 20,000 people larger or smaller than Worcester). Worcester is like a lot of other American cities, while New York and Chicago are not.

Second (and perhaps in contradiction to the above paragraph) Worcester has, despite its modest size, played somewhat of a role in urban politics studies of the past century. The Banfield and Wilson reference above was actually about Worcester; Worcester has had several waves of immigration, and Jewish and Protestant Yankee residents have sparred with Catholics over control of the city council (for opposite reasons: Protestants have feared being swamped by immigrants, while Jews have argued that they are sufficiently different from other immigrants to require their own voice in government). Worcester has a relatively unorthodox structure to its government and its elections. It has since 1947 had a nonpartisan, weak mayor form of government, in which the mayor is an elected member of city council who runs simultaneously for both offices; the council appoints a city manager who makes the major administrative decisions. Worcester has an eleven person city council, in which six councilors are elected at large and five represent districts of approximately 35,000 people.

Worcester has a population of 175,000; whites constitute 77 percent of this population, African-Americans make up about six percent, Asians make up five percent, and Latinos make up fifteen percent. Although it is within fifty miles of Boston, Worcester has always been a city in its own right. Although Worcester County is currently growing in population much faster than the rest of Massachusetts, Worcester is not a particularly wealthy city and it is surrounded by several more prosperous suburbs.

Worcester elections are held in odd-numbered years, and tend to feature a voter turnout of roughly 25 percent.

Worcester elections, like those in many American cities, are nonpartisan. They do, however, feature a process that resembles party primaries and serves to winnow the number of candidates to two competitors for each position. For the five city council districts, the preliminary election narrows the field to the two top vote-getters. In the case of at-large elections, the field is winnowed in the preliminary election to twelve candidates for the six at-large council slots. The preliminary election, held on the second Tuesday of September, thus produces twelve at-large candidates. Our analysis in this paper focuses on these twelve candidates. The general election is held on the first Tuesday in November.

In addition, the mayoral candidate must win one of the six at-large council slots. Voters choose their council members, and then vote separately for mayor. Any one of the twelve at-large candidates may run for mayor. In practice, some at-large council candidates declare their candidacy for mayor before the preliminary election, but may reconsider their decision after the preliminary election. The mayor's responsibilities include collaboration with the rest of Council to create meeting agendas, and then to oversee the weekly council meetings. One of the mayor's most significant powers is the ability to veto legislation brought forth by Council. The mayor's job is part-time, and is viewed by some as largely a ceremonial position. Yet the city's previous mayor, Timothy Murray, was widely viewed as having expanded the prestige of the job, and in 2006 Murray became the first Worcester mayor in decades to use the job as a springboard for higher office, running successfully for Lieutenant Governor.

The outcomes of council races depend largely on turnout. Voter registration forms are offered in a variety of languages. In the event that a voter misses the registration deadline for one phase of the election, they are still encouraged to register to vote in the next phase of the election. In regards to getting out the vote, City Clerk David Rushford describes two ways in which the city encourages voters to vote: formal and informal techniques. Formal techniques include advertising elections on talk radio, in newspapers, and paid advertisements sponsored by the candidates. Informal techniques include strategically placing polling locations around the city. Mr. Rushford commented on the fact that Worcester is an extremely "neighborhood oriented city. People identify themselves with their neighborhood and are loyal to it." As a result, polling locations are placed in each unique neighborhood, near places of worship, in community centers, and near schools. Candidates tend to think about their campaigns with reference to the city's neighborhoods or to particular ethnic groups.

The 2007 Election

The November 6th Worcester Municipal Elections was one of the most heated elections in recent years. During the September preliminary election, six at-large candidates were eliminated from the race, leaving twelve still in play. Within the first

week, William J. McCarthy dropped out after winning the primary, this allowed John J. Mahoney to re-enter the race for City Council (Melady 2007). Of the six at-large seats that candidates were vying for, only two seats were really in play. Gary Rosen, Konstantina B. Lukes (acting Mayor at the time), and Kathleen M. Toomey finished first, second, and third respectively in the primaries. Frederick Rushton finished fourth, leaving his district seat to run at-large in hopes to become the city's next Mayor. There was a large gap in votes between these top four candidates and the remaining eight candidates, who had to battle for the other two seats (Kotsopoulos 2007b).

Once the preliminary election was over, the mayoral race began to unfold. According to Worcester's electoral rules, the runner-up in the mayoral race serves as the vice-mayor and will become mayor should the mayor resign. Timothy Murray, who served as Mayor from 2001 to 2006, had been quite popular and had little opposition in his 2005 re-election bid. However, it was widely expected at the time of the 2005 race that Murray would run in 2006 for Lieutenant Governor. Konstantina Lukes, Murray's main antagonist on the council, had been the only candidate to run against him in 2005. When Murray did run successfully for Lieutenant Governor, then, Lukes became mayor in January of 2007. Many accounts of city council politics have focused on the clash between her personality and political philosophy and that of the rest of the council. Although Worcester elections are nonpartisan, she was widely seen as the "Republican" in the race. Many in the city believed that the race for Mayor would be a shoot-out between Lukes and Frederick Rushton, but that was not how it played out. Mike Perotto and Dennis Irish, who had declared their candidacy for mayor before the preliminary election, dropped out of the mayoral race after the preliminary election to focus on their at-large campaigns. According to some anecdotal accounts, there had been an understanding brokered by Democratic leaders that the top vote-getter in the preliminary among the declared mayoral candidates would remain in the race while other contenders would drop their mayoral bids. A fifth declared mayoral candidate, William Coleman, who finished twelfth in the preliminary election, decided to stay on the ballot. Most consequentially, however, Gary Rosen, who finished first in the preliminary election, declared his mayoral candidacy after the preliminary (Moynihan 2007). Councilwoman Kathleen Toomey reportedly also contemplated running for Mayor but ultimately decided against it (Nangle 2007a).

Rushton had reason to hope that his political endorsements would launch him into the forefront of the tight race. Murray and U.S. Representative James P. McGovern both formally endorsed Rushton as the best candidate for Worcester (Nangle 2007b). However, in the end, these endorsements do not appear to have had a major effect. The original general election count that came from the election commission was that B. Lukes had received the most number of votes. She had outpolled Rushton by a mere seventy-seven votes. That same night machines could not count 185 ballots (Kotsopoulos 2007c). In a race this tight, those votes could decide who the elected Mayor is. As such, after giving it some thought Rushton asked the city for a recount. During the recount 285 votes changed hands, and all candidates gained votes. At the end of three weeks, Lukes emerged as the city's first elected female mayor by a narrow 116 vote margin over Rushton (Kotsopoulos 2007c).

Joseph M. Petty and Michael J. Germain narrowly won the final two at-large seats. Germain was a newcomer to the Worcester City Council scene. The media attributed his win to “months of hard campaigning, his weathering of a painful personal scandal, and financial and organizational support from powerful municipal unions” (Sutner 2007). Petty made a last-minute comeback from his ninth place finish in the September 11 preliminary election. He was able to come from behind by virtue of more aggressive fundraising, late corporate support, and a number of direct mail pieces sent throughout October (Sutner 2007).

Massachusetts Campaign Finance Law

In Massachusetts, the Office of Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF) regulates political contributions to state and municipal candidates. Guidelines for all candidate types are distributed through the OCPF website. Candidates running for mayoral and at-large council seats in cities of more than 100,000 residents (Boston, Cambridge, Lowell, Springfield and Worcester) are considered “depository” candidates, and are subject to a set of regulations detailed below (Commonwealth of Massachusetts OCPF n.d.). This means that they must designate a bank in Massachusetts to be the depository for their campaign funds and they must appoint a chairman and a treasurer for their committee. The same person can be the chair and the treasurer, as long as the Treasurer is not the candidate. All receipts must be deposited into this account and all expenditures must be made from it, using a special check provided by the OCPF. Periodic reports are filed by the campaign with the bank, which forwards the information to the OCPF. During non-election years and the first six months of an election year in which that candidate’s name is on the ballot, the bank forwards these reports to the OCPF once a month, during the last six months of the election year the reports are submitted every two weeks. Regardless of whether a depository candidate intends to raise money in the course of their campaign, he or she must still appoint a bank.

Contributions may not exceed \$500 and must be deposited into the candidate’s depository account in the same form in which they were received. For example, if a \$200 check is received, that check must be deposited, if \$200 in cash is received, that cash must be deposited. Additionally, when the candidate deposits a contribution, he or she also files the contributor’s name and address with the OCPF. Contributions under \$50 do not need to be itemized in this way and may be combined into a single deposit unless a contributor’s aggregate, non-itemized contributions to a candidate or committee exceed the \$50 threshold in a calendar year. Massachusetts also prohibits public employees from soliciting political contributions as well as banning the solicitation or receiving of political contributions in any building occupied for government use. This means that public employees running as depository candidates must form a candidate committee to handle their fundraising in addition to appointing a bank as the location of their depository account.

In contrast to many other states, which allow virtually unregulated money to be spent on political campaigns, Massachusetts has strict limits on a contribution’s size and

origin, restrictions which apply to municipal races as well as state races. As discussed, an individual over 18 may contribute a maximum of \$500 to depository candidate in a calendar year, up to a limit of \$12,500 in aggregate contributions per year; individuals under 18 are limited to an aggregate of \$25 in contributions per year. Political action committees (PACs) are also held to a \$500 per year limit on contributions to a depository candidate or their committee. Registered lobbyists are limited to a smaller total of \$200 per year to a candidate or candidate committee. Local party committees, such as ward or town party committees are limited to \$1,000 per year in contributions per candidate while state party committees may contribute up to \$3,000 per year per to a candidate. There are no limits on in-kind contributions from local or state party committees to a candidate or their candidate committee. All contributions from business or professional corporations are prohibited, whether cash, in kind, or any other form, although unincorporated businesses may be used to make contributions, provided they are attributable to an individual proprietor of that business (e.g. John Smith D.B.A. Smith's Auto Shop) and are applied to their individual contribution limit. Candidates may, however, contribute unlimited funds to their own campaigns. Beyond this, municipal depository candidates may also make unlimited loans to their campaigns. Finally, candidates or their committees must ask any contributor who has given more than \$200 in a calendar year for their employment information twice, once when the contribution was solicited and in at least one written follow up.

Aggregate Data

Table 1 shows the vote totals for all at-large candidates in the preliminary and general election. Preliminary election fundraising is clearly influenced by the decision of four candidates (Irish, Lukes, Perotto, and Rushton) to run for Mayor before the preliminary election. Only two of the unsuccessful preliminary election candidates filed financial statements with the state of Massachusetts; all we can glean from these disclosures is that the money raised by these candidates (in each case, roughly \$8,000) is not necessarily sufficient to win one of the twelve general election slots. This table also calculates a receipts-to-votes ratio for preliminary and general election candidates; it is here that the incumbency advantage becomes evident. Incumbents needed to raise far less money to win in the preliminary election than did nonincumbents; this advantage diminishes somewhat in the general election. The effect of the mayoral race is also evident in preliminary election spending; three of the four candidates who declared their mayoral candidacy before the preliminary vote raised substantially more than did other at-large candidates. The incumbent mayor (Konstantina Lukes) is the exception to this pattern.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

Table 2 shows several measures of the funds raised by the twelve general election candidates. With the exception of William Coleman (about whom more will be said later), several trends appear worthy of mention. First, \$20,000 appears to be the threshold for running a viable at-large campaign in Worcester; all but two of the

candidates raised at least this much, although the top vote-getter, Gary Rosen, was one of these two. Second, incumbents do not necessarily raise more money than nonincumbents. Several incumbents raised relatively small sums (as reflected in the dollars per vote estimates in Table 1); the incumbent who raised the most money was unsuccessful in his bid to keep his seat. Third, as has been noted in literature on other types of campaigns, incumbents tend to rely somewhat less on personal loans; the three candidates who made the largest personal loans or contributions from prior campaign funds (Bergman, Rushton, and Germain) were all nonincumbents, although Rushton had previously been a district counselor. Differences between incumbents and nonincumbents in the percentage of funds raised in itemized (above \$50) contributions, in the average contribution size, in the number of maxed out donors, or the amount of money raised from donors outside of the city are not particularly noticeable. Such differences have been noted in studies of federal candidates; we speculate that these differences do not emerge here because of the smaller sums of money involved and because of Massachusetts's relatively restrictive contribution limits and reporting requirements. For instance, federal candidates vary substantially in their reliance on small and large donors, but the higher reporting threshold (\$250) and contribution limit (\$2,300 as of 2008) may make differences in the amounts contributed more noteworthy than is the case here. Although there are several anomalies, to be explored below in our discussion of the individual candidates, one can conclude that money can make a candidate competitive but does not necessarily determine voting outcomes.

The city council data allow somewhat limited inquiry into the sources of contributions. All candidates are asked to list the occupation of their contributors, but the identifications are spotty and often unrevealing, as is the case with federal data. PAC contributions are listed with the individual donations, but are an unreliable measure of the contributions of corporate interests since many corporate leaders opt to make personal donations. Thus, some PACs do show up in the data (one notable instance is the Paul Revere-Provident Bank PAC, which gave to several candidates), and one can identify some developers or other noteworthy business interest among the individuals; one instance of this is Berkeley Investment's Young Park, the developer of a multi-million dollar retail complex slated to be constructed in downtown Worcester within the next five years. But there is no systematic way to measure the contributions of business donors.

Labor union contributions are somewhat more easily classifiable in the data. Five candidates (Toomey, Perotto, Petty, Rushton, and Ross) received contributions from organized labor; unions making contributions included the Carpenters' Union, the Police and Firefighters Unions, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the Sheet Metal Workers, the Roofers' Union, the Plumbers and Pipefitters Union, the Nurses' Union, the United Steelworkers, the United Food and Commercial Workers, and the Teamsters. Union support for each of the candidates is noted below; only one nonincumbent (Ross) received substantial union support.

Candidate Profiles

Incumbents

Konstantina Lukes (Incumbent Mayor): When she began her campaign for mayor of Worcester, Konnie Lukes began raising money through letters. These letters first went to close family and friends, and as the race progressed she expanded her mailing. Lukes cites direct mailing and letters as her most effective technique of raising money. She does not like calling and asking people for money or holding fundraisers. In fact, over the years of running for city council and mayor, Lukes' donation pool has remained very consistent. She stated that she did not change her campaign or fundraising techniques significantly when running for Mayor versus running for City Council. Lukes raised approximately twenty percent of her funds from outside of Worcester, a smaller percentage than that of the three candidates who expected to run against her before the preliminary election. Her main donors were family and friends that give every year in smaller donations. Lukes claims that she strongly dislikes raising money and holding fundraisers, and believes that less than twenty percent of her campaign time was spent raising money. She believes that some of her opponents were much more aggressive than she was in their fundraising, and that this was not necessary unless the candidate had higher political goals beyond winning the Mayor's office. An example she cited was former mayor (and current Lieutenant Governor) Tim Murray, who spent \$160,000 on his Council campaign in 2005.

Lukes did not get any significant endorsements from major union or business groups in Worcester, but she was endorsed by the Worcester *Telegram and Gazette*. She appeared regularly on a local news station, but did not call in to radio stations or do a significant amount of radio ads and public appearances. Lukes believes that the amount of money raised in a campaign should be proportionate to the salary the winner will receive yearly. She spent about twenty thousand dollars on the Mayor's race while her losing opponent spent about eighty thousand, so she does not believe that there is a set amount of money to raise that will help a campaign. Most of Lukes' campaign money was spent on voter contact, with very little spent on fundraising and overhead costs. She saved significant amounts of money by running her campaign out of her personal law office. However, she did loan herself \$5,650 for the mayoral campaign, and believes that in all of her races over the years she has loaned herself about seventy thousand dollars. She has not paid herself back for these loans. When asked about her opinions on campaign finance laws in council races, Lukes believes that there should be a spending cap (note the implicit criticism of Murray and Rushton here) because without a lot of money it is hard for a candidate to have a chance.

Kate Toomey: In the 2007 Worcester City Council Election, Kate Toomey was running for her second term as an at-large city councilor. She had previously served on the school committee. Toomey claims that she campaigns all year round in order to reach the voters and obtain as much name recognition as possible. During the months leading up to the election Toomey focused on direct mailings, the most effective technique in raising

money. The mailings were sent to frequent voters, newly registered voters, and 'key' friends.

Throughout her career, Toomey has developed a core donor base of 800 people. Roughly 500 have been repeat donors since her first campaign with the school committee. Toomey receives a majority of her donations on the grass-roots level; she raised the largest percentage of her contributions in unitemized amounts of any of the candidates. She has a strong voting bloc composed of women and mothers whose general contribution ranges from \$25 to \$50. She is a firm believer that donations translate into votes. Therefore, it is more beneficial to seek a number of smaller donations rather than a few large donations. Toomey received the majority of her donations from residents from Worcester, with only \$4,475 coming from outside the city. These outside donations were received from friends and family who support her stance on city issues. Toomey also received small contributions from three labor unions.

Of the total \$20,673 raised, Toomey claims that very little was spent on overhead costs. She campaigned out of her home, leaving phone bills and soft drink purchases as the extent of her overhead. The majority of her money was spent on advertising. She purchased signs, pens, direct mailings, sponsored baseball teams, and even created a newsletter that was sent via e-mail. She would e-mail the monthly newsletter to an e-mail list which she created, and then friends would forward the e-mail to their contact lists. Toomey does have a web site, although it is not currently up-to-date. Another factor that was used to get her name out there was Facebook. Toomey has a Facebook account that she hopes will allow her access to the younger college demographic in the Worcester area.

Kate Toomey does not know which percentage of her money was spent raising funds, however, she did note that raising money was easier as an incumbent with some name recognition. She held four to five fundraisers, two of which were hosted by friends, and sent out a few mailings, some in the form of e-mail. Due to time constraints, Toomey was less hands-on in this campaign than in past years. She also wishes that she had used the internet as a means to raise money and will hopefully do so in the future. Toomey expressed the personal sacrifices she has had to make as a woman and a mother to be on the city council. Throughout her political career, she has taken out \$32,000 in loans. This current campaign she did not loan herself any money. Toomey hates asking people for money. She feels that people who donate money some times feel as though they deserve favors in the future, which she simply can not do as an elected official. She knows most of her donors on a personal level through previous work experience, the community, her neighborhood, and through her career within the city.

Toomey received endorsements from several unions and from representatives that she has worked with over the years. Toomey believes that a candidate needs \$30,000 to run for office for the first time along with name recognition. After that point she does not feel as though there is a maximum of which after money is no longer effective. She claims money is a perceived strength, that the more you have the better you are. One just needs to make sure that the amount raised represents a large number of voters, not just a

few large donors. Toomey believes that the citizens were more interested in the 2007 race than is the norm. She had hoped that only one candidate would run against the Republican leaning Konnie Lukes. She thought about running for mayor herself, but decided that the time was not right and did not want to split the anti-Lukes vote. She may run in a future election.

Gary Rosen: Gary Rosen was elected to the City Council for the second time in the 2005 election. Rosen had been elected ten years ago and served for two years, and then was not re-elected. Before running for City Council, Rosen was a member of the School Committee. He also taught chemistry for 27 years. In running for City Council, Rosen raised very little money, but was first in the primary and the election. He attributes this to putting his face out there. If you were around Worcester this past summer and during the fall, you surely would have seen Gary Rosen holding a sign for himself at any of the busy intersections in Worcester. In addition, he had a great deal of yard signs up on highly traveled road ways in Worcester. As a retired school teacher, he had the time to campaign for himself in an intensive manner. Rosen does not like fund raising, and said that he was not good at it. As Tables 1 and 2 show, Rosen raised the least money of any successful candidate. A great deal of his donations came from family members, as he said he didn't have a lot of friends. His method for raising the small amount of money he did raise was to go to family and friends. He does not believe in asking someone for money more than once. He said that once people donated to him once, he could not ask them for more money. However, he did say that if he could offer advice to someone running for office, it would be to raise money. He believes that money is essential to help get your name out and your issues.

Rosen had similar sentiments regarding his mayoral race. Again, he talked about how he had a small political machine and that while it got him his position on the city council, it was not enough to get him the position of mayor. He believes that his strategy of getting his face out there was very effective for him personally because he had the time to campaign for himself and in addition was not good at raising money.

Mike Perotto: Mike Perotto was a District 2 and At-Large City Councilman who withdrew from the mayoral race following a disappointing showing in the preliminary election. He subsequently turned his attention to keeping his council seat, but ultimately lost that seat in the general election. He was well known for his various works in subcommittees including Former Chairman of the Standing Committee, Former Chairman of the Public Safety Committee as well as a member of the Committee for Commerce and Development. During his time on the council, Perotto had a reputation for not focusing a lot of time on campaigning. He did maintain a website through which people could contribute. Perotto held several well-publicized fundraisers during the 2007 campaign; an example of this was shown advertised in *Worcester Magazine*, the local free entertainment weekly, for August 24th 2007. The Committee to Re-Elect Mike Perotto held a "night of food, discussion and entertainment" Friday at Fiddler's Green, Worcester Hibernian Cultural Center, 19 Temple St. The event was open to the public (Kotsopoulos 2007a).

Perotto raised a total of \$53,759, but much of this was received before the preliminary election, in anticipation of his run for mayor. He loaned himself \$5,600 and drew upon a balance of approximately \$7,500 left over from his previous campaigns. Most of his contributions came from Worcester and neighboring towns such as Shrewsbury. His total receipts from outside of Worcester were \$12,825, a slightly larger-than-average proportion. Perotto also received backing from five different unions (the Carpenters' Union, the IBEW, the Sheet Metal Workers, and Plumbers and Pipefitters Union, and the Roofers' Union), all before the preliminary election. A curious note to perhaps mention is that a lot of his donations are coming from persons of Italian descent. He got a few endorsements from *Telegram and Gazette* and from *Worcester Magazine*. Perotto declined to be interviewed for this paper.

Joseph Petty: Joseph Petty is currently serving his sixth term on the city council. Like many of his colleagues, Petty claims to dislike raising money for elections. He also feels that there is simply not enough time during a campaign to raise adequate money. He has a lot of strong endorsers; a lot of lawyers support him. Petty also noted that he received a large number of small donations; as Table 2 shows, he received approximately 16 percent of his funds in unitemized contributions, a smaller percentage than the top two vote-getters (Rosen and Toomey) but more than the other incumbent candidates. He uses lots of direct mail techniques to get his name out. One example of this is a mailing he sent out in October. It featured a smiling Mr. Petty, who is often referred to as “the Quiet Man” on city council holding a musical instrument and the headline read “Joe Petty Will Never Toot His Own Horn.” Another tactic of choice for Mr. Petty is renting out spaces to hold fundraisers and dinners. Petty however, did not do well during preliminary election and needed to be more aggressive than usual after finishing in the bottom half of candidates. He said he generally will rent out a hall, and basically just hope people will show up. Petty raised a total of \$29,597 during the last election; he raised very little before the preliminary election, but may have been galvanized by his ninth-place finish into raising money more aggressively between the preliminary and the general. He donated about \$3,500 of his funds himself. Most of his contributions came from within Worcester while \$6,384 (slightly over twenty percent) did not – a typical percentage among the candidates. When asked about fundraising in Worcester, Petty said it does not matter if someone is an incumbent or a challenger, money matters in elections. It is expensive to get your name out there, and money is needed to keep up in campaigning.

Nonincumbents

Michael Germain: Michael Germain was the only candidate not previously on the council to win a seat. Having raised the second-most money of all of the candidates running on the last election, Germain attributes a portion of his success to his ability to effectively raise funds. In his year-end report, Germain reported raising approximately \$34,000, although in our interview he claimed to have raised substantially more. He started raising money for his campaign with a self-loan of \$5,000. He then hosted the first of many social functions, this first one being a social gathering where he asked everyone in attendance to donate at least one hundred dollars. These initial efforts raised \$7,500 for Germain to start his campaign.

Germain commented that his most successful method of raising funds consisted of events where the donor received something in return for their contribution. This includes one of his more successful functions: a golfing tournament. In return for their contribution, donors got the opportunity to enjoy a day of golf as well as some personal time with the candidate they are supporting. While such an event requires a significantly larger amount of time and effort to organize, in the end, it pays off more as well. Not only does the candidate benefit financially, but this more personalized approach seems to draw in donors who eventually become committed supporters.

In regards to the actual process of raising money, Germain commented that he did hire a Campaign Manager and a Finance Director. These individuals often took it upon themselves to organize receptions and social functions where Germain was to attend. Here, individual donors could write checks, and based on the contribution amount, the Manager and Director often set up personal meetings with larger donors to pursue more support.

Since this has been Germain's first experience on Council, he was not able to list any repeat donors. He did, however, comment that in just his first year running, he has already had contributors make multiple donations. He added that it often becomes difficult to constantly approach the same donors for increasing donations. He commented that this gets particularly difficult when approaching family members. Family is often a first choice for candidates when initially approaching different people for contributions. This, according to Germain, often makes it difficult to repeatedly approach family members. Germain says that he typically receives smaller donations. He feels that these smaller donations end up paying off more, as they enable donors to feel more involved. In other words, if someone makes a small donation, they feel perhaps even more connected to the campaigning than a bigger donor, because they are eager to donate even a small amount for the candidate's success.

Overall, Germain estimates having had spent approximately forty percent of his time campaigning on raising money. He attributes this rather large percentage to his being a first-time candidate, but adds with a laugh, that "luckily, it was not one hundred percent!" Germain emphasized that the vast majority of his attempts to raise funds involved personal interaction. While he did certainly utilize the usual techniques of mailers, newspaper and radio ads, and signs (the total of which came to approximately eighty percent of his total money raised), Germain emphasized that the vast majority of his attempts to raise money were done personally in an individualized manner. Germain focused his fundraising energy on functions where he could meet donors face-to-face, and often progressed these interactions into future individual meetings.

While most of Germain's financial support came from within Worcester, he received support from contributors in states including New York, Illinois, and Kansas. Most of these contributors were friends of Germain's from his time as a student at Holy Cross College in Worcester. Germain was not specifically endorsed by other politicians, but he did contend that some of his most useful financial support came from unions. As a

first-time candidate, he raised over \$30,000, but remarked that it is possible that after approximately forty thousand dollars, fundraising is no longer crucial or of much potential to affect the campaign. Overall, Germain is satisfied with the campaign finance system in Worcester and feels the laws cater to the needs of potential candidates.

John Mahoney: Despite being a neophyte candidate, in his 2007 campaign for an at-large seat, John Mahoney, an insurance agent and proprietor of a local bar, was able to raise more than the \$20,000 (\$21,152) generally considered the threshold for a viable citywide campaign. Following his establishment of a depository account at Commerce Bank, Mahoney announced his candidacy for an at-large city council position in April of 2007 on the Jordan Levy radio show (a popular radio show hosted by the former Worcester mayor). With his wife serving as the Treasurer of the campaign, Mahoney quickly began raising the funds necessary to secure a seat on the city council. His first fundraiser, held in April of 2007 at Fiddler's Green, featured many local proprietors of small businesses and managed to net a total of more than \$10,000, or nearly half of Mahoney's total receipts. Not being a public employee, Mahoney was able to solicit funds personally, which he believed to have been advantageous, since it allowed him to capitalize on the many personal relationships that he had built with small business owners over the years. He also saw this as something of a flaw in his approach to fundraising, however, since he now believes that it might have been more effective to make heavier use of surrogates in his fundraising, if for no other reason than to be able to reach more people and expand his fundraising base beyond small business owners. Approximately 25 percent of Mahoney's funds came from outside of the city of Worcester, mostly from family members friends and business acquaintances of Mahoney's who live elsewhere in Massachusetts. All of Mahoney's contributions came from within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Mr. Mahoney did not receive any endorsements from unions or other interest groups, nor did he receive any campaign contributions from them. He did, however, receive the endorsement of Worcester's largest newspaper, the *Telegram and Gazette*.

Overall, Mahoney estimated that raising money took around 10 percent of his campaign time, which he felt was acceptable if not ideal. Mahoney felt that the amount of money he raised might have played a role in the outcome of the election, in that if he had raised more he may have managed to win a seat on the council; however, he also stated that he felt that changing how the money was spent might have had the same effect. For example, Mahoney felt that more extensive use of direct mail for both voter contact and fundraising would have yielded better results than the strategies pursued by his campaign, which utilized direct mail, but not to the extent Mahoney feels he should have. In the aggregate, the campaign spent approximately 10 percent of its money on fundraising and approximately 40 percent on voter outreach. Overhead expenses were kept at a minimum by running the campaign from his home. Mahoney felt that the Mayoral race, for which he was not a candidate, had little effect on his campaign.

In the end, it was clear that Mahoney felt that he might have had more success if he had been able to raise more money, additionally. Contrary to conventional wisdom, he also felt that there was not a point past which fundraising was no longer important. He also felt that while this may have been the case, the fact that he did not raise more money

was due to this being his first run for office, rather than the result of any inherent flaw in Massachusetts campaign finance regulations. Mahoney did, however, go on the record as supporting a raise in the individual contribution limit from \$500 to \$1,000, although he felt that \$500 was an adequate limit for contributions from Political Action Committees.

Morris Bergman: Morris Bergman has been a practicing attorney in Worcester for almost 20 years and this was his first run for office. He raised over \$40,000 during his election, one of the largest sums of any candidate and the largest of the nonincumbents. Bergman began his campaign with a personal loan to get bumper stickers and yard signs. In our interview, he stated that getting his name out was the most important thing for him to let voters know that he was a viable candidate and did have a chance at gaining a seat on the city council.

Once his name was out, he invited people that were heavily involved in politics and friends to the first fundraiser to start raising money. He said that holding fundraisers did not cost a lot of money as one is only really paying for the hall and catering. He said this could be accomplished for about \$500, while the fundraiser itself would bring in \$3000-\$4000. Fundraising in this arena proved to be the most profitable. The second highest fund raising outlet was people giving donations instead of attending events. Bergman did have some people helping raise money, specifically in helping coordinate the fund raisers. Most of the money donated to the campaign was from individuals within Worcester, save for some family donations from out of town. While he has a small number of \$500 donations, most contributions were smaller donations. There were some specific groups that he singled out as being particularly supportive, including teachers, police, fire fighters and retirees.

Most of Bergman's money was spent on the media. His campaign spent money on advertisements on Charter cable as well as advertising in the *Worcester Telegram and Gazette*. The third most expensive thing in the campaign was mass mailings.

The mayoral race did not have a large effect on Bergman's race. He said it was helpful for some people, such as Gary Rosen, to use the mayoral race to get their name out more. In his case, it was not effective as it was his first run for office. In regards to campaign finance, he believes that the goal of campaign finance regulation has been accomplished as far as letting the public know who is donating how much to which campaigns. He does believe that regulations are necessary, but finds some regulations arbitrary. Specifically, he takes issue with the donation limit of \$500. He believes that this number should be higher, particularly for city council races. Bergman also believes that corporate donations should be allowed because corporations can donate things such as supplies without donating money specifically. He thinks that the current system is transparent enough to allow corporate donations. However, he also said that a lot of campaign finance law is based on an honor system, which allows people to lie. However, he does believe that the regulations that are in place are better than no regulations at all. Bergman does plan on running for office again in the future.

Grace Ross: Grace Ross had an unusually high profile for a nonincumbent candidate, particularly since she had only recently moved to Worcester at the time of her council

campaign. Ross has been involved in activist movements, including gay rights and anti-racism causes, for many years. In 2006 she ran for governor of Massachusetts as the Rainbow-Green Party candidate. As Table 2 shows, Ross was one of the better financed candidates for Worcester City Council and finished sixth in the preliminary election. During the general election, she was criticized for not having resided in Worcester for long enough, and subsequently she also became embroiled in a controversy surrounding alleged anti-Semitic statements attributed to the Green Party (though not to Ross herself) which may have cost her some support in the general election. She finished eight in the general election.

Ross's campaign finances were raised in small donations, the vast majority under \$200, with no evident patterns as far as occupation or political party, according to the candidate. Because Worcester's elections are non-partisan, Ross claimed to have received no assistance from the Rainbow-Green Party, although a few of Ross's friends from the party did end up working for the campaign and although her contribution records list a \$400 contribution from the national Green Party. Ross raised contributions for her campaign through a mix of direct mail, internet donation, and in-person fundraising. According to Ross, fundraising did often get in the way of campaigning for office. By far, most of her campaign's finances were spent on paying staff and on overhead expenses. As the table indicates, Ross raised a large proportion of her funds from contributors outside of Worcester, no doubt because she could contact contributors to her earlier statewide campaign. Ross was also the one nonincumbent who received substantial backing from organized labor and other interest groups; she received contributions from five different unions, four of which (the Nurses' Union, the Teamsters, the United Steelworkers, and the UFCW) did not donate to any other council candidates. Ross also received financial support from the national Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund.

William Coleman: William Coleman has been a community activist for many decades. After working, for US Senator Edward Brooke from 1976 to 1978, Coleman became a perennial candidate for elected office. Coleman has been running for office since 1979. Despite his inability to win any elections, he describes himself as a community activist who works for change from outside the political system. In 2007, Coleman ran for the Worcester City Council. Coleman was the most poorly financed candidate for Worcester City Council, raising slightly over \$860. Despite his poor fundraising, Coleman defeated three candidates in the preliminary election who substantially outraised him. He ultimately finished twelfth in the general election. His campaign finances were raised from five small donations and a loan from his personal funds. There were no evident patterns as far as occupation or political party. According to the candidate, the few contributions he received came from ordinary people who liked what he stood for. Worcester's elections are technically non-partisan, but according to Coleman, Tim Murray and other party insiders largely ignored his campaign. Coleman raised contributions for his campaign through a mix of in-person fundraising. Since Coleman dislikes fundraising and raises funds rarely, fundraising rarely got in the way of campaigning for office. All of his campaign's expenses were spent on advertising, mostly by fliers, and reimbursing campaign volunteers for gasoline. Coleman was the lone

African-American candidate in the race, but Worcester's African-American population is not large enough to serve as a base in a city-wide campaign.

Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain interviews with two of the candidates – Rick Rushton, the most prolific fundraiser and the strongest challenger in the mayoral race, and Dennis Irish, an incumbent who declared for mayor in the preliminary election but subsequently withdrew from the mayoral race and ultimately lost his council seat. These candidates were clearly an important piece of the puzzle here, and in future versions of this paper we hope to provide information on these two candidates.

Conclusions

In our review of the literature on campaign finance at the local level, we summarized several common themes in the research on how money is raised and how important it is to local races. Some of these propositions held true for our candidates, while others did not.

First, and most importantly, following Lieske's claim, there does appear to be a threshold amount a candidate must raise to be viable. In the preliminary election, this amount appears to be about \$8,000, and in the general election, it seems to be about \$20,000. Most of the candidates, and particularly the nonincumbent candidates, provided large personal loans or contributions to their campaigns in order to speed their progress towards this threshold. Meeting this threshold is most important for nonincumbents; several incumbents have sufficient name recognition that they can raise less, but to be a competitive candidate as a nonincumbent one must raise enough money to make voters aware of one's candidacy. Beyond this threshold, however, money does not seem to be particularly important. Several candidates who raised well in excess of \$20,000 did not win council seats, although all of them did come close, and beyond this threshold money does not appear correlated with votes. The most prolific fundraisers by far were the three candidates who announced their intention to challenge the incumbent mayor early in the election; two of these candidates ultimately lost their council seats, and the runner-up in the mayoral race raised almost three times as much as the incumbent mayor. A knowledgeable observer of Worcester politics provided us with a relatively simple explanation of the importance to first-time candidates of raising money early – a candidate must make an initial purchase of a large number of yard signs. Once this purchase is made, additional spending becomes less important, and once one has run once, he or she has already made this initial investment and can recycle the signs from one campaign to the next.

Second, incumbents do not necessarily outraise nonincumbents, but they seem to have an easier time raising money. This may simply be because they are more experienced, but it may also be because they are able to maintain a consistent donor base

from one election to the next. The top three incumbent vote-getters appear to have spent far less time and energy raising money than did the other candidates. Incumbents are not, however, noticeably better at raising money from outside of the city, or from large or small donors, than are nonincumbents. This may be a function of the data we have available – for instance, some contributions from outside of Worcester came from national unions or PACs, or from well-connected partisan donors, but most appear to come from family and friends of the candidates or from people who reside just outside of Worcester but have business interests in the city. It is difficult to identify any sort of pattern here.

Third, Massachusetts' campaign finance laws seem to mute many of the differences in contribution size that one sees at the federal level. The low threshold for reporting a contribution (\$50) may make summing up unitemized contributions less meaningful than it is in federal races, where the threshold for reporting is four times as high. Many candidates spoke proudly of their appeal to small donors, but their definition of who a small donor is was different. Likewise, the maximum contribution amount (\$500) makes drawing conclusions about maxed out donors more difficult; there was not pattern in such donors across candidates.

Most importantly, all of the candidates strongly agreed that money is important, and all claimed to dislike fundraising but to wish they had more money to spend. Yet few candidates blamed a lack of resources for their losses. While some candidates had paid advisors, most ran their campaigns by themselves. This meant that the candidates agreed with most media observers about the outcome of the election – some candidates made strategic blunders, others made good tactical decisions, some were simply good candidates, others were not as good. We do not have the ability using these data to comment on the most common claim about urban politics, namely, that corporate or development interests tend to predominate. While the interests of donors are clearly important, for the most part these candidates provide a refreshing reassurance that the quality of campaigns can matter more at the local level than does the money that was spent in the campaigns.

Interviews

- Bergman, Morris. Interviewed by Kathryn O’Leary, March 14, 2008.
- Coleman, William. Interviewed by Alexander Abels, March 13, 2008.
- Germain, Michael. Interviewed by Mishal Aslam, March 13, 2008.
- Lukes, Konstantina. Interviewed by Mary Joyal, February 26, 2008.
- Mahoney, John. Interviewed by Kenyon Hayes, February 27, 2008.
- Petty, Joseph. Interviewed by Julie Cariglia, March 8, 2008.
- Rosen, Gary. Interviewed by Kathryn O’Leary, February 29, 2008.
- Ross, Grace. Interviewed by Alexander Abels, March 13, 2008.
- David Rushford (City Clerk). Interviewed by Mishal Aslam, March 13, 2008.
- Toomey, Kate. Interviewed by Angela Romeo, February 27, 2008.

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Table 1: Preliminary and General Election Vote Share and Campaign Financing

Candidate	Preliminary Election Votes	General Election Votes	Mayoral Election Votes	Outcome	Receipts	Preliminary Receipts*	Receipts per Vote (preliminary)	Receipts per Vote (general)
Rosen, Gary	7,372	10,616	4,552	Won general, lost mayor	\$16,458	\$1,366	\$0.19	\$1.55
Lukes, Konstantina	6,282	9,871	7,507	Won general, won mayor	31,381	12,675	2.01	3.18
Toomey, Kate	6,020	9,814		Won general	20,673	12,300	2.04	2.11
Rushton, Frederick***	5,002	9,654	7,391	Won general, lost mayor	86,607	40,677	8.13	
Irish, Dennis**	4,547	7,059		Lost general	39,239	26,765	5.89	5.59
Ross, Grace	4,228	6,698		Lost general	21,256	12,721	3.01	3.18
Germain, Michael	3,990	7,223		Won general	34,010	6,485	1.63	4.71
Perotto, Mike** ***	3,862	6,107		Lost general	53,759	22,110	5.73	
Petty, Joseph	3,577	8,226		Won general	29,597	8,921	2.49	3.60
Bergman, Morris	3,395	6,203		Lost general	43,840	8,032	2.37	7.07
McCarthy, William	3,111			Withdrew from general	8,030	8,030	2.58	
Coleman, William	3,093	5,114	1,318	Lost general, lost mayor	854	25	<.01	.17
Mahoney, John	3,020	6,420		Lost general	21,152	2,650	.88	3.29
Cruz, Maritza	2,332			Lost preliminary	14,096	14,096	6.04	
Alaimo, Allison	2,330			Lost preliminary	8,150	8,150	3.50	
Callahan, James	1,138			Lost preliminary	0			
Dellasanta, John	990			Lost preliminary	--			
Grandone, Michael	962			Lost preliminary	0			
Total	14,274	21,516						

* Preliminary election receipts for general election candidates are calculated based on itemized receipts (and thus underestimates total fundraising slightly). Preliminary election receipts for candidates who lost the preliminary election or withdrew (McCarthy, Alaimo) are based on year-end disclosure forms and thus includes itemized and unitemized receipts, and include any funds raised after the preliminary election.

** Irish and Perotto initially announced their candidacy for mayor but withdrew following the preliminary election.

*** Rushton and Perotto did not file year-end reports; their contributions are calculated from monthly reports.

Table 2: Summary Statistics on Candidate Fundraising

Candidate	Status	Outcome	Total Money Raised	Itemized Contributions	Unitemized Contributions *	Transfers/Loans	Mean Itemized Contribution	Number of \$500 Donors	Contributions from outside of Worcester
Bergman, Morris	Nonincumbent	Lost council	\$43,840	\$24,165	8,675	\$11,000	\$159	8	\$6,410
Coleman, William	Nonincumbent	Lost council, lost mayor	854	650	204		162	0	0
Germain, Michael	Nonincumbent	Won council	34,010	21,205	5,805	7,000	149	7	8,255
Irish, Dennis	Incumbent	Lost council	39,239	38,240	249	750	151	10	15,265
Lukes, Konstantina	Incumbent mayor	Won council, won mayor	31,381	22,250	3,481	5,650	112	7	5,950
Mahoney, John	Nonincumbent	Lost council	21,152	15,265	4,877	1,010	112	6	5,875
Perotto, Mike	Incumbent	Lost council	53,759**	33,235	7,551	12,973	141	21	12,825
Petty, Joseph	Incumbent	Won council	29,597	21,348	4,749	3,500	100	7	6,384
Rosen, Gary	Incumbent	Won council, lost mayor	16,458	8,925	3,533	4,000	168	8	2,700
Ross, Grace	Nonincumbent	Lost council	21,256	19,313	1,943		135	10	11,998
Rushton, Frederick	Nonincumbent (district council)	Won council, lost mayor	86,607**	67,690	9,775	9,142	189	39	34,505
Toomey, Kate	Incumbent	Won council	20,673	14,580	6,093		106	2	4,475
Total				286,867		47,652	157	125	115,022

* Unitemized contribution totals calculated by subtracting itemized contributions and loans from total reported receipts. Candidates are not required to report contributions of less than \$50; itemized contributions of less than \$50 were excluded from itemized contribution total. Because *** Rushton and Perotto did not file year-end reports (**), their contributions are measured by summarizing their monthly reports.