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Buchtitel	Positioning the Subject
Serientitel	
Kapiteltitle	Positioning the Subject Agency Between Master and Counter
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Abstract	Entering debates around subjectivity and subjectivation the subject is argued to face two opposing agency-directions: (i) experiencing effects and forces as undergoer, and (ii) experiencing oneself as agent in world construction. In storytelling activities, I suggest to investigate positioning at three levels: (a) between speaker and interlocutor, (b) as character and content construction, (c) vis-à-vis dominant discourses—reflecting an empirical sense of self. Finally, positioning analysis targets three areas of <i>sense-of-self</i> navigation: (i) sameness and change across time; (ii) difference and sameness vis-à-vis others; and (iii) agency in a world-to-person versus a self-to-world direction of fit. <b>Hinweis:</b> Wir benötigen für jedes Kapitel eine Zusammenfassung von etwa 10 bis 15 Zeilen Länge. Diese Zusammenfassung wird in der Regel nur online, z. B. auf SpringerLink, zu sehen sein, sodass interessierte Leser einen ersten Eindruck von Ihren Inhalten gewinnen. Sollten Sie keine Zusammenfassung geliefert haben, wird der erste Textabsatz als Abstract publiziert. Sie können uns mit Ihren Korrekturen jedoch noch einen Zusammenfassungstext zusenden.
Schlüsselwörter	Subjectivity - Subjectivation - Agency - Narrative - Positioning - Narrative practices



# 1 Positioning the Subject Agency 2 Between Master and Counter

3 Michael Bamberg

## 4 Abstract

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7 as undergoer, and (ii) experiencing oneself as agent in world construction. In  
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13 others; and (iii) agency in a world-to-person versus a self-to-world direction  
14 of fit.

## 15 Keywords

16 Subjectivity · Subjectivation · Agency · Narrative · Positioning · Narrative  
17 practices

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© Der/die Autor(en), exklusiv lizenziert an Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden  
GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2022  
S. Bosančić et al. (Hrsg.), *Positioning the Subject*,  
Subjektivierung und Gesellschaft/Studies in Subjectivation,  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38539-2\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38539-2_2)



## 18 **1 Introduction**

19 Entering debates around subjectivity and subjectivation through the lens of  
20 psychology requires stepping out of conventional, mainstream psychology that  
21 starts from a Western individual's interiority as the center where the threads of  
22 defining the subject theoretically feed into its empirical investigation. Subjectivity  
23 and its subject, from a critical psychological perspective, I think it is fair to say,  
24 are relatively new topics, originating with the 1984 publication of *Changing the*  
25 *subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjectivity* (Henriques et al. 1984)  
26 and the subsequent foundation of the journal *Subjectivity* (see Blackman et al.  
27 2008)—with the authors' explicit aim to “reprioritize subjectivity as a primary  
28 category of social, cultural, psychological, historical, and political analysis”  
29 (ibid.: 1). It also lies within this newly emerging movement (within psychology)  
30 to decenter the autonomous human subject, that questions of critique and change  
31 could become re-defined and tackled in empirically innovative ways (cf. Venn  
32 2002, 2020).

33 In this contribution, I will make the argument that within psychology,  
34 particularly in this newly emerging, non-mainstream and critical tradition,  
35 the subject is theorized as interlinking what I call two opposed directions of fit  
36 between self and world: On one hand, subjects refer to and make sense of their  
37 subjecthood as ‘being subjected,’ i. e., being the undergoer and experiencer  
38 of effects and forces impinging on them and out of their control. On the other,  
39 subjects experience themselves as agents in their construction of world, which  
40 effectively and ultimately includes their own self-construction. The former depicts  
41 the relation between person and world as a world-to-person direction of fit, while  
42 the latter portrays it as a person-to-world direction of fit. It will be argued that the  
43 tension between these two opposing directions of meaning construction account  
44 for one of the cornerstones for positioning theory and its empirical counterpart,  
45 positioning analysis, which both to be laid out in more detail in the next parts of  
46 this chapter. As indicated with the title of this contribution, theorizing the subject  
47 and subjectivity and making use of positioning theory (in the form of rigorous  
48 empirical analyses) are intimate friends—who go hand-in-hand in their call for  
49 what we present in the form of positioning analysis.

50 I shall start out with a brief survey of terms that all seem to circumscribe  
51 aspects of what is taken to be central to people making sense of themselves, i. e.,  
52 their sense of who they are as a person. Of the wide range of terms circulating  
53 in everyday English as proxies for ‘person’ and ‘personhood’ (self, identity,  
54 subject, character, persona, individual, psyche and mind—to name a few) I will  
55 rely on previous reasoning (summarized in Bamberg und Dege, 2021) that all



56 of them gravitate around three basic contradictions that are sought to be sorted  
57 out and ‘navigated,’ which we characterized as “dilemmatic spaces” or “arenas”  
58 (cf. Bamberg 2011a, 2020a). These three contradictions consist of, and they will  
59 be detailed below under the header of ‘positioning,’ (i) that we are considering  
60 ourselves as same and different vis-à-vis others; (ii) that we are the same in what  
61 we consider our past and present here-and-now, but also, and simultaneously,  
62 that we have changed; and (iii) that we are the product of world (our parents,  
63 communities, biological and material conditions that shaped us), but that we also  
64 (and simultaneously) impact and form world and make it ours (constituting the  
65 above two ‘directions of agency-fit’). While the differentiation and integration  
66 between self and other typically is dealt with in branches of social psychology  
67 (eg. ingroup versus outgroup bias and prejudice), developmental psychology  
68 has tackled how people maneuver the space between constancy and change (as  
69 in, for instance, biographical memory, life-stories, and autoethnography). When  
70 it comes to the third dilemmatic arena, the exploration of agency as originating-  
71 from-person versus originating-from-world, I believe it is fair to argue that  
72 psychology in its traditional disciplinary boundaries of individual psychology is  
73 trapped in theorizing the person’s interiority as the essential center from where  
74 identity and the meaning-of-life seem to emanate, with its counterpart in the form  
75 of sociological challenges theorizing and empirically interrogating ‘the subject’  
76 as being constituted by environmental and especially social (organizational,  
77 institutional, cultural, and socio-historical) forces. And although recent shifts  
78 from cognitive to cultural psychologies may be interpreted as openings to  
79 overcome the interiority-exteriority dichotomy, I also believe it is fair to say  
80 that these occasions more routinely turned into continuations of individual  
81 psychologies, holding onto the person’s interiority as the essential center from  
82 where meaning emanates, with culture and context as (impinging) variables.  
83 Positioning theory and positioning analysis, locating the empirical subject as  
84 constituting itself, while simultaneously being constituted, will be presented as  
85 an alternative to this trap of an either-or, i. e., ‘having’ an interiority, that is to be  
86 investigated as ‘expressing itself,’ versus mechanistically put together—without  
87 agency and at the mercy of external effects and forces.

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## 88 2 Subjects and Their Agency

89 In a recent attempt of sorting through some of the differences and congruities  
90 between ‘self’ and ‘identity’, the way these terms are currently made sense of  
91 in our everyday use in common English, we realized that other terms, such as



92 ‘individual’ (*individuality*), ‘subject’ (*subjectivity*), character and personality, and  
93 even consciousness, might equally have to be included to develop a deeper and  
94 more complete understanding of their contemporaneous currency in everyday dis-  
95 course.<sup>1</sup> In a nutshell, and grossly simplifying, we (Bamberg und Dege, 2021)  
96 argued that all three, ‘self,’ ‘individuality,’ and ‘subject/subjectivity,’ serve, though  
97 in different ways, to set the stage for our everyday understanding of ‘identity:’  
98 *Self* as providing the propensity to self-reflect and account for itself—and thereby  
99 as positioning itself as potentially different (versus similar or same) in relation to  
100 others. As a result, a self is empowered (*empowers itself?*) to self-augment—and  
101 becomes prepared to begin to work toward temporal continuity—with an aptitude  
102 for coherence and unity, striving for identity across the life-span (cf. Ricoeur  
103 1992). *Individuality*, in contrast, focalizes predominantly on the differentiation  
104 between self and other, and as such paves the way for the assumption of  
105 individual uniqueness, and the latently corresponding reference to ‘subjective  
106 experience.’

107 In our attempt to settle for a balanced account for how subject and subjectivity  
108 (and its relatives *subjecthood* and *subjective*—as in *subjective* experience)  
109 configure in everyday English, we faced complications that stem from a range of  
110 diverse and partly antithetical meanings. First, and relying on dictionary entries,  
111 the term *subject* in its most common usage can best be related as coinciding and  
112 overlapping with the use of the English nouns *topic/topicality* or some kind of  
113 *thematic centrality*. The following may serve as examples for this usage:

- 114 • Let’s change the subject of the conversation
- 115 • Math was my favorite subject in school
- 116 • Van Gough often used landscapes and flowers as subject
- 117 • Today’s subject is on narrative and its role in strategic branding

118 Whether this type of usage was the original one, only subsequently applied to  
119 particular events and persons is contentious, though there seem to be added (or  
120 just expanded) components of being or becoming subjected, as in:

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<sup>1</sup>Approaching theoretical terms from the vantage point of how they surface and function in pre-theoretical, everyday discourse opens up insights into their often unclear and debatable origins and versatile connotations. In addition, this perspective is openly centering on particular language-games in use, thereby attempting to avoid global, pan-cultural (philosophical) assumptions about the history of self, identity and related psychological concepts (cf. Bamberg und Dege, 2021).



- 121 • All of them were British subjects
- 122 • He became a subject of an investigation
- 123 • They were (served as) subjects in clinical trials
- 124 • Prices may be subject to change
- 125 • Classes today are subject to cancellation

126 Note that both connotations (thematic centrality and being-subjected-to-  
127 something) share an essential passive (non-agentive) component, seemingly  
128 working from a world-to-person direction of fit as vantage point for making sense  
129 of subject.

130 In stark contrast, the agency direction of fit from world-to-person is reversed  
131 when we turn to how the term *subject* is used to designate the syntactic category  
132 ‘subject’ in the business of linguistic analysis. In English, an SVO (subject-  
133 verb-object) language, the noun (or noun-phrase) that precedes the verb is  
134 the subject of the clause, and the noun-phrase that follows the verb the object.  
135 Although this categorization is designed to apply strictly to word-order (as  
136 syntactic arrangements) for English, it has taken on widespread generalized  
137 connoting semantic overtones in the form that the subject in English (as well as  
138 other languages that place their subjects in sentence-initial position<sup>2</sup>) typically  
139 connotes an agent (doer), and the object marks the entity to which the action has  
140 been conferred. In short, subjects, due to their English clause-initial position,  
141 are generalized to typically transfer aspects of the *subject’s* action onto an  
142 experiencer or undergoing entity. And while this generalization may be a feasible  
143 overgeneralization by native language speakers of an SVO or SOV-type of  
144 language, it does in no way rely on universally established principles. It should be  
145 noted that this assumption of ‘*the subject*’ as agentive, as originally grounded in  
146 everyday English perception, and its agency direction of fit from person-to-world,  
147 has taken off from its origins and become widely accepted in everyday English,  
148 though thus far little reflected in current dictionary entries.

149 Yet a third, and only partly overlapping meaning of the terms subject and  
150 subjectivity unfolds in their contrast to object and objectivity. Here, subjectivity  
151 is calling up personal, individualized and experiential ways of giving meaning  
152 to experience, especially to personal affective experience, in contrast to  
153 depersonalized, objective, and ‘true’ ways of making sense of self, the world, and  
154 the relationship between them. As part of the subjectivity-objectivity contrast,

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<sup>2</sup> ...such as German, which follows a SOV-typology.



155 subjectivity and ‘the subject’ galvanize aspects that differentiate the person not  
156 only as different from others, but—in alignment with a focus on the individual  
157 and individuality, heighten the subject’s potential uniqueness—the utmost  
158 differentiation within the self-other same/different-dimension.

159 These three connotations of subjectivity—(i) viewing the subject as the  
160 recipient and undergoing end of the world-to-person direction of fit, (ii) turning  
161 the direction of fit around and providing the subject with agency to act upon  
162 the world, and (iii) giving the subject a center for personal experience and  
163 demarcating it off as different from others in its potential for uniqueness—do  
164 not easily match up with each other and may lead to ambiguity and confusion.  
165 For the purpose here, it may suffice to be cognizant that the latter two heavily  
166 rely on the concept of a person’s interiority: recognizing one’s capacity for  
167 agency and uniqueness seems to imply choices that go along with appropriations  
168 of freedom, rights, ownership, duties and liabilities (cf. Harré und Moghaddam  
169 2015). In contrast, the meaning complex of subjects as theme-centered entities  
170 with a direction of fit from world-to-person that we discussed briefly above, does  
171 not require the assumptions of an interiority and psychological center; the agency  
172 direction of fit goes from world-to-person.

173 Thus, what our discussion of subject and subjectivity thus far could ‘reveal’,  
174 is its potential contribution to the overall spectrum identity/self/individuality,  
175 as being the least psychologized—in terms of an interior center from where the  
176 others are assumed to be organized. At the same time, subject and subjectivity  
177 conserve the potentially fruitful contradiction between the two directions of fit—  
178 being constituted within this tension—whereas identity, individuality, and self  
179 traditionally are made sense of as products of a person’s interiority.

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### 180 **3 Positioning, Interaction (Discourse) + Narrative** 181 **Practices**

182 To start with, the notion of positioning originally had not been designed for the  
183 analysis of narrating as an interactive activity. Rather, it aimed to strategically  
184 employ the notion of plots and story lines as guiding templates for human sense-  
185 making. Building on Foucault’s notion of “subject positions” (Foucault 1969),  
186 Hollway (1984) argued that “discourses make available positions for subjects to  
187 take up;” and, applying it to the category of gender, “women and men are placed  
188 in relation to each other through the meanings which a particular discourse makes  
189 available.” Davies und Harré (1990) built on these connections between dis-  
190 courses and positioning and defined positioning as a discursive practice “whereby



191 selves are located in conversations as observably and intersubjectively coherent  
192 participants in jointly produced story lines” (ibid.: 48). Thus, in conversations,  
193 due to the intrinsic interactional forces of conversing, people position themselves  
194 in relation to one another in ways that traditionally were defined as roles. And  
195 consequently, in doing so, people are said to “produce” one another (and  
196 themselves) situationally as “social beings”. This in mind, positioning explicitly  
197 addresses language and language practices under the header of how people  
198 relationally attend to one another in interactional settings, whereas stories and  
199 storytelling originally being confined to address what stories are referentially  
200 “about”, i.e., the sequential order of events and their evaluations (cf. Labov &  
201 Waletzky 1997). In a somewhat contrastive but complementary move, we (Bamberg  
202 1997, 2020b; Bamberg & Georgakopoulou 2008; Georgakopoulou 2007) suggested  
203 to apply the notion of positioning more productively to the analysis of storytelling  
204 by linking and merging the emphasis on interaction with the more traditional  
205 approach to themes and content and proposed the process of positioning to take  
206 place at three different levels as three arenas of “*positioning vis-à-vis*.”

207 First, in our daily practices, speakers mark themselves off as different,  
208 similar, or same with respect to others. Integrating and differentiating a sense  
209 of who they are vis-à-vis others takes place in moment-by-moment navigations;  
210 and stories about self and others are good candidates to practice this from early  
211 on. Navigations of a sense of self and identity contribute strongly to a sense of  
212 communal belonging on one hand, and of individuality and even uniqueness on  
213 the other. A second arena of constructing a sense of who we are relates to the  
214 navigation of agency, the way we touched on above. And although it seems as  
215 if agency exists as an a priori in the form of a human capacity, i. e., as if selves  
216 or organizations seem to be born with “*having*” an identity or sense of self, we  
217 suggested to better theorize agency as the space in which we navigate the two  
218 opposing directions of fit: the one going from world-to-person, the other from  
219 person-to-world, the way we discussed above. While it is possible to view oneself  
220 as a passive recipient of external forces (typically natural/biological or social—  
221 such as climate change or tsunamis on one hand, and parents, teachers, culture  
222 or nationality on the other), it also is possible to view the world as a product  
223 of the self. In this case selves or institutions position themselves as forces that  
224 impact and agentively change and even produce world. The navigation between  
225 agency and passivity becomes particularly relevant in presentations of selves as  
226 involved and responsible—as for claims to success and aggrandizement—ver-  
227 sus denials of culpability in mishaps or wrongdoings. Again, speakers sharing  
228 stories about (past or future) actions practice navigations of this sort. Third, when  
229 relating past (or future) to present, speakers can either highlight the constancy





230 of characters, i. e., declare them to be the same they used to be; or they can  
231 present a sense of who they are as having undergone some gradual (continuous)  
232 or radical (discontinuous) change—resulting in a different, new persona or  
233 entity. The space for how to navigate the connection of past (or future) selves  
234 with a sense of who they are for the here-and-now, is often seen as coupled to  
235 acquiring a sense of worth, or as having lost it and becoming useless (Bamberg  
236 2011a). While the navigation between sameness and difference and between the  
237 two directions of fit (of person and world) do not require diachronic temporality  
238 as an essential prerequisite, navigations of constancy and change do require the  
239 correlation of two events in time—which narrative inquirers have taken to be a  
240 minimal definition for story (cf. Labov & Waletzky 1997). Thus, it appears that  
241 navigations of constancy and change make a good argument for a privileging of  
242 storytelling as an opportune space for positioning practices.

243 In addition to positioning practices within these three navigation-arenas,  
244 positioning theory draws heavily on how speakers bring off and position  
245 themselves vis-à-vis so-called master and dominant narratives—thereby engaging  
246 in practices that may have enduring repercussions. In a general sense, the use  
247 of the term master narrative, also called dominant or capital-D discourses, goes  
248 back to the assumption of a necessity for a horizon or background against which  
249 human sense-making becomes possible. While this horizon or background has  
250 been theorized as based on a *collective consciousness* (and a ‘social mind’ or  
251 ‘intersubjectivity’), Searle (1994, 2010) started to use the term *background* more  
252 categorially to refer to something that is ‘deeper’ and more general, such as the  
253 human ability to walk (upright), a front (from where we visualize the world) and  
254 a back, and being equipped with arms (left and right) and using our hands. Searle  
255 juxtaposes this *deep* background with a collective/cultural background providing  
256 for what is assumed to be implicit to cultural routines and practices, allowing for  
257 the subtleties of particular kinds of language games. We have tried to appropriate  
258 the term master narrative for a linkage to the navigation of the above discussed  
259 directions of fit—for individual as well as institutional sense-making strategies  
260 (Bamberg 2005: 287), and thereby alluding to an affinity to what had been  
261 called *story lines* or *narrative threads* with an intrinsic temporality. In addition,  
262 we added to Searle’s two backgrounds a third set of assumptions that springs  
263 from interlocutors’ bodily engagement in local, situated contexts through which  
264 meaning microgenetically is brought into existence. Relevant for this discussion  
265 is that interlocutors, but particularly storytellers in narrative practices, are  
266 assumed to be situated in vis-à-vis positions vis-à-vis preexisting assumptions—  
267 providing arenas for navigating sameness/difference, the two directions of fit, and  
268 in case of available storylines, the temporal contours of constancy and change.



269 Now, we would like to suggest that the span from deep-seated assumptions  
270 that are profoundly woven into our language habits, to the communal/cultural  
271 assumptions that are more easily reflective and changeable, down to the situated  
272 bodily engagement between interlocutors, forms a continuum. For instance,  
273 critical considerations of language habits that reflect gender or racial biases  
274 may lead to changes in language practices with more ease than assumptions  
275 that are much harder to reflect and reconsider—such as our understanding of  
276 spatial dimensions of our human up-right posture and forward-movement; or our  
277 understanding of temporal dimensions as based on our understanding of spatial  
278 relations. It is against this backdrop that we can more firmly argue that speakers,  
279 and particularly storytellers, by necessity are forced to navigate continuously  
280 their vis-à-vis positions in terms of what of ‘the background’ continues to ‘go-  
281 without-saying,’ and what stands out as special and unique to the circumstances  
282 of the here-and-now of the interaction. And although this definitely holds for all  
283 interactive positioning, in storytelling activities this necessity of taking position  
284 prompts speakers/narrators to take position and navigate the three positioning  
285 arenas (agency/passivity, sameness/difference, constancy/change), and do this at  
286 three levels: (a) at the level of interaction between speaker and interlocutor, (b) at  
287 the level of character construction within the story-realm, and (c) at the level of  
288 positioning vis-à-vis background assumptions and dominant discourses—which  
289 we argued to simultaneously reflect practices that are taken to be highly relevant  
290 for the construction of an empirical sense of self. Thus, engagement in narrative  
291 practices requires interlocutors to engage in a continuous navigation between  
292 having faith and aligning with, and maintaining existing background assumptions  
293 on one hand, and testing or re-scripting—up to the possibility of challenging and  
294 openly countering—them on the other. Both being complicit and countering are  
295 at work in interactive narrative practices simultaneously and in concert.

296 Having clarified that storytellers inevitably position their alignments and  
297 divergence vis-à-vis assumptions that can be taken to filter into their narrative  
298 (and non-narrative) local and situated practices, and as we will argue in the  
299 next session that these positions are analytically accessible, we finally can turn  
300 and take issue with a particular interpretation and application of the term master  
301 narrative. Changing the focus from master narratives as enabling individual local  
302 interactive and storytelling practices to their constraining and limiting powers,  
303 especially when said to be experienced as hegemonic and subjugating, i. e., as  
304 ruling out potential other (counter)discourses, gives the term counter a special  
305 and more concerted force. It is this particular contrast that I originally dwelled on  
306 when arguing “that countering dominant and hegemonic narratives is the flip-side  
307 of being complicit” (Bamberg 2004b: 351). However, in the same breath, I tried



308 to put forth that neither master nor counter-narratives exist uniform, monolithic  
309 or pure, but rather that both are plagued by inconsistencies and contradictions,  
310 and both also require to be interrogated by the same methodical means as when  
311 the lens is not on the master-counter dichotomy. And it is in this context that the  
312 analysis of counter-narratives gains its attraction for opening potentially diverging  
313 gates into the analysis of power relationships and social change. Notwithstanding  
314 this incredible potential, our main bid for analyzing narratives as narrative  
315 practices, and thus as processes, and not solely as the product of narrative  
316 practices, remains central to our approach.

317 Returning to the role of counter-narratives, we now are better positioned to  
318 specify counter-narratives as uniquely distinguished by the aim to transform  
319 background assumptions which typically align with master narratives. In other  
320 words, master and counter-narratives are identifiable through the foundational  
321 illocutionary criterion of distinction. Which narratives “master” and which  
322 “counter” remains to be determined situationally and contextually, relative to the  
323 organization of social and political power in a given context. However, a variety of  
324 subcategories of narrative beyond master and counter can be delineated and may  
325 prove useful for analytic work with both master and counter-narratives. Unlike  
326 master and counter-narratives, parallel, alternative, and intersecting narratives are  
327 not identified through illocutionary intent and social context, but rather on the sole  
328 basis of content. Elsewhere, we have illustrated the differences between and utility  
329 of these constructs, with a discussion of the alternative narratives of falling-in-love  
330 versus arranged marriages (cf. Bamberg und Wipff 2021).

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#### 331 **4 Positioning analysis**

332 Due to space limitations, it is not possible to demonstrate in a characteristic  
333 exemplar fashion how positioning theory is put to work. Instead, I will detail the  
334 principles of positioning analysis, followed by pointing the reader to illustrations  
335 of the analytic procedures available in previous publications and work presented  
336 online.

337 In a nutshell, positioning, as an analytic framework, combines textual-thematic  
338 analysis with its traditional focus on what seemingly was captured in interview-  
339 transcripts (positioning level I), with the analytic attempts to capture and  
340 describe what is happening in the local and relational context of the interaction  
341 (positioning level II). Thereafter, both in concert are taken to move the analysis  
342 toward our particular interest at positioning level III, i. e., the navigation between  
343 master and counter background assumptions—thereby constituting an individual



344 sense of one's subjecthood. It should be noted and underscored that this kind of  
345 analysis does not rely on any recourse to the meaning-construction process as  
346 springing off from a psychological interiority (a *soul* or *mind* or *brain*). While we,  
347 as positioning analysts, in alignment with certain ethnomethodological principles,  
348 strongly oppose traditional psychological theorizing that starts from internal  
349 constructs and considers them to function as engines for action and behavior, we  
350 nevertheless posit that the interactive narrative practices in which people engage  
351 each other sediment in repetitive and routinised communal and cultural practices  
352 that may have repercussions in future practices.

353 In the first analytic step, the question is addressed how characters are  
354 constructed in position to one another within the specific sequence represented at  
355 the textual level, irrespective whether the text stems from life-stories, interviews,  
356 newspaper-clips, or naturalistic, everyday interactions between people. More  
357 concretely, positioning level I analysis aims at the linguistic and paralinguistic  
358 means (i. e., expressive, non-verbal behavior) that do the job of navigating the  
359 characters created in the text through the three identity spaces discussed in the  
360 previous section: sameness/difference, agency/passivity and continuity/change.  
361 Special emphasis here is attributed to the navigation of the agency, i. e., how  
362 speakers design their textual characters in terms of the direction of fit between  
363 world and person. While the traditional interest in psychology typically is in  
364 speakers' self-revelations, especially in the form of analytic self-disclosure,  
365 it should be noted here that the analysis of character-positioning other than the  
366 self is equally (often more) revealing than talk about oneself. In addition, the  
367 navigation of sameness/difference and constancy/change will be made relevant  
368 for how characters are presented as accountable and responsible personae, i. e., as  
369 traversing power relationships and social (and individual) change.

370 At a second level, the analysis will turn to how speakers position themselves  
371 vis-à-vis their interlocutors. At this level, linguistic, paralinguistic and bodily  
372 means (facial, gesture, proximity) are scrutinized for their contributions to the  
373 discourse mode that may be "under construction". Does the speaker, for instance,  
374 attempt to instruct their listener in terms of what to do in the face of adverse  
375 conditions, or engage in apologies for actions and attribute blame to others  
376 (or both)? This level of analysis typically aims to develop an understanding of  
377 why a particular turn was taken at this point in the conversation. This is where  
378 the reading of linguistic and non-linguistic markers at positioning level I is  
379 reinterpreted in terms of what John Gumperz (1982) termed "contextualization  
380 cues"—how linguistic and non-linguistic, affective signals become interpretive  
381 cues for where co-conversationalists are in conducting their relational affective  
382 business, and where they are headed. On one hand, it appears as if at positioning



383 level II we as analysts/interpreters *are leaving* the seemingly safe grounds of what  
384 actually has been said (and arguably can be captured in transcriptions) and enter  
385 the layer of multimodal performance features of discourse performance (with all  
386 its slopes and bumps that on the surface invite a multitude of interpretations).  
387 However, what we gain is that the positioning approach takes this level of the  
388 interactive co-construction of talk serious as foundational and constitutive for  
389 what is *textualized* at level I, and also what becomes the constitution of a sense  
390 of the subject at level III (below). To clarify, the local and situated relational  
391 business at hand between co-conversationalists is the foundation from where  
392 themes and content are making it to the surface for level I analysis. And, in  
393 the same vein, this also holds for the construction of a sense of subjectivity  
394 positioned at level III—to which we will turn next.

395 Having opened up for empirical investigation how speakers position characters  
396 *vis-à-vis* one another (level I) and position themselves *vis-à-vis* their audience  
397 (level II), the final step attempts to address an arguably trickier problem, namely  
398 whether and how speakers may position a sense of their subjectivity *vis-à-vis*  
399 *themselves*. More succinctly, this question attempts to explore whether there is  
400 anything in positioning practices that we as analysts can interrogate in the form  
401 of claims or stances (see our discussion of claims-making analysis and stance  
402 taking below) that goes above and beyond the local conversational situation. In  
403 other words, at level III, positioning analysis interrogates whether and how the  
404 linguistic devices and bodily maneuvers employed in narrative practices actually  
405 point to more than the content of what the narrative is “about” (level I), and  
406 directives *vis-à-vis* the interlocutor in their interactional business (level II). For  
407 the dealing of level III positioning, it is argued that in constructing content *and*  
408 audience, speakers observably appeal to dominant discourses (master narratives),  
409 align with or undercut them, and construct local answers to the question: “Who  
410 am I?” (Bamberg 2011a). To be clear, however, attempted answers to this  
411 question are not generalizable across contexts, as personality theory or other  
412 psychological trait theories would like to; rather, they are *projects of limited*  
413 *range*. Nevertheless, we as analysts assume that these repeated and continuously  
414 refined navigation practices rub off, produce and transmit a sense of how to  
415 engage effectively and productively in sense-making procedures that endure  
416 and may turn into habits—and this also to the extent of a sense of subject and  
417 subjectivity that is perpetual (and analyzable) at positioning level III.

418 There is a good number of instances that demonstrate how this type of ana-  
419 lysis is carried out. The first worth mention involves a very superficial (but short  
420 and engaging) demonstration (available on YouTube) of how consumers are  
421 positioned in TV-ads in the midst (May 2020) of the first peak of COVID-19 in



422 the US (Bamberg 2020a). A more sophisticated micro-analysis of Edison Chen's  
423 (an Asian singer, rapper and movie producer) verbal and visual positioning after  
424 a photo-scandal in 2008 is available in Bamberg (2020b)—again with visual data  
425 online. Other material used to perform detailed positioning analyses consists  
426 of videotaped police interrogations (Bamberg 2011b), closing arguments in the  
427 courtroom (Bamberg & Wipff 2020), 10-year-old males sharing stories around a  
428 campfire (Bamberg 2004a), or the politician John Edwards in a televised inter-  
429 view (Bamberg 2010). What becomes apparent is that positioning analysis over  
430 the last two decades has increasingly integrated and sophisticated the analysis of  
431 visual cueing in interaction data. Research reports that came out of a longitudinal  
432 project from the mid-nineties probably demonstrate best how positioning analy-  
433 sis with visual data also feeds deeper reflections of participants' positioning of  
434 their subjectivities as contradictory and multi-layered—opening our susceptibility  
435 to the complexities for interventive and educational strategies. Watching for  
436 instance ten-year-olds' interactions (as published in Bamberg 2012; Bamberg &  
437 Georgakopoulou 2008), my students' first reactions range between legitimizations  
438 and critique, such as “boys-will-be-boys” versus “toxic masculinity”—though  
439 largely insensitive to the complexities of what actually is going on underneath  
440 the surface of these interactions. However, after a close inspection of the  
441 participants' navigations between dominant and counter backgrounds and the  
442 ways their positions are displayed in micro-genetic detail, especially when it  
443 comes to their role as accountable subjects, a fuller understanding can emerge  
444 for the complexity and struggle for recognition in the formation processes of  
445 gendered subjectivities. As such, these documentations of positioning analysis  
446 are well suited to uncovering the contextually sensitive navigation of agency,  
447 resistance, performance but also ambivalence, dilemmas and contradictions for  
448 them as subjects. Employing positioning analysis facilitates a deeper inquiry into  
449 the delicate positioning work between master and counter positioning as well  
450 as how speakers position themselves as subjects—and simultaneously are being  
451 subjected—between the two directions of agency-fit.

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## 452 5 Concluding remarks

### 453 5.1 Comparing theories + their potential for empirical 454 inquiry

455 As may have become apparent, positioning theory attempts to avoid the psycho-  
456 logical trap of having to invent interview techniques that arguably are equipped





457 to penetrate individuals' interiorities, make them reflectively introspect, and  
458 thereupon engage in self-disclosure that then is assumed to unveil an authentic  
459 self. Instead, positioning theory avoids the exterior/interior distinction in its  
460 entirety, and approaches the subject as positioned and simultaneously positioning  
461 themselves—by way of navigating the two directions of agency-fit on one hand  
462 and in this process maneuvering between master- and counter-positions vis-  
463 à-vis ideological and hegemonic positions on the other. As such, the subject is  
464 approached as agentively engaged in the creation of ideological positions, though  
465 with the potential to critique and undermine these positions as well. Positioning  
466 analysis then is the methodology to (ethnographically) follow participants in  
467 their construal processes of such positions as process in which their subjectivities  
468 come to existence and are performed. These processes are described in terms of  
469 practices, i. e., as bodily (and as such also as verbally) performed and over time  
470 refined and changed enactments. Thus, what is being analyzed as the unit of  
471 analysis is not the person, and as such also not “the subject.” Rather the unit of  
472 analysis has shifted to the context—the time and place in which positioning is  
473 performed.

474 As a way of concluding, it should be noted that there is a range of competing  
475 theories and methodologies with their corresponding methods that compare and  
476 contrast with positioning in illuminating ways. To end our discussion, I briefly  
477 want to touch on two such competing approaches, “claims making,” and “stance  
478 taking.” Positioning, in contrast to ‘claims making,’ ‘stance’ or ‘perspective,’  
479 refers to an act or activity that, if applied to subjectivity, can be performed self-  
480 reflective and transitive—as in speakers can position themselves as they can  
481 position others. In addition, position also can characterize a state or result of  
482 agentive positioning activities of self or others—as in speakers or others being  
483 positioned as lawyers, females, young, Latinx, and the like. Claims making, a  
484 sociological concept for theorizing and analyzing social problems developed  
485 by Spector und Kitsuse (1977), and expanded by Ibarra und Kitsuse (2003;  
486 Koopmans & Statham 1999) to include political analyses of movements and  
487 protest, captures the agentive component of positioning, but remains disinterested  
488 in an analysis of the person who is making claims. Stance taking (Du Bois 2007;  
489 Englebretson 2007) and ‘perspectivation’ (Graumann und Kallmeyer 2002)—  
490 two related theoretical frameworks grounded in linguistic theorizing and applied  
491 to discourse analytic investigations—similarly are well situated to capture the  
492 agentive engagement of speakers in their choice of linguistic markers, but also  
493 seem to be relatively uninterested including into their analytic endeavors the  
494 stance or positionality as attributed to speaking subjects in terms of a world-to-  
495 person direction of fit. Interestingly, representatives of both claims making and



496 stance taking allude to the notion of position and positioning, without exploring  
497 them for their full potential.<sup>3</sup> Thus, and to sum up, positioning as theory and as  
498 analytic procedure is optimally “positioned” to capture the dynamic between a  
499 person-to-world direction of fit and being positioned as a result of a world-to-  
500 person direction of fit when discussing the relation between master and counter  
501 narratives and the role of background assumptions that ultimately enable  
502 communication and understanding (intersubjectivity) as well as enable critique  
503 and change.

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<sup>3</sup>Graumann and Kallmeier argue: “With ‘perspective’ and ‘viewpoint’ we refer to a position [sic] from which a person or a group view something (things, persons or events) and communicate their views” (2002, p. 1); while Downing und Perucha (2014) explicitly qualify their notion of stancetaking as “intersubjective positioning.”





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