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Humphreys Bebbington

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# An Andean avatar: post-neoliberal and neoliberal strategies for securing the unobtainable<sup>1</sup>

HUMPHREYS BEBBINGTON

*'Enough is enough. These peoples are not monarchy, they are not first-class citizens. Who are 400,000 natives to tell 28 million Peruvians that you have no right to come here? This is a grave error, and whoever thinks this way wants to lead us to irrationality and a retrograde primitivism.'* (Alan Garcia, President of Peru, 5 June 2009)

**Q20**

*'Is it mandatory to get gas and oil from the Amazon north of La Paz? Yes. Why? ... combined with the right of a people to the land is the right of the state, of the state led by the indigenous-popular and campesino movement, to superimpose the greater collective interest of all the peoples. And that is how we are going to go forward.'* (Álvaro García Linera, Vice-President of Bolivia, 11 September 2009)

*'It's absurd to be sitting on top of hundreds of thousands of millions of dollars, and to say no to mining because of romanticisms, stories, obsessions, or who knows what.'* (Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, 11 October 2008)

When Ecuadorian indigenous leaders went to a Quito cinema to watch the recent box office hit, *Avatar*, several of the film's messages struck close to home (Spitzer 2010). *Avatar* tells the tale of a planet Earth in which today's oil states (Nigeria, Venezuela) are militarised battlegrounds where global powers use force to secure access to oil. This is also an Earth so over-consumed that the US looks to outer space to secure the natural resources it needs to survive. There is no second contradiction of capitalism<sup>2</sup> at work here, however, because this search for and extraction of natural resources appears as big, and highly profitable, business. The film focuses on the encounter of one such business seeking out the precious sub-soil mineral 'Unobtainium' on the moon Pandora, also home to an indigenous people. The film charts the efforts of the company to use science, corporate social responsibility and military action in order to secure the deposits of

Humphreys Bebbington

**Q2**

Unobtainium that lie beneath the homeland and sacred sites of one particular indigenous tribe. The film culminates in a series of violent confrontations with the indigenous people ultimately victorious, company staff summarily dispatched back to Earth, and a human supporter of the indigenous people going genetically native.

It left a huge impression on us. For example, the movies are almost real. It's an example that makes us think a lot because the indigenous are defending their rights. We have to defend, just as the indigenous so clearly defended in the movie. We had an uprising; we had a confrontation with gases. It's the same as what we just saw in the movie,

commented Mayra Vega, a Shuar leader.<sup>3</sup> While some of the leaders' observations were more ironic – Luis Vargas, an Achuar, commented that 'this is a Hollywood movie, so it's practically a given that a mestizo comes to the defence and leads [the people] to triumph' – the similarity to their own experiences with hydrocarbons and mining companies was palpable.<sup>4</sup> '[I]t's reality, what's happening now just in another dimension', commented Marlon Santi, the leader of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador. The only difference for Santi lay in the level of conflict – in his own Sarayacu; the Kichwa population has been able to hold oil companies at bay without extreme violence.

Not so elsewhere. Across the border in Peru, June 2008 saw an attempt by the government of Alan Garcia to pass into law a series of decrees that would, *inter alia*, ease third party access to collectively held indigenous and *campesino*<sup>5</sup> land (Burneo 2008). Though primarily intended to unblock stalled mining projects in the Andean highlands, this barrage of laws catalysed an 'Amazonian strike' led by indigenous organisations and involving river blockades and occupation of hydrocarbon installations. That strike ended when the government agreed to revisit some of the laws, but when by 2009 it was still dragging its feet, indigenous organisations mobilised again. That mobilisation culminated in a standoff between protestors and the police on the Curva del Diablo, a stretch of road outside the town of Bagua. By the end of the day, 33 people had been killed, 11 of whom were policemen held hostage at an oil pumping station and deliberately murdered by their Awajun-Wampis captors in retaliation for the shooting of indigenous people. Even in a country so accustomed to violence and where some 70,000 people were killed during the armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s (CVR 2003), the events in Bagua rocked political debate and everyday conversation, and absorbed pages in both national and international press (e.g. Vidal 2009). This was not violence on the Hollywood scale of *Avatar*, but it was brutal – and, as in *Avatar*, the killing was being done by indigenous people as well as the armed wings of the state and industry.

The Peruvian government's responses to Bagua were at best half-hearted, if not cynical. A Commission was created to investigate events, and round-tables were convened so that government and indigenous leaders could negotiate a way forward. However, at the same time as indigenous leaders participated in round tables they were also being pursued by public prosecutors as the intellectual

95 authors of the deaths in Bagua. Meanwhile, when the Commission finally delivered its report it was signed by just four of its seven members and two members (a nun and the indigenous President of the Commission) produced a dis-  
sident letter citing 43 reasons why they did not sign (Manacés Valverde and  
Gómez Calleja 2009).

100 At the time of writing, and all this dissent notwithstanding, the Executive had sent a bill to Congress (Proyecto de Ley 3917) to ease forced resettlement of populations for projects that are of ‘public or primordial interest’. Meanwhile, Awajun-Wampis leaders were meeting again to discuss the possibility of new  
mobilisations, and lowland and highland indigenous and peasant organisations have called for public protest against the new bill.

105 In the remainder of this paper we argue that beyond the terrible human tragedy of Bagua, these events are of more general relevance to readers of *New Political Economy*. We suggest that what occurred in Bagua can be understood in terms of broader processes unfolding in the Andean-Amazonian region. These processes raise difficult questions for those who claim that parts of Latin America are now governed by regimes that can be characterised as post-neoliberal, and also throw very troubling light on the prospects for crafting new political economies in the many peripheral economies that are characterised by resource extraction.  
110

### **Violent environments: what difference does post-neoliberalism make?**

#### *Neoliberal violence*

115 The violence in Bagua had evident roots in deeper processes of structural change – the long history of usurpation of indigenous lands, the four decades of indigenous organising in the lowlands, the sustained failure of government to respond to lowland territorial claims. However, its immediate precursor was what Peruvian political and economic commentator Humberto Campodonico (2008) called a ‘torrent’ of decrees issued by the Executive Office under competencies given to it in December 2007 by Law 29157. This law delegated to the Executive the power to circumvent Congress and directly pass legislation necessary for implementing the terms of the Free Trade Agreement signed in 2006 with the USA.  
120 These powers were delegated for 180 days from 1 January 2008, and on their basis the Executive issued a hundred or so decrees, a great many of which were issued toward the end of the 180 day period (hence the notion of ‘torrent’). A number of the laws had the effect of weakening communal forms of property, of facilitating private investment in areas historically occupied and owned by peasant and indigenous communities, and of strengthening the hand of the state in achieving the outcomes it wanted on these properties. A leading constitutional lawyer, Francisco Eguiguren, deemed that a number of these laws had nothing to do with the Free Trade Agreement, and that as such the Executive Office had misused the powers given to it (CNR 2008). Other actors – including indigenous organisations, legal defence groups and the Ombudsman – also considered that  
130 under the provisions of ILO 169 and Peru’s Constitution, several of these laws should have been (but were not) consulted on with indigenous communities  
135

prior to their emission, and that as such they were neither legitimate nor constitutional. (Chase Smith 2009; Rénique 2009)

140 Many of these decrees reflected the translation into legislative proposals of a  
manifesto for Peruvian development that Peru's President Alan Garcia had pub-  
lished (just two months before the passage of Law 29157) under the banner of  
'The Dog-in-the-Manger Syndrome'. He used columns in the main national news-  
paper, *El Comercio*, to lay out his views regarding the main factors preventing  
145 Peru from entering into a full-blown 'take-off' along the lines proposed by  
W.W. Rostow in his theory of the stages of growth (Rostow 1960). In essence  
Garcia saw two main problems: a land and resource tenure system that offered  
indigenous and formally registered communities a degree of protection to rights  
of collective property and of consultation prior to large scale capital investment  
on their lands; and a set of civil society organisations and activists that sought  
150 to defend these rights. These organisations were, for Garcia, the dogs-in-the-  
manger who wanted to prevent large-scale capital from deriving value from  
resources that indigenous and peasant communities could not transform them-  
selves. Garcia (2007) complained 'there are millions of hectares for timber extrac-  
tion that lie idle, millions more that communities and associations have not, and  
will never, cultivate, in addition to hundreds of mineral deposits that cannot be  
155 worked'. 'That same land, sold in large lots, would bring in technology from  
which community members would also benefit but the ideological web of the  
19<sup>th</sup> century continues as an impediment: the dog in the manger'. Hydrocarbon  
expansion was moving slowly because 'against oil they have created the image  
of the "non-contact" jungle native' while for mineral development the problem  
160 was that 'barely a tenth of these resources are being exploited because here we  
are still discussing whether mining destroys the environment', a non-issue for  
him. These arguments imply a vision of development for Peru in which the role  
of modern technology, private property, large scale capital, and a combination  
of both foreign direct and domestic investment are paramount – a development  
165 process led by capitalists and in which the rest of the population participates as  
beneficiaries.

Q3

It is entirely appropriate to share Richard Chase Smith's view that this is a  
manifesto for a 'clear project of state reform that leads to an ultra-neoliberal  
170 model oriented towards the concentration of land and natural resources in  
private hands' (Chase Smith 2009: 51): a project that is, furthermore, remarkably  
well organised. A 'torrent' of a hundred or so new laws does not appear easily – it  
requires an orchestrated network of lawyers to prepare these laws, guided and  
resourced by interests committed to this project. But the question is whether  
175 what is going on in Peru should be only, or best, understood as an exercise in  
ultra-neoliberalism; and by the same token whether the violence in Bagua  
should be understood as the product of one more dislocation of neoliberalism –  
one more neoliberal, violent environment (Peluso and Watts 2001).

180 *Post-neoliberal violence?*

Peru's neighbours, Ecuador and Bolivia, are pursuing projects deemed anything  
but neoliberal – as much by international financial markets as by their own

185 governments. After assuming power in January 2007, Ecuador's president Rafael  
Correa spoke of his new government as bringing the country out of its 'long neo-  
liberal night'. One of the indicators, for him, of this unbridled neoliberalism had  
been the mining sector where, following reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s,  
rights to the subsoil had been handed out indiscriminately, leaving a large part  
of the central-southern highlands and Amazonian lowlands under concession.  
Legislation was so neoliberal that once a private party requested a concession,  
the state had to grant it; and to a very considerable degree, concessions could  
be renewed indefinitely. During his electoral campaign, Correa had suggested  
190 that Ecuador was on the verge of exploding such was the level of social conflict  
induced by this situation.

Initially Correa's government appeared to target the extractive sector as one in  
which it was going to prove its post-neoliberal credentials and craft new ways of  
governing the economy and natural resources. Indeed, the first Minister of Energy  
and Mines, Alberto Acosta, was an ecological economist in the Martinez Alier<sup>6</sup>  
mould, who sought to substantially rein in, if not ban, open cast mining. He and  
Correa also declared a commitment to a different way of managing oil (and  
carbon). This proposal hinged around the sensitive field of Yasuní-ITT (Ishpingo  
Tambococha Tiputini) located beneath a protected area of astounding biodiversity  
and occupied by Huarani and other indigenous peoples living in voluntary iso-  
lation (Yasuní is, perhaps, Avatar's Pandora on Earth). The government com-  
mitted itself to pursuing an alternative proposal for the governance of ITT<sup>7</sup> in  
which the oil would be left under the ground if the international community put  
200 half the revenue that Ecuador would otherwise have received from the oil into a  
trust fund that Ecuador could use for broad development purposes. On moving  
to the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly – which was charged with  
writing a new, post-neoliberal, constitution – Acosta carried these agendas with  
him, declaring that he would propose a ban on open-pit mining as part of the  
new constitution (Reuters 2008). Indeed, early in its work the Assembly passed  
210 interim mining legislation that declared stringent environmental and social con-  
trols, rescinded many concessions, froze a series of exploration projects until ir-  
regularities were addressed, and laid a basis for the creation of a state mining  
company. Yet by the time the Constituent Assembly was finishing its work in  
late 2008, the distance between Acosta and Correa had widened. Acosta was stick-  
ing to his ecological economist's principles, while Correa clearly worried more  
and more about growth. The parting of ways became so palpable that Correa  
began to intervene directly by telephone in sessions of assembly working  
215 groups that were finessing articles dealing with, among other things, extractive  
industries and the issues of free, prior and informed consent.<sup>8</sup>

220 While all was not lost in the final constitution, the period since late 2008 has  
seen *both* new legislation that is much more favourable to the large scale  
mining sector *and* a progressive hardening of Correa's positions on the rights of  
citizens to protest against extractive industry. If in late 2007 he was already  
saying: 'The ecologists are extortionists. It is not the communities that are protest-  
ing, just a small group of terrorists. People from the Amazon support us. It's  
225 romantic environmentalists and those infantile leftists who want to destabilize  
government' (Correa 2007), by late 2008 his position had moved from ridicule



to intolerance: ‘I’ll say it again, with the law in my hand, we will not allow such abuse, we will not allow uprisings that block roads that attack private property’ (Correa 2008). By late 2009 a healthy number of mining protestors were being pursued by the law, the government had moved (but then stepped back from) rescinding the legal status of Ecuador’s most outspoken environmentalist non-governmental organisation (NGO),<sup>9</sup> and a radio station in the Southeast of the country had its license revoked because it had broadcast radical statements of indigenous Shuar leaders during protests against mining.<sup>10</sup>

As the executive’s commitment to extraction hardened, the likelihood that Yasuní-ITT would become an oil field has also appeared ever greater. In January 2010, Correa rejected a long negotiated deal brokered by his own government with the UNDP, Germany, Spain and others that would have secured about half of the money required for the trust fund. Correa insisted that the conditions tied to the use of trust fund resources were too constraining: ‘if that is how it is going to be, keep your money and in June we’ll begin to exploit ITT. Here we are not going to trade in our sovereignty’ (Correa cited in EFE 2010). His Foreign Minister resigned in response. The significance of the Yasuní-ITT experiment failing would stretch well beyond Ecuador – not only as a sign that efforts to keep oil underground are likely to fail, but also because OECD donors who over the last year have become inclined to support such an initiative are less likely to risk wasting their efforts and political capital again.

While we cannot be sure of the reasons for this progressive hardening, many of them may well be fiscal. A member of Correa’s first cabinet, by instinct an environmentalist opposed to expanded extraction, recounts how, on seeing the government accounts, they first became aware of just how far the structure of government expenditure was dependent on the extractive economy. With the output of current oil fields projected to decline, the minister could see no way of sustaining social sector spending other than through expanding the oil frontier southwards (i.e. towards Yasuni) and opening up large scale mining. One imagines an ‘ah-ha moment’ of tragic revelation as the minister recognised the resource curse incarnate, staring up at them from the accounts and challenging the foundations of several political ecological principles they had hoped to bring to their cabinet work.

The links between fiscal realities, extractive policy and political projects are clearer in the case of Bolivia because the government makes no bones about the matter. The issue of extraction figured prominently in the politics that culminated in the election of Evo Morales’ Movement to Socialism (MAS).<sup>11</sup> This process has been reviewed elsewhere (Perreault 2006). Here the main point to make is that at the core of MAS’s strategy on extraction is to secure surplus for redistribution: in the words of Bolivia’s Vice President Alvaro García Linera, ‘The social-state need[s] to generate economic surpluses that are the state’s responsibility’, ‘you need to produce on a large scale, to implement processes of expansive industrialisation that provide you with a social surplus that can be redistributed and support other processes of campesino, communitarian and small scale modernization’ (García Linera 2009). The strategy for doing this has been two fold. First has been a form of hydrocarbons nationalisation that, while not involving outright state ownership (Kaup forthcoming), has massively increased the state’s

**Q12**

**Q5**

revenue from hydrocarbons (by an order of seven, according to some claims by Morales).<sup>12</sup> Second has been the concerted effort to extend the extractive frontier into both traditional and non-traditional areas of extraction.

275 In addition to securing overall macroeconomic stability,<sup>13</sup> this surplus is needed, according to the government, for two main reasons. The first is to increase transfers to those departments (sub-national administrative units) that currently receive no or few fiscal transfers from extraction because they have little or no hydrocarbon or mining activity within their boundaries. In the short term this revenue would be delivered through a hydrocarbons tax (IDH) on existing  
280 operations. Some of this IDH tax will be re-directed by central government to non-producing departments. In the longer term, the goal is to open new extractive frontiers in these departments so that they too can produce their own oil, gas and minerals and hence receive royalties directly. The second reason is to fund the range of social programmes initiated or broadened by the MAS government and that together constitute an important programme of redistributive and targeted  
285 social spending. The reach and visibility of these programmes<sup>14</sup> has made them central pillars of the viability of MAS' political project.

Evo Morales himself has emphasised this association of targeted social spending and the extractive economy in his efforts both to justify the government  
290 commitment to extraction and to criticise the position of environmental and activist groups such as Fobomade (The Bolivian Forum on Environment and Development).

295 What, then, is Bolivia going to live off if some NGOs say 'Amazonia without oil'? ... They are saying, in other words, that the Bolivian people should not have money, that there should be neither IDH nor royalties, and also that there should be no Juancito Pinto, Renta Dignidad nor Juana Azurduy (all cash transfer and social programmes) (Morales 2009).

300 At times Morales implies that if there were other alternatives they would be pursued, but that this is not the case:

305 necessity obliges us to exploit this natural resource, the gas, the oil, for all Bolivians. ... If there's oil, gas, you know it is for all Bolivians and this money that we collect from oil, from gas, has to go to all Bolivians. (Morales 2009)

310 Even if the extraction encounters resistance, it has to go ahead because its fruits are for all and because there is no other quick<sup>15</sup> pathway to increased social investment.

315 Nonetheless, this felt necessity to extract has indeed triggered resistance and has done so among MAS's own ostensible bases, in particular lowland indigenous organisations but on occasion highland organisations also. The chorus of discontent from these groups has gathered progressively more adherents and visibility since 2008. Recently, for instance, the Consejo de Capitanes Guaraní-Tapiete de Tarija, the coordinating body of indigenous organisations in Tarija (by far



the main gas producing department of Bolivia) issued a resolution complaining that:

320 we aren't prepared to continue seeing our demands subordinated to  
the interests and whims of other sectors and continuously passed  
over. ... We wish to express our concern and annoyance that our  
territories are being permanently affected by natural resource  
extraction activities and infrastructure construction without any  
325 consultation with our organizations as laid down by constitutional  
principles and current laws. ... No argument can justify govern-  
ment authorities or representatives of state or private companies  
simply ignoring all the rights that have been gained by indigenous  
peoples and that constitute the essence of the process of change  
underway in our country. (CCGT 2010)

330 The resolution ends stating that the organisations will be mobilised until their  
demands are met.

In addition, if relations with the Guaraní in Tarija have become tense, those  
with indigenous groups in the north of La Paz are yet more so. In this region  
335 the government – through Petroandina, a joint enterprise of the Bolivian and  
Venezuelan state hydrocarbon companies – is attempting to open a new hydro-  
carbon frontier in order that La Paz can generate its own royalties. The response  
of the Confederation of Indigenous People's of La Paz (CPIILAP), echoes that in  
Tarija, expressing a sense both that their rights have been passed over and that they  
340 feel deeply let down by the government. Their Natural Resources Secretary  
declared on January 2010: 'we the indigenous peoples have been leaders in this  
process of change, but the minute we ask respect for indigenous issues and pro-  
cesses of consultation we've been accused of belonging to the right, and of  
being part of separatist movements' (Servindi 2010). As with the CCGT in **Q6**  
345 Tarija, CPIILAP in La Paz also declared itself in mobilisation.

At the time of writing this increasing stand-off between lowland indigenous  
groups and MAS seems acute, with the government showing no sign of stepping  
back. On the contrary, the head of Bolivia's state hydrocarbons company YPFB,  
Carlos Villegas, recently stated that 'The issue of environmental permits and con-  
350 sultation and participation has become an obstacle (to investments)' and that 'This  
year we want to undo these obstacles'. A new draft hydrocarbons law reworking  
social and environmental safeguards so that 'social issues will not be an obstacle  
to investment' is now on its way to Congress (quotations from La Razón 2010).

355 **New (geo-)political economies?**

The argument here is not to suggest that contemporary political and economic  
dynamics in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru look exactly the same. There remain  
evident differences among the three countries' policies and approaches to extrac-  
360 tion. Peru does not speak of increased state investment in, or regulation of, the  
sector, Bolivia and Ecuador do; Peru appears to welcome capital from all over,  
while Bolivia and Ecuador suggest a certain predisposition to collaborate with

state and private companies from Venezuela, Russia, Iran and others. There are also political differences. Peru has not gone through a Constitutional Assembly process, while Bolivia and Ecuador have rewritten their Constitutions in ways that should offer new constitutional resources to indigenous and *campesino* populations. In addition, the Morales administration in Bolivia is still more open and able to negotiate and deal with its *campesino* and indigenous critics than is the case in Peru, where such critics are more likely to be persecuted and demonised (Ecuador appears to lie somewhere between these two positions). And evidently, the use of armed police and military violence on protestors has been by far the most severe in Peru (though it has not been insignificant in Ecuador either). So we do *not* want to suggest that there is nothing that is *post-* in Bolivia and Ecuador.

However, there *are* also convergences among the three countries, and the extractive sector seems to channel these convergences.<sup>16</sup> All three countries are encouraging the expansion of extractive industry as a pillar of macroeconomic strategy, and they each link this expansion to the possibility of poverty reduction and social investment. Of more concern is the sense that Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia also share a growing intolerance of resistance to this policy and each have greeted this intolerance with increasingly harsh rhetoric, criminalisation of protest (or at least threats to this effect), and a tendency on the part of their executive branches to emit proposals for legislative reform that reduce the scope for the exercise of citizen voice during the project cycle of extractive investment.

Another shared characteristic is that the extractive booms in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru are each part of a far larger re-ordering of Latin America's geopolitical economy and economic geography. Of central importance here is the so-called Initiative for Regional Infrastructural Integration in South America (IIRSA), US \$69 billion worth of 514 infrastructural investments in transport, energy and communications.<sup>17</sup> The logic binding these projects together draws on the shared historical imaginary of a geographically integrated South America in which inter-oceanic roads connect the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continent, widened rivers (*hidrovías*) connect inland production zones (of soybean, grains, bio fuels or whatever) with modernised ports, and pipelines and high-tension transmission lines link sources of hydrocarbons and hydroelectricity to consumers, exporters and energy hungry sites of mineral extraction and processing. While senior managers at the Inter-American Development Bank have said, in interviews, that there is no strategic relationship between extractive industry investments and IIRSA, the potential synergies are not lost on some of the industry representatives we have also interviewed. These synergies include, for instance: the building of ports that will facilitate mineral exports; the building of ducts that facilitate the transport of hydrocarbons; and the building of power lines that will, *inter alia*, bring electricity to extractive industry installations.

Synergies aside, the wider point is that South American geographies are being profoundly reworked in ways that converge on the Andes-Amazon region. Of particular significance here are the roles of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela. In many respects IIRSA reflects a Brazilian vision of Latin America, while some of the key regional players in the extractive and infrastructural sectors are also Brazil based: Petrobras (hydrocarbons), Vale (mining), Odebrecht (civil engineering) and the Brazilian Development Bank–BNDES (finance). Meanwhile

PDVSA, Venezuela's state hydrocarbons company is an increasingly important partner in investment and technical expertise in Bolivia and Ecuador. But another factor in this reworking is 'China'. As the performance of the Chinese economy places yet further pressure on the competitiveness of Latin America (Phillips 2009), this only increases the dependence on, and proclivity to promote, primary production and resource extraction as sectors in which a subsidy from nature sustains at least some global comparative advantage.<sup>18</sup> In addition, in these sectors too, across all three countries, China appears as an increasingly important foreign direct investor.

Q1

Q15

At one level these patterns (if that is what they are) might be read as a straightforward manifestation of the resource curse as a path dependent effect of long histories of extraction (Kaup forthcoming). Here we appear to have three national governments with extraction-dependent public budgets<sup>19</sup> whose ability to diversify their economies is circumscribed and who show signs of creeping authoritarian practices in order to secure the extractive base of their macroeconomy, social spending and political projects. These tendencies towards authoritarianism in turn produce progressively more difficult contexts for social movements who, for their part, seem increasingly predisposed to threaten, and even use, direct action. If there *is* something to this interpretation then the implication is that the spectre of the resource curse, if not determining all political outcomes, is at least an important constraint on the possibilities of political innovation and of the construction of government (and societal) practices that can make substantive and not merely discursive claims to post-neoliberal credentials.

Other questions also arise. If the Peruvian experience is anything to go by, protestors will demand that their localities receive a greater share of the revenue generated by extraction, and the industry will support this in the hope that it eases their operating difficulties. However, the experience so far from Peru is that these transfers create even more conflict than the extractive projects themselves (Arellano-Yanguas forthcoming a, forthcoming b). The difference, however, is that these conflicts are now *within* local society and local government rather than *between* society, enterprise and central authorities. In a context in which extraction moves deeper into areas historically occupied by indigenous peoples and claimed by them as territory, then the possibility must exist that conflict *within* indigenous society will increase.<sup>20</sup> This raises important questions about the longer term nature and viability of indigenous populations in these areas.

A further challenge to indigenous society will derive from the land tenure debates that follow in the wake of the extractive frontier, and that – if they translate into legislation – will in turn help the further expansion of that frontier. Recall that the spark to the deaths in Bagua was the attempt to facilitate private investment in areas of historically collectively governed and protected land tenure arrangements. It should therefore be unsurprising that one of the first figures to tread straight into the mire of Bagua was Hernando de Soto, declaring that the introduction of private property rights would help resolve the growing conflicts in the Amazon.<sup>21</sup> There is no need to pass judgment on the legitimacy of de Soto's statements for one to conclude that to the extent that such tenure changes end up being promoted across the Amazon (and Andes), then forms of indigenous organisation and governance would change forever.

455 Finally, reading across the three countries raises troubling issues of geographical and social justice, for the logics and consequences of extraction seem very similar regardless of the political project or ideological model. In each case, the argument is made that the subsoil belongs to the nation, and that it should be  
460 extracted so that its benefits can be shared by that nation. While the absolute benefits that are actually enjoyed by this ‘nation’ may vary among the three cases – the government’s proportional shares of the value of the subsoil may be higher in Bolivia than in Peru – the distributional effects are similar. Value is taken from certain spaces and distributed to others. The spaces that bear the  
465 brunt of the externalities generated by extraction are in the vicinity of the wells, mines, pipelines and smelters, and in none of these three countries are environmental safeguards and regulations handled with the seriousness necessary to offset the risk that today’s sites of extraction will be tomorrow’s sites of contamination and reduced viability. Meanwhile benefits and opportunities accrue in other  
470 spaces – in departmental and national capitals and more generally in areas of demographic concentration. This seems to be exactly the same whether we are talking of the north of La Paz in Bolivia, Yasuní in Ecuador, or Rio Corrientes in Peru. And once again, these are spaces that are occupied by indigenous groups who have been systematically and repeatedly disadvantaged by national development models. That pattern shows no sign of changing, whether under neo-liberal or post-neoliberal regimes.

475 Taken together, the politics and economics surrounding extraction in these three countries complicates distinctions between neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism, raising questions as what the pre-fix ‘post’ refers to. If it is supposed to refer to differences in macroeconomic policy, then as far as the extractive economy is concerned these differences are not that great. If it merely refers to differences in political discourses and the ways in which nationalism, imperialism and capitalism are *talked* about, then the difference implied by being ‘post’ would seem to be more rhetorical than substantive. And if it refers to differences in political  
480 style and practice, distinguishing regimes that are brazenly sympathetic to extractive capital from those that are just actually sympathetic, then ironically the ‘post’-neoliberal seems the less transparent of the two. To the extent, then, that Bolivia and Ecuador have been sources of inspiration for those who hope for a post-neoliberal agenda, the implication is that much more hard work has to be done to define the substance of this agenda.<sup>22</sup>

485 Whether these various neoliberal and post-neoliberal dynamics around extraction will translate into replays of Bagua is impossible to say, though the increasing assertiveness of Presidents and indigenous organisations alike is cause for concern. What seems far clearer is that this is a pattern that translates into  
490 replays of long histories of colonialism, of violent incorporation of peripheries, and of resource dependence. In that regard, the post in post-neoliberalism seems to count for too little.

## 495 Notes

1. This essay draws on research conducted during an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Professional fellowship held by Bebbington (RES-051-27-0191) and an ESRC doctoral fellowship held by

- Humphreys Bebbington (PTA-051-2006-00005). For more information in English and Spanish see [www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes](http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes). The paper has been helped immeasurably by the support of, and conversations with colleagues at the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales, Centro de Estudios Regionales de Tarija, Consejo de Capitanes Guaraníes de Tarija, Fundación Tierra-Bolivia and Servicios Educativos Rurales-Peru, with Maria-Luisa Burneo, Guido Cortes, Fernando Eguren, Leonith Hinojosa, Jennifer Moore, Hernán Ruíz, Cynthia Sanborn, Martin Scurrah, Teresa Velasquez and Ximena Warnaars, and with members of the TCD seminar group in the UK, and by the comments of Nicola Phillips, Gavin Bridge and Matthias vom Hau.
2. James O'Connor (1998).
  3. This and all other citations are taken from Melaina Spitzer's report for Public Radio International describing the leaders' visit to the cinema (Spitzer 2010).
  4. Another clear and striking similarity was with the mining company executive's incredulity as to why these backward peoples would not give access to their subsoil and agree to relocate in return for some schools and social services. It is impossible to count how often we have heard the same consternation, apparently genuine at times, in our own interviews with extractive industry staff and consultants.
  5. 'Campesino' most literally translates as peasant, though in many instances also conveys a far stronger sense of culture and collective identity than does the English term.
  6. Joan Martinez Alier is an influential ecological economist based at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
  7. The proposal had been floating around, and steadily elaborated over a period of years, in a process involving civil society groups, activists and academics. See Rival (2009, forthcoming).
  8. We draw here on interviews with elected representatives and advisors present in those sessions.
  9. This occurred in March 2009 – the NGO was Acción Ecológica.
  10. Following outcries the licence was later restored until the completion of a legal enquiry into the behaviour of the station (Moore 2010).
  11. Morales took office in January 2006.
  12. See his speech in El Alto on You Tube: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7G\\_oYDpKIQ](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7G_oYDpKIQ)
  13. The Morales government has, counter-intuitively, become a darling of the international financial institutions on account of its healthy budget surplus generated, above all, by gas.
  14. As in the many billboards advertising them as evidence of Evo's and MAS's ability to bring new resources to the popular sectors.
  15. Speed is important here. Political logic demands that Morales (and Correa) show results within the electoral cycle. Hydrocarbons offer one of the few ways of increasing government revenue in ways that are consonant with this need to demonstrate rapid increases in social expenditure. Politically and economically, growing and nationalising the hydrocarbon sector are more viable means of increasing resources for social investment than is the expropriation of domestic wealth (be this through either direct means or large tax increases).
  16. At least as regards the logic of expansion in the extractive sector, one is tempted to refer to these as 'family resemblances' (Peck 2004) and not merely convergences.
  17. For more information on IIRSA see [www.iirsa.org](http://www.iirsa.org). According to IIRSA, by the beginning of 2009, 51 of its projects had been concluded and 196 were being implemented, with a combined cost of \$38 billion; another 103 projects were being prepared, with a cost of \$17 billion, and 31 projects had been defined as strategically important and so were being given priority (IIRSA 2008). Given the scale of investment in IIRSA, and the transformations in South American environments that it will catalyse, there is remarkably little work on it in the academic literature.
  18. Though, as Bridge (2004) has argued persuasively, much of the comparative advantage in mineral extraction derives from policy frameworks, not geology.
  19. As indicators of this dependence, note the following figures generated by Leonith Hinojosa within the context of the programme on Territories, Conflicts and Development ([www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes](http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes)). Between 1990 and 2007, mining and hydrocarbons constituted on average seven point five per cent of GDP in Bolivia, thirteen point three per cent in Ecuador and five point nine per cent in Peru. This contribution has, however, increased markedly since 2000, and in 2007, the figures were 23 per cent for Ecuador, 12 per cent for Bolivia and 11 per cent for Peru. The contributions of the extractive sectors to foreign exchange are far greater. On average, between 1990 and 2007, extractives made up 57 per cent of total exports in Bolivia and Peru and 42 per cent in Ecuador. Between 2004 and 2007, as commodity prices boomed, these figures jumped to 70 per cent, 59 per cent and 68 per cent respectively. Calculating direct contributions to government revenue is more complex – and not always transparent – but estimates suggest that in Ecuador some 50 per cent of government income comes from the oil sector, while in Bolivia the average contribution from oil and gas over the last decade has been 34 per cent (UNCTAD 2007). As another measure of Bolivia's fiscal

dependence on hydrocarbons, when overall income from hydrocarbons fell by 35 per cent between 2009 and 2010, the central state's total revenue from taxes declined by 12 per cent, and eight of Bolivia's nine departmental governments saw their budgets fall by 23 per cent on average (Fundación Jubileo 2010). In Peru, the contribution from extractives increased to 42 per cent by 2006. The trend lines for total GDP and the percentage contribution of extractives to GDP move together in Peru and Bolivia, as do the trend lines for the weight of extractives in GDP and government social spending, implying a clear link between income from extractives and social investment (Hinojosa, 2009) Gudynas (2009) likewise notes that governments, above all the socially progressive ones, have used incomes from extractive industry for social policy. The relationship is most direct in Bolivia, where the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons was identified by the MAS government as the means of funding its commitments to fund a universal pension programme (*Renta Dignidad*) and the social policies brought together in its programme *Bolivia Digna* (which included a Social Protection Network, the Juancito Pinto programme [a payment to keep children in school] and an integrated community development initiative).

20. In the case of Bolivia, we have already noted this trend among the Weenhayek (Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington 2010).
21. See de Soto's much seen and debated video at: <http://www.ild.org.pe/indigenous-peoples-amazon/video>.
22. Thanks to Matthias vom Hau for pushing us on these issues.

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