Through two lenses: A cultural–developmental approach to moral psychology

Lene Arnett Jensen *

Department of Psychology, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01610, USA

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Abstract

This paper proposes a cultural–developmental approach to moral psychology. The approach builds on and synthesizes findings from different research traditions, including the cognitive-developmental, domain, two orientations, three ethics, and moral identity traditions. The paper introduces a conception termed a cultural–developmental template. The template charts developmental patterns across the life course for moral reasoning in terms of the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. The template, however, is not one-size-fits-all. Its general developmental patterns accommodate to the different constellations of Ethics held by culturally diverse peoples. From the present theoretical proposal follows a set of specific research expectations as well as a set of broader research implications for how to conduct research on morality from the vantage points of both culture and development. These expectations and implications include consideration of moral emotions, definitions of morality, and cultural variation in the life course itself.

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Introduction

At a time when people increasingly grow up and live in a globalized and multicultural world, we are challenged as psychologists to conduct research that captures both the devel-
opmental and cultural sides of people’s lives (Arnett, 2002; Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Jensen, 2003; Larson, 2002; Phinney, 2000; Valsiner, 2007). Across diverse research areas, psychologists more and more recognize culture as a crucial context in which development takes place (e.g., Cole, 1996; French, Schneider, & Chen, 2006; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Miller, 1999; Rogoff, 2003; Shweder et al., 1998; Sternberg, 2004). The aim here is to propose a new theoretical approach that takes both culture and development into account with respect to moral psychology.

The present paper introduces a new conception termed a cultural–developmental template. The template charts developmental patterns across the life course for moral reasoning in terms of the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity (e.g., Jensen, 1991; Shweder, 1990). The template, however, is not one-size-fits-all. Its general developmental patterns accommodate to the different constellation of Ethics held by culturally diverse peoples.

While the present paper addresses moral psychology, the cultural–developmental template conceptualization might be useful for other research areas as well. Thus, it provides one way to strike a balance between universalistic, one-size-fits-all approaches and particularistic, one-theory-for-every-culture approaches.

Definitions, foci, and organization

Here, development will be defined as psychological change that occurs in human beings as they age. Developmental change may involve increase or decrease; it may be quantitative or qualitative; and it may be gradual or stage-like. Culture will be defined as “symbolic and behavioral inheritances” (Shweder et al., 1998, p. 867) shared and co-constructed by members of a community. Symbolic inheritances are conceptions of divinity, nature, society and persons, and behavioral inheritances consist of common or habitual familial and social practices. Culture, then, is not synonymous with country or ethnicity but rather describes communities whose members share key beliefs and behaviors. Cultural communities include heterogeneity among subgroups and individuals (e.g., Jensen, 1997a; Turiel, 1998, 2002). Variation also exists between cultural communities in their degree of heterogeneity.

The present focus is foremost on research addressing moral reasoning and concepts. Intra- and interpersonal moral reasoning is important in individual and collective moral judgments and actions (Jensen, 1997a; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). However, consideration of some recent work on moral emotions is also included (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Kagan, 1987). In fact, the present view is that for most moral issues, addressing the relation between moral reasons and emotions will be more useful than drawing sharp distinctions.

In terms of organization, a succinct description of major lines of developmental and cultural research first lays out basic issues as well as findings to take into account in synthesizing developmental and cultural perspectives. Next follows a proposal for an integrative cultural–developmental approach to moral reasoning. The approach builds on developmental and cultural findings from a number of traditions while also drawing specifically on work with the three ethics proposed by Shweder and his colleagues (e.g., Jensen, 1991, 1997a; Shweder, 1990; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Then, there is a discussion of specific expectations as well as broader implications for research that follow from this new approach.

Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that I hope to encourage constructive dialogue on the challenging question of how to take into account both development and...
culture. The aim was to take a step beyond critique to present a new theoretical proposal. In recent years, exciting research pertaining to areas such as self, mind, language, and cognition has highlighted the intersection of culture and development (e.g., Cahan & White, 1992; Cole, 1996; Jensen & Larson, 2005; Kagitcibasi, 1996; Leichtman, 2006; Li, 2004; Miller, 1994, 1999; Nsamenang, 1992; Rogoff, 1990; Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, & Morelli, 2000; Shweder et al., 1998). Here the proposal is to consider both culture and development in research on a fundamental, fascinating, and complex part of human psychology—namely, morality. The argument is that a more compelling and complete approach to moral reasoning springs from combining the lens of culture with the lens of development—in other words, from looking at people’s moral reasoning through two lenses.

A history of division and a prospect for integration

A differentiation between cultural and developmental perspectives on moral reasoning occurred early in social science work. More than a century ago, the eminent sociologist Emile Durkheim (1951) argued that both everyday and momentous moral choices are influenced in critical ways by culture (1893/1984, 1897/1951). In forceful language, he stated that

> even the moralist who believes he is able, by the power of thought, to withdraw himself from the influences of surrounding ideas, cannot succeed in doing so. For he is entirely permeated by them and, whatever he does, it is they that he discovers once more at the conclusion of his deductions. This is why every nation has a school of moral philosophy that is in harmony with its character (1893/1984, p. 330).

About 40 years later, Jean Piaget critiqued Durkheim’s work (1932/1965) for paying insufficient attention to the developmental side of moral reasoning. Piaget agreed with Durkheim that morality forms in the context of social interactions (Damon, 1997; Youniss & Damon, 1991), and he granted that cultures vary to some extent in the moral concepts they make available to children. Nevertheless, Piaget emphasized that children everywhere share common developmental characteristics and a common potential moral trajectory. Specifically, Piaget argued that the younger child’s internalization of the moral rules conveyed by parents and other authorities is followed by increasing autonomy from those rules in late childhood or early adolescence. Through egalitarian peer interactions, according to Piaget, older children negotiate and remake some of the moral rules of their culture. Unlike Durkheim, Piaget did not see each culture as “permeating” its children with its moral philosophy. Bringing a new perspective to the issue, he wrote that “child morality throws light on adult morality”—meaning that children’s constructions of novel moral concepts point the way for how to better “form men and women” (1932/1965, p. 9).

Durkheim and Piaget held leading roles in setting a social science stage for focusing either on cultural diversity or developmental commonality, and for focusing either on the continuance of cultural tradition or the potential for collective progress. Subsequent to Durkheim and Piaget, cultural and developmental researchers have continued to make

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1 Piaget discussed how members of “primitive” and “differentiated” societies (Piaget’s terms) differed in their moral development (1932/1965, Chapter 4).
important discoveries about moral reasoning across the lifespan and across cultures. Next follows a succinct analysis of the central research foci and findings coming out of the three major developmental approaches of Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Turiel, and of the cultural approach of Shweder. As we shall see, attempts at reconciling and integrating the different theoretical foci and empirical discoveries have been few and inadequate. Seeing the research and findings in relation to one another, however, points the way to the present new theoretical proposal.

A cognitive-developmental approach

Starting in the late 1950s, Lawrence Kohlberg (e.g., 1958, 1964, 1969, 1981, 1984) formulated a cognitive-developmental approach to moral reasoning that has influenced much of the subsequent research on morality. Inspired by Piaget (1932/1965) among others (Baldwin, 1895, 1906, 1911; Dewey, 1930; Kant, 1785/1949), Kohlberg wanted to find out if moral reasoning develops in a predictable sequence. To help answer this question, he presented research participants with “hypothetical dilemmas” that often pit the value of life against the value of property or the value of one person’s life against the value of several people’s lives.

Drawing on participants’ responses to the dilemmas as well as his readings of Western rationalist moral philosophy, Kohlberg concluded that moral reasoning occurs in a sequence of three levels. Each level includes two stages, for a total of six. According to Kohlberg, every child starts out at the pre-conventional level, reasoning strictly in terms of ego-centered considerations. The child initially focuses on avoidance of punishment and obtainment of rewards (Stage 1) and then on satisfaction of self-interests (Stage 2). Next follows the conventional level and a shift to group-centered considerations. Here the focus is on adhering to the norms of family and other groups to which one belongs (Stage 3) and maintaining social order (Stage 4). The third post-conventional level goes beyond both the self and one’s society—reminiscent of the Piagetian adolescent’s perspective. Here the emphasis is on democratic procedure and social utility (Stage 5) or universal principles pertaining to justice and individual rights (Stage 6). Also like Piaget, Kohlberg thought that interactions and discussions with peers are particularly conducive to advanced moral development.

Extensive research has found that the first three of the cognitive-developmental stages are common across diverse cultures, whereas the other stages are not. Across cultures, younger children often use the concepts from Stages 1 and 2, and in the course of adolescence, the concepts from Stage 3 become common (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, 1984; Snarey, 1985; Walker, 1989). Stages 4 and 5, however, are less common, and Stage 6 is so rare that it was removed from the cognitive-developmental scoring manual by the early 1980s (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1986). In Snarey’s (1985) comprehensive review of 44 cross-cultural studies using the cognitive-developmental approach, none of the research participants reasoned at Stages 4 or 5 in 66% of the studies. Even in the studies where these two stages did occur, the majority of participants reasoned below Stage 4 in 67% of the studies. Reasoning in terms of Stages 4 and 5 is limited mostly to Western or Western-ized middle and upper-middle class adolescents and adults residing in urban areas.

Extensive research across cultures has also found that children and adolescents think in terms of numerous moral concepts that Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental approach does not take into consideration. This is the case for concepts pertaining to religion, spir-
rituality, and divinity (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Jensen, 1995, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b; Richards, 1991; Richards & Davison, 1992; Shweder, 1987; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990; Shweder & Much, 1986; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995). The cognitive-developmental manual includes 708 “criterion judgments” for scoring moral reasoning but, as noted by Walker, only a single one of these addresses religiosity, spirituality, or divinity (Walker et al., 1995, p. 384).

Furthermore, many researchers have concluded that concepts pertaining to community, collectivity, and interdependence also are not well-accounted for by the cognitive-developmental approach (e.g., Dien, 1982; Edwards, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1997; Ma, 1988; Snarey, 1985; Tappan, 1997; Tietjen & Walker, 1985; Walker & Moran, 1991). Yet members of many cultures place a premium upon such concepts. For example, research with Chinese children has shown that by age 4, they are well aware of notions pertaining to shame, loss of face, social discretion, and role-based duties (Fung, 1999; Miller, Wiley, Fung, & Liang, 1997). Moral development is well under way at an early age in these children. This morality, however, seems in step with Confucian ideals of social hierarchy and harmony, rather than the ideals of individual justice and rights at the end of Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental sequence.2

Only a few reformulations of the cognitive-developmental stages have aimed to include moral concepts that the approach does not take into consideration. Snarey and Keljo (1991) proposed an alternative Stage 5 focusing on “Gemeinschaft” concepts such as communal well-being. Ma (1988) proposed changes to Stages 4 through 6 for a Chinese perspective oriented toward collectivity and harmony. These reformulations, however, apply only to the very limited number of people in the world who ever reach Stages 4 or above. Related, they do not address the emergence and early development of the many kinds of community and divinity concepts that are not adequately included in the cognitive-developmental approach.3

In sum, children across many cultures develop along the path of the first half of the cognitive-developmental stage sequence. From early on, however, they also take other paths.

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2 Some researchers have argued that some community reasons and most or all divinity reasons should not be coded within the cognitive-developmental approach. With respect to community reasons, the argument is that references to concepts such as filial piety constitute the “content” rather than “structure” of moral reasoning (Lei, 1994). This argument, however, fails to explain the criteria by which the many community reasons used across cultures but not captured by the cognitive-developmental approach are content (cf., Brainerd, 1978, on criteria for structure to serve as an explanatory device). It also should be noted that most researchers who work or have worked with Kohlberg’s approach do not seem to regard such community reasons as dismissible content. Relegating these community-oriented reasons to “content,” dismisses key conceptions of morality that exist within a variety of cultures. With respect to divinity reasons, an argument has been that these concepts are meta-ethical rather than moral, addressing why one should be moral instead of how one goes about being moral (Kohlberg, 1967; Kohlberg & Power, 1981). As Kohlberg put it, reasoning in response to the question of what is morally right (or wrong) “could be answered with non-religious reasoning” (Kohlberg & Power, 1981, p. 233). This argument seems unconvincing in light of research showing that many people do invoke divinity reasons in response to moral issues, and that they clearly consider these reasons important or even final explanations of how one goes about behaving morally.

3 Rest and his colleagues (1999) also proposed a revision of the Kohlbergian post-conventional conception. Their proposal was based on research with the Defining Issues Test (DIT) rather than Kohlbergian hypothetical dilemmas. Again, the reformulation applied only to the top level of the theory at which few people reason. Gibbs (1977, 1979) has proposed reconceptualizing the post-conventional level as no longer forming part of the stage sequence (see also Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007).
with other end goals. In order to arrive at a synthesis, the question is: How do we capture both the developmental commonality and the cultural diversity?

The domain approach

In the latter half of the 1970s, Elliot Turiel and his colleagues proposed taking a step back from Kohlberg’s question of how moral reasoning develops to the question of what is moral in the first place (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1975). Turiel and his colleagues wanted to find out whether children differentiate moral from non-moral issues. Based on a similar tradition of Western rationalist philosophy that Kohlberg drew on (Duncan & Fiske, 1977; Dworkin, 1978; Gewirth, 1978; Lewis, 1969; Rawls, 1971; Searle, 1969), they argued that in order for a rule to be moral, key criteria are that it applies to everyone and that it cannot be altered (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). If children were to be asked whether these criteria of universality and inalterability apply to different kinds of issues, would they make distinctions between moral and non-moral issues? Also, would their reasoning in response to the issues vary? To address these research questions, Turiel and his colleagues have often presented children and adolescents with vignettes. For example, in one vignette a child pushes a peer off a swing, and in another a child calls a grandfather by his first name.

Turiel and his colleagues have concluded that three domains of knowledge can be differentiated, even if occasional overlap occurs (e.g., Nucci, 1981, 1985; Nucci & Turiel, 1993; Smetana, 1983; Turiel, 1983; Turiel et al., 1987). One of these domains is moral, but the other two which they have termed “conventional” and “personal” are not. According to Turiel and his colleagues, the three domains differ on criteria, reasoning, and issues. With respect to criteria, conventional and personal rules—unlike moral ones—apply only to one’s group or oneself, respectively. Also, conventional and personal rules—unlike moral ones—are alterable. With respect to reasoning, moral rules are justified in terms of references to justice, fairness, and the welfare of other individuals. Conventional reasoning, in contrast, focuses on communal and religious norms, interests, and authorities. Personal reasoning focuses on the welfare of the self. Based on these criteria and modes of reasoning, according to Turiel and his colleagues, examples of moral issues include stealing and aggressive acts (such as pushing someone off a swing). Conventional issues involve a wide variety of acts such as those pertaining to forms of address (such as calling a grandfather by first name), attire (such as wearing a head scarf), sexual customs (such as premarital sex), and familial arrangements (such as divorce). Personal issues include one’s choice of friends and recreational activities. The implication of Turiel’s conclusion is a notable narrowing of the moral domain. Morality, from this perspective, is solely that which goes beyond both self and society, akin only to the highest levels of development in Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s approaches.

Research findings across cultures have shown that children make a distinction between the moral and non-moral in accordance with the domain approach, but only for a highly select set of issues. In many parts of the world, children—even as young as three years of age—differentiate moral vignettes where an innocent child is pushed, hit or robbed from conventional vignettes where children eat food with their fingers or fail to follow the rules of a game. By and large, children speak of these vignettes in terms of the criteria and reasoning that the domain approach predicts (Ardila-Rey & Killen, 2001; Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986; Killen & Sueyoshi, 1995; Kim & Turiel, 1996; Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro,
In other words, contrary to Kohlberg’s theory, even very young children reason in terms of fairness and the interests of other individuals.

In many other instances, however, the predicted correspondence between issues, criteria, and reasoning does not hold. This has been found, for example, for matters pertaining to showing respect (such as honoring a deathbed promise), helping others in need (such as taking an ailing elderly parent into one’s household), sexuality (such as coed bathing), and avoiding disgusting behaviors (such as eating one’s dead pet dog). In many parts of the world, children and adolescents apply “moral” criteria of universality and inalterability to these matters, but they reason in terms of what the domain approach deems non-moral concepts such as role-based duty, social order, and spirituality (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Edwards, 1987; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Miller & Bersoff, 1992, 1994; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Nisan, 1987; Shweder et al., 1990; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszsynski, 2001; Zimba, 1994).

Taken together, these findings suggest that children in many parts of the world recognize that not all issues are of the same hue. Children from diverse cultures, however, appear to regard a wide variety of issues and reasons as moral that are not included within the moral palette of the domain approach. A new synthesis, then, would seem to require a broader definition of morality than the domain approach one. It would also need to take into account that definitions of the moral sphere may be both universal and culturally varied.

The two orientations approach

While domain approach researchers in the course of the late 1970s and 1980s proposed a narrowing of the moral domain, Carol Gilligan (1977, 1979, 1982) during the same period called for a broadening. She argued that a considerable part of psychological work—including work on moral development—was premised on the development of boys and men, and that the time had come to address the development of girls and women. She noted, for example, that Piaget had suggested that boys show more advanced negotiation of moral rules than girls. She also noted that Kohlberg’s initial research included only boys, and she claimed that girls score lower than boys on his sequence of stages. To Gilligan, this led to the question as to whether girls indeed are less developed or if they speak a different moral language—one that has been misinterpreted or gone unheard.

On the basis of interviews with American children and adults, Gilligan came to the conclusion that there are two kinds of moral orientations. One is a “justice” orientation, focused on how to negotiate among competing rights in an impartial manner. This orientation, according to Gilligan, is characteristic of male development—and of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s approaches. The other orientation, however, pertains to “care” and is more characteristic of female development. Here the concern is with tending to the needs of self and those with whom one has relationships. To Gilligan, this language of care is different from the justice one, but it deserves to be heard and valued.

Contrary to Gilligan’s claims, research reviews have found that girls and boys mostly score alike on Kohlberg’s stage sequence (Walker, 1984, 1986). (See also Thoma (1986) for a review of sex differences on Rest’s DIT measure.)
Research across cultures has found that children and adolescents—whether girls or boys—speak of both care and fairness. In some cultures, however, care considerations have a decidedly different inflection from Gilligan’s. Research in India and Japan, for example, has found that when children and adolescents speak of care, their focus is not so much on interpersonal feelings as role-based duties (Bersoff & Miller, 1993; Miller, 1989, 1994, 2006; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller et al., 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Shimizu, 2000, 2001). Also, the care is directed not only at other individuals but also communities as a whole, such as family, school, or society.

In sum, the motive to care seems to be universal. Why we care and in regards to whom, however, vary across cultures. The challenge for a new theoretical synthesis is to address the development of these diverse concepts of care.

The three ethics approach

While the two orientations approach added new breadth to the kinds of moral concepts that developmental scientists address, Richard Shweder (1982a, 1982b) in the course of the 1980s and 1990s suggested casting a still wider moral net—one that would catch the moral considerations of highly diverse cultures. Based on his research with children and adults in India and the United States as well as a broad reading of Western and non-Western work in philosophy and the social sciences, Shweder (1990) proposed a tripartite distinction between Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity (see also, Jensen, 1991; Shweder et al., 1997).

The three ethics involve different notions of what is at the heart of personhood and different moral reasons. The Ethic of Autonomy—to which developmental psychology has long paid the most attention according to Shweder—involves a focus on people as individuals who have needs, desires, and preferences. The moral goal is to recognize the right to the fulfillment of these needs and desires and to strive to make available the means to satisfy them. Whereas an autonomous self is free to make many choices, the self is restricted by concerns with inflicting harm on other individuals, encroaching on their rights, and consideration for their needs. Thus, in terms of moral reasoning, the Ethic of Autonomy centers on moral concepts that address the interests, well-being, and rights of individuals (self or other), and equality between individuals. It also includes the notion of taking responsibility for oneself and autonomy-oriented virtues such as self-esteem, self-expression, and independence.

The Ethic of Community spotlights how people are members of social groups such as family, school, and nation, and how they occupy various roles and positions within these groups. The moral goal of this social self is the fulfillment of role-based duties to others, and the protections and positive functioning of social groups. Accordingly, the Ethic of Community includes moral concepts pertaining to persons’ duties to others, and concern with the customs, interests, and welfare of groups. This ethic also addresses community-oriented virtues such as self-moderation and loyalty towards social groups and their members.

The Ethic of Divinity focuses on people as spiritual or religious entities. Here the moral goal is for the self to become increasingly connected to or part of that which is pure or divine. This goal may include either this-worldly or other-worldly considerations. The central moral conceptions of the Ethic of Divinity pertain to divine and natural law, injunctions and lessons found in sacred texts, and the striving to avoid spiritual degradation and come closer to moral purity. This ethic also taps divinity-oriented virtues such as awe, faithfulness, and humility.
Research has shown the presence of all three ethics in diverse cultures (e.g., Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001; Buchanan, 2003; Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1995, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, in press a, in press b; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Vainio, 2003; Vasquez et al., 2001). Furthermore, research has indicated cultural differences across and within countries. Across countries, findings suggest that American participants use Ethic of Autonomy concepts more than participants in countries such as Brazil, India, and the Philippines (Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1998a; Vasquez et al., 2001). Research within India, Finland, and the US has also indicated a difference between religious groups, with religiously liberal persons reasoning more in terms of Autonomy and less in terms of Divinity than religiously conservative persons (e.g., Jensen, 1997b, 1998a; Vainio, 2003).

Moral motives pertaining to Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, then, are widespread across cultures. The questions that a synthesis needs to address are: When do these ethics emerge in development? How is their course of development similar or different across cultures?

\textit{From one to two lenses}

Through a developmental lens, then, we have gained insight into some common patterns for how children and adolescents develop morally, as well as into issues of relevance for how children and adolescents define morality. The limitation of approaches such as the cognitive-developmental and domain ones, however, is that they are “one-size-fits-all” models that do not accommodate culturally diverse definitions of morality, culturally diverse moral reasons, or culturally diverse paths of moral development.

Through a cultural lens, we have gained insight into the presence across cultures of diverse ethics, and variation among culturally diverse peoples in their use of these ethics. Cultural approaches, however, give limited attention to developmental commonality, and instead raise the specter of one-theory-for-every-culture.

There have been very few proposals for how to view moral reasoning through both developmental and cultural lenses, and the proposals that have been put forth have been insufficient. Indeed, Turiel et al. (1987) have cautioned that “[t]he not too successful efforts of the past 40 or 50 years of combining the two disciplines [of psychology and anthropology] indicate that this is a hazardous enterprise” (p. 200). Nevertheless, seeing moral reasoning through both developmental and cultural lenses has become only more compelling as the worlds of Durkheim and Piaget have given way to a global world where many people live in the context of diverse cultures. At this time, then, it would be fruitful to build on the findings of developmental and cultural research to formulate a truly cultural-developmental approach. As demonstrated by the above analysis, the central challenge of such an approach is to chart the development of multiple moral motives across diverse cultures.

\textit{Through two lenses: a proposal for integration}

Research with Shweder’s approach provides for a way to capture highly diverse moral concepts used by different cultural groups. Up until now, however, a developmental model of the three ethics has not been presented. To address the intersection of culture and development, then, it may be helpful to consider how Shweder’s cultural approach can be extended by taking developmental findings and concepts into account.
In considering how the three ethics vary developmentally, it is necessary to address two issues: (1) the degree to which an ethic is used at different ages (e.g., Does the overall use of the Ethic of Community go down, remain stable, or go up with age?); and (2) the specific types of moral concepts that persons of various ages use within an ethic (e.g., Does a child reason in terms of different kinds of Ethic of Community concepts as compared to an adolescent or an adult?).

Most of the research that has analyzed people’s moral reasoning in terms of the three ethics has used a coding manual developed by Jensen (1991, 1996, 2004). In this manual, each of a person’s moral reasons is coded into one ethic (i.e., Autonomy, Community, or Divinity), allowing for an assessment of the degree to which a person uses each of the three ethics. Furthermore, each moral reason is coded into one of numerous subcategories (each ethic includes 13–16 subcategories, e.g., “Self’s Psychological Well-Being” and “Rights” for Autonomy, “Duty to Others” and “Social Order or Harmony Goals” for Community, and “Scriptural Authority” and “God-Given Conscience” for Divinity), allowing for an assessment of the specific type of moral concept used within an ethic. Distinguishing not only among the three ethics but also among types of moral concepts within each ethic means that highly diverse concepts can be taken into account. For example, different community concepts such as the Chinese concept of shame (Fung, 1999) and the Indian concept of role-based obligations (e.g., Miller, 1994) would likely be coded into the subcategories of “Community-Oriented Virtues” and “Duty to Others,” respectively.

In the following, a model will first be proposed for how degree and type of use of the three ethics is related to age. This model builds on the large body of developmental and cultural research described above as well as additional work to be described below. The model as a whole is based on extensive empirical work, but for some of its elements the available evidence is more limited. Where this is the case, it will be pointed out. The description of the model will be followed by an explanation of how the intent is for it to be used as a cultural–developmental template for research with different age groups within diverse cultures. The model, then, is not one-size-fits-all, but rather accommodates the prevailing ethics of diverse peoples. In other words, the template model finds different expressions in different cultures.

The three ethics across the lifespan

The model in Fig. 1 illustrates the present proposal for how the three ethics are used across childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. In other words, the three lines show a developmental pattern for the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. The positions of the lines, however, do not indicate their relative frequency in relation to one another (e.g., use of Autonomy being more frequent than use of Community and Divinity).

5 The development of the first coding manual in 1991 was based on a cluster analysis conducted by Shweder and his colleagues, an interdisciplinary review of literature on morality, and in-depth interview research with young, midlife, and older Americans (Jensen, 1995). Jensen revised the manual in 1996 based on additional interview and questionnaire research with American and Indian adults who were religiously diverse. By 2004, a variety of researchers had used the 1996 coding manual, and based on their feedback it was further refined. For studies that have used the manual, inter-rater reliability assessments (using Cohen’s Kappa) have ranged from .71 to .94.
With respect to the Ethic of Autonomy, the proposal is that reasons within this ethic emerge early and that the degree to which persons use this ethic stays relatively stable across adolescence and into adulthood. However, the types of Autonomy concepts that persons use are likely to some extent to change with age. Support for the proposal comes from the consistent finding across the research approaches of Kohlberg, Turiel, and Gilligan that children in different cultures speak early about harm to the self and the interests of the self (e.g., Colby et al., 1983; Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1984; Snarey, 1985; Turiel, 2002; Walker, 1989; see also Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995). Furthermore, as domain work has shown, children in quite diverse cultures are also capable of reasoning about harm to other individuals and the needs or interests of other individuals (Turiel, 2002). This finding also finds support in studies from different cultures using a variety of other theoretical approaches (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Haidt et al., 1993; Miller, 1994).

As persons in different cultures grow into adolescence and adulthood, research with different approaches has also shown that some reasoning pertaining to the welfare of the self and other individuals remains (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1995; Gilligan, 1982; Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1995, 1998a; Turiel, 2002; Vasquez et al., 2001; Walker et al., 1995; Zimba, 1994). Adolescents and adults continue to reason in terms of these concepts for diverse issues and perhaps especially for issues of relevance to their own lives (Buchanan, 2003; Walker et al., 1995). And it is likely that many or even most of the moral issues that people contemplate (outside of a research setting) are indeed of personal relevance.

In adolescence and adulthood, other types of Ethic of Autonomy reasoning may also become increasingly used, even if they are unlikely to become the most common types of Autonomy reasoning. Research with European and American participants, including Piaget’s original work, has indicated that adolescents and adults are more likely than children to speak of concepts such as individual rights and equity in a consistent and in-depth manner (e.g., Killen, 2002; Piaget, 1932/1965; Walker, 1989). However, as shown above in the cross-cultural review of Kohlbergian research, these concepts do not prevail in the reasoning of adults across cultures (Snarey, 1985). Nevertheless, research in other cultures suggests that adolescents and adults give some consideration to equity and justice (e.g., Miller & Luthar, 1989; Zimba, 1994).
The present proposal, then, is that a common pattern is for the degree of Autonomy reasoning to stay relatively stable across the lifespan but with some changes in types of Autonomy reasoning. However, it also needs to be noted that in cultures where there is a very strong push for collectivity or submission to divinity, there may be somewhat of a decline over time in Autonomy reasoning. In such cultures, considerations of the needs, desires, and interests of individuals (especially the self) would be seen as either irrelevant or even morally objectionable, and hence by adulthood these considerations might go down.

Turning to the Ethic of Community, the proposal is that both the degree of usage and the diversity of types of concepts rise throughout childhood and into adolescence and adulthood. As shown in developmental research by Kohlberg and his colleagues (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984) as well as cultural research by Shweder and his colleagues (1990), younger children in diverse cultures are likely to invoke some Community concepts, such as those relating to the interests of one’s family and familial customs. Cross-cultural research with the domain approach also shows this, even as the reasoning has not been regarded as moral but rather as conventional (e.g., Turiel, 2002). Moral reasoning related to the family is likely to find continued expression past childhood and probably even more so in the course of adolescence and adulthood as a person’s awareness of diverse types of family considerations increases (e.g., duty to family in addition to family interests and customs; e.g., Miller et al., 1990).

By late childhood and adolescence, a person is likely to also add community concepts that pertain to social groups other than the family. Thus, research across many cultures has found that children’s social circle widens as they reach late childhood and grow into adolescence (Whiting & Edwards, 1988). For example, by late childhood and early adolescence, the salience of friends and peers rises (e.g., Hurrelmann, 1996; Killen, 2002; Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998; Schlegl & Barry, 1991; Youniss & Smoliar, 1985). Other collective contexts, too, gain in importance across cultures, including school and work place. Thus, compared to younger children, the expectation reflected in Fig. 1 is that older children and adolescents use more Community concepts pertaining to non-familial groups.

By the time a person reaches late adolescence or adulthood, moral concepts that pertain to even broader social entities such as society as a whole are likely to become used in a more frequent and consistent manner. Thus, longitudinal research has shown how persons in their late teens and adulthood reason more about matters pertaining to societal organization, as compared to children and younger adolescents (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Walker, 1989). While this longitudinal research has been carried out in North America, the findings are likely to generalize. A variety of cultural research with adults has shown how they reason in terms of broader social entities (e.g., Jensen, 1998a; Nisan, 1987; Zimba, 1994).

With respect to the Ethic of Divinity, there is less research available and hence the proposal here has a more restricted empirical basis. In cultures that emphasize scriptural authority or where people conceive of supernatural entities (e.g., God) as largely distinct from humans (e.g., omniscient and omnipotent), the present suggestion is that the degree of use of the Ethic of Divinity will be low among children but will then rise in adolescence and become similar to adult use of this ethic. The reason is that in such communities, the culturally articulated concepts pertaining to supernatural entities are of such an abstract nature that they may be readily translated into moral reasoning only by adolescents whose cognitive skills allow for more abstraction than those of younger children (Adelson, 1971;
Additionally, the suggestion is that the types of Divinity concepts used by older adolescents will be largely similar to those used by adults. Older adolescents are likely to be as capable as adults of using diverse Divinity concepts such as those referencing scriptural authority, God’s authority, and spiritual virtues.

Preliminary research support for this pattern derives from in-depth interviews with children (ages 7–12), adolescents (ages 13–18), and adults (ages 36–57) who were part of an American religiously conservative congregation (Jensen, 2006a). In their conservative Protestant religion, God is omniscient and omnipotent. In response to six different moral issues, the adolescents and adults used significantly more Ethic of Divinity reasons than the children, and the children used very few Divinity reasons. Furthermore, adolescents and adults did not differ in the number or types of Divinity concepts that they used.

Support for the pattern is also suggested by the fact that a number of religious traditions have ceremonies and celebrations in early or mid-adolescence that explicitly confer moral responsibility on the adolescents and link that responsibility to knowledge of religious teachings (Mahoney, Pargament, Murray-Swank, & Murray-Swank, 2003; Sita, 1999). Within Catholicism, for example, adolescents who take part in the Confirmation ceremony promise to live by the teachings of the Catholic Church, and they show that they are ready to be responsible for their actions. Within Judaism, when an adolescent boy becomes Bar Mitzvah or an adolescent girl becomes Bat Mitzvah, they assume responsibility for obeying the laws of Judaism and the Jewish people. Thus, Bar Mitzvah and Bat Mitzvah are Hebrew for “son of the commandments” and “daughter of the commandments,” respectively. The presence of these rituals in diverse religions begins to point to adolescence as a key time for the explicit expression of moral reasons within an Ethic of Divinity.

The age pattern for the Ethic of Divinity proposed above, however, may only apply to some cultures. In cultures where scriptural accounts of supernatural or transcendent entities are less salient or where people regard such entities as less distinct from humans, it is possible that Divinity concepts are more accessible to and hence used more by children in their moral reasoning (Saraswathi, 2005). In some Hindu communities, for example, religious devotion finds expression in tangible and recurrent activities (e.g., bathing, dressing, and feeding the gods); there are many places within and outside the home for worship (e.g., household shrines, temples, roadside shrines); and there are a variety of persons seen to have god-like status or special connections with the gods (e.g., gurus, sadhus [renouncers], temple priests) (e.g., Jensen, 1998a; Shweder et al., 1990). In such cultures, children may reason about moral issues in terms of Ethic of Divinity concepts from fairly early on because these concepts are tied repeatedly to specific everyday activities and objects. Then in the course of adolescence and adulthood, additional Divinity concepts may become part of a person’s moral reasoning.

As Fig. 1 shows, the present proposal is that use of each of the three ethics generally either stays relatively stable or increases. With age, there is likely to be increasing cognitive complexity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993; Lerner, 2002) which would allow for increased use of diverse moral concepts. Research on moral reasoning does show that the number of moral

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Ample research shows that children growing up in cultures with a predominance of abstract conceptions of the supernatural can express these conceptions of supernatural entities (Oser, Scarlett, & Bucher, 2005). The suggestion here is that these conceptions do not get applied to moral reasoning until adolescence.
reasons provided by participants goes up with age (e.g., Jensen, 2006a; Walker et al., 1995).

The cultural–developmental template

As mentioned above, the intent is for Fig. 1 to serve as a cultural–developmental template for research with different age groups within diverse cultures. This means that the developmental patterns in Fig. 1 are accommodated to the constellation of ethics that prevail within different cultures.

To give an example, research has shown that in some religiously conservative cultures adults frequently reason in terms of the Ethics of Community and Divinity and infrequently in terms of the Ethic of Autonomy. In some religiously liberal cultures, adult members frequently use the Ethics of Autonomy and Community, and quite rarely use the Ethic of Divinity (Buchanan, 2003; Jensen, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, Vainio, 2003). Based on this knowledge, it is possible to make predictions for the expression of the cultural–developmental template in these two kinds of cultures.

Within religiously liberal groups, as seen in Fig. 2, the expectation would be that children, adolescents, and adults will make frequent use of Autonomy concepts, even as the type used may change with age. Community concepts will be rarer among children but will then become quite common among adolescents and adults. The Ethic of Divinity will be used infrequently at all ages and if it emerges, this will only occur in the course of adolescence.

Fig. 3 shows the predicted cultural–developmental patterns for religiously conservative groups. Here, children, adolescents, and adults will infrequently use the Ethic of Autonomy. There may be some decrease in this ethic over the lifespan because of the emphasis on renouncing self-interest that characterizes some religiously conservative communities. With respect to the Ethic of Community, the expectation would be that its prevalence will be low among younger children, higher among children in late childhood and early adolescence, and high among late adolescents and adults. Use of the Ethic of Divinity will be low among children (for religiously conservative communities with abstract conceptions of the supernatural), but it will then rise markedly in adolescence and remain high throughout adulthood.

Fig. 2. Expression of the cultural-developmental template among religious liberals.
In summary, the cultural–developmental template of moral reasoning proposed here allows for a way to conceptualize the moral development of children, adolescents, and adults who form part of diverse cultural communities. The template incorporates a broad definition of moral reasoning rather than a restrictive one. It incorporates complexity by taking into account multiple dimensions. Specifically it allows us to see people’s moral lives through the lenses of both culture and development. The template also allows for flexibility in that it allows for consideration of the interaction of development and culture. The template proposal, then, strikes a middle ground between having a single model for people everywhere and the prospect of having one model for every culture.

Future directions: research expectations

Like all theoretical proposals, the present one entails specific research expectations and questions. The present proposal, however, also entails some noteworthy broader implications for how to conduct research on moral psychology. This is because it synthesizes two research paradigms with different conceptions and traditions of how to study morality. The specific research expectations and the broader research implications will be discussed in turn.

The template thesis

The cultural–developmental template described above lays out expectations for developmental changes in use of the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity in the context of specific cultures. As described, the proposed developmental changes in degree of usage of the Ethics of Autonomy and Community are supported by a substantial body of research, and the expectation would be that they would find continued support.

We know somewhat less about some of the lifespan developmental changes in types of Autonomy and Community reasoning used within various cultures. Here there is a need for more research to test and elaborate on the present proposal.

We know relatively little about lifespan changes for the Ethic of Divinity. As described above, this constitutes an emerging area of research. The present template suggests how
changes in Divinity reasoning may occur developmentally (with adolescence being an important period), as well as how this developmental pattern may depend on both the extent of Divinity reasoning used within a culture and the kind of conceptualizations of the supernatural that prevail within a culture. These specific suggestions require additional testing.

**The definition of morality thesis**

The present cultural–developmental proposal entails a broad definition of morality that includes Autonomy, Community, and Divinity reasoning. This proposal is based on an extensive number of studies conducted in diverse parts of the world. The present model also details how cultures differ on their constellation of ethics (e.g., some cultures preference Community over Autonomy whereas other cultures preference Autonomy over Community). Consequently, one expectation is that people from different cultures to some extent will vary in the kinds of behaviors they include within the moral domain. For example, people who reason in terms of Ethic of Divinity concepts such as God’s will or the human body being God’s temple are likely to regard a number of behaviors as moral that people who do not use this kind of reasoning will imbue with little or no moral significance. Research has begun to show support for this thesis with respect to behaviors such as suicide in the case of terminal illness and alcohol use (Jensen, 1995), as well as behaviors pertaining to purity and pollution (Haidt & Graham, 2006). More research, however, is needed on how different constellations of ethics (at various ages and in various cultures) are related to different definitions of what is moral and what is not.

Another expectation is that people from different cultures may vary on the kinds of criteria they have for regarding behaviors as moral. As described above, the notion of universalizability has been prominent in moral development research, especially in domain theory research and Kohlberg’s Stage 6 definition. Ironically, the universalizability criterion may not be universal. For example, research has indicated that religiously conservative groups have a hierarchical worldview (e.g., Ammerman, 1987; Jensen, 1997a, 2006b). In this view, God is above humans. Among humans, differences exist in some respects between various groups, including believers and non-believers. Based on such a worldview along with Ethic of Divinity reasoning, a conservative Christian can maintain that one may require more morally out of a Christian than a non-Christian (e.g., sexual abstinence prior to marriage, modesty in dress, tithing). An orthodox Jew can hold that moral expectations for Jews are different from those for non-Jews (e.g., keeping kosher, circumcision). It would seem that a large number of peoples do not share the universalizability criterion that came out of Western rationalist philosophy (Wilson, 1993), or at least it is not their only or foremost criterion. As noted by Blasi (1987, 1990), what we need is more research on people’s indigenous criteria rather than presupposing criteria coming out of particular philosophical traditions. The present proposal is that it would be fruitful to examine the kinds of criteria held by people with different constellations of the three ethics.

**The constellation of ethics thesis**

As described above, the proposal here is that cultures have distinct constellations of ethics. Furthermore, the present expectation is that individuals, too, reason about different
moral issues in terms of particular constellation of ethics, and that these constellations change with development. In other words, the expectation is not what might be termed a “toolbox” approach to moral reasoning which would predict that an individual uses one kind of reasoning for one issue, a different kind for another issue, and so forth. The present expectation is in harmony with recent identity work on moral reasoning and behavior that also emphasizes a certain measure of cognitive coherence within the self (e.g., Blasi, 1994; Colby & Damon, 1992; Damon, Menon, & Bronk, 2003; Lapsley, 2006; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Yates & Youniss, 1996; Youniss & Yates, 1997). As described by Blasi (1994), for example, a person will reason in terms of certain moral concepts across diverse issues. As a person comes to identify strongly with these concepts, they become a core part of the person’s sense of self that will habitually guide behavior. In turn, the behaviors may reinforce and refine the moral identity.

The present thesis, however, does not entail that an individual’s constellation of ethics is impervious to some variation across moral issues. Research has suggested that people to some extent reason differently about researcher-generated vignettes than participant-generated personal moral experiences. This has been found both for research with Kohlberg’s stages (Walker et al., 1995) and the three ethics (Buchanan, 2003). Research with the three ethics has also suggested that individuals’ reasoning about some issues may be influenced by public debate (Jensen, 1998b). For example, across highly varied moral issues, religiously conservative American adults almost never reason in terms of the Ethic of Autonomy concept of individual rights. A clear exception, however, occurs for the issue of abortion where they often invoke the rights of the fetus. Here, their reasoning seems influenced by recognition of the popularity and persuasiveness of rights language in the American public forum.

Research, then, is needed on how development and culture influence a person’s use of an ethic and specific types of ethics reasons that ordinarily fall outside the person’s constellation of reasons. Merging the above findings with the identity work, we might expect that persons would be particularly likely to experience fluctuation or inconsistency in their constellation of ethics during periods of developmental change (e.g., moving from one phase of the life course to another) and during periods of cultural change (e.g., within a culture as a whole, or for a person moving from one culture to another).

The moral emotion question

The proposed cultural–developmental template is based on the large body of available research focusing on moral reasoning. A variety of researchers, however, have highlighted moral emotions (e.g., Eisenberg, 1992; Haidt, 2001; Kagan, 1987). This work has helped to broaden the focus of research on morality to include emotions in addition to reasoning.

Here, some questions for research on moral emotions from a cultural–developmental perspective will be put forth. Could developmental templates be proposed for various moral emotions, such as guilt, shame or gratitude? How might such templates vary across cultures? How might development and/or culture relate to what is defined as moral rather than non-moral emotions? How might development and/or culture influence the extent to which people’s moral behaviors are based upon emotions or reasoning? How might development and/or culture even influence how this distinction between reasoning and emotions is understood and experienced?
To the extent that some moral emotions map onto the three ethics, it is possible that the present template may have applicability to these emotions. In a series of studies, Rozin et al. (1999) found that anger, contempt and disgust were strongly related to the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, respectively. If more research were to show such relations for a number of other emotions, it might be that specific cultural–developmental expectations could be proposed for the degree to which people experience Autonomy, Community, and Divinity emotions as well as for the specific types of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity emotions that they experience.

Future directions: broader research implications

Cultural variations in the life course

Turning to broader research implications of synthesizing developmental and cultural perspectives, one of those is the need to consider that cultural variations in the life course itself may influence moral development. For example, recent research indicates that a new phase of the life course has become common in the US and other post-industrial societies. Spanning the late teens through the mid-to-late twenties, researchers term this period “emerging adulthood” (Arnett, 1998, 2000, 2004). Emerging adulthood has been found to be distinct from both adolescence and adulthood behaviorally, demographically, and subjectively. It is a “self-focused age” (Arnett, 2004), with emerging adults aiming to form independent beliefs, establish financial autonomy from parents, and take responsibility for the consequences of their own actions. As noted, emerging adulthood is not a period of life that is present in all cultures. Researchers see it as a period that has become notable in societies where educational training has become extended while marriage and family obligations often are postponed (e.g., Mayseless & Scharf, 2003).

In cultures where there is an emerging adulthood phase, one might expect this phase to be characterized by substantial Ethic of Autonomy reasoning. There might even be a momentary up tick in the Autonomy pattern described in Fig. 1. Several recent studies with the three ethics has indeed shown a pronounced use of the Ethic of Autonomy among American emerging adults (Arnett et al., 2001; Jensen, 1995; Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, & Cauffman, 2002, 2004). Interestingly, the phase of emerging adulthood might also account for older findings by Kohlberg and his colleagues. In this work, Kohlberg was surprised to find that American participants who reached college age seemingly reverted to reasoning in Stage 2 with its focus on self-interest. To assimilate the findings to their structural approach which does not allow for back sliding, he and his colleagues ended up revising Stage 5, incorporating notions of relativism (Kohlberg, 1984). From a cultural–developmental perspective, Kohlberg’s finding could be interpreted as fitting with the self-focused tenor of emerging adulthood.

To give another example of the significance of cultural variations in the life course, the indigenous Indian conception of the life course includes a final “Sanyasa” phase where older persons are supposed to renounce their ties to community in order to focus on their connection with the spiritual notion of Atman. As described by Saraswathi (2005), the Sanyasa ideal is to lead a life as water on a lotus leaf—on the leaf but not of it. For those Indians who actually adhere to this life course conceptions, one might expect a final down tick in the otherwise common Ethic of Community pattern described in Fig. 1.
Cultural variations and developmental contexts

Taking a cultural–developmental approach also entails addressing how the contexts that influence moral development will vary across cultures. Over the course of the early 20th century—as mass education in Europe and the United States became common and compulsory—Piaget emphasized the peer context. Kohlberg continued the emphasis on peers. There also appears to be an implicit focus on peers in domain research. The moral vignettes that domain researchers use in their research typically involve interactions between peers (e.g., hitting an age-mate, pushing a playground peer off a swing, failing to share with a classmate, teasing a peer). Recent research has addressed other contexts, especially family (e.g., Smetana, 2000; Walker, 1989) but also civic organizations (e.g., Flanagan, 2003; Youniss, McClellan, & Yates, 1997).

Yet today’s children and adolescents growing up in urban areas all over the world are exposed to moral messages from many other sources too: after-school counselors, extra-curricular activity coaches, television, magazines, websites, and so forth. What is the influence on moral development of these other contexts? Meanwhile, in a number of areas of the world (especially rural and poor ones), the moral contexts surrounding children and adolescents are different. Children’s daily access to mass media, such as television and the internet, is much less pronounced. Adolescents (especially girls) are far less likely to attend secondary educational institutions. Both children and adolescents spend more time in the contexts of family and small communities. What are the implications for the moral development of these children and adolescents? Because the contexts of moral significance are likely to vary not only across age but also across cultures, an implication of taking a cultural–developmental approach is the need to consider more contexts than typically have received research attention (Jensen, in press c; Jensen & Larson, 2005).

Cultural variations and diverse age groups

Another important implication of the cultural–developmental approach involves turning Piaget’s research dictum on its head. Piaget wrote that “Child morality throws light on adult morality” (1932/1965, p. 9). Adult morality, however, also throws light on child morality. By focusing on adults (and across the lifespan in general), we might discover moral concepts that mainly emerge after childhood and later

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A common critique of cultural models is that they focus exclusively on learning as a developmental mechanism. In this respect, however, the proposed cultural–developmental template allows for research consideration of all of Aslin’s (1981) five models of possible relationships between maturation and environment. The five models are: induction, attunement, maintenance, facilitation, and maturation. It is possible that cultural experiences induce development as a purely environmental effect and that without the cultural lessons various moral concepts would not develop. It is possible that cultural experiences serve to attune maturational processes such that the development of moral concepts reaches a point that goes beyond a basic maturational level. It is also possible that cultural experiences maintain maturationally developed moral concepts that would otherwise deteriorate. Facilitation may occur where cultural experiences speed up the development of moral concepts that will otherwise develop maturationally as well. Finally, maturation may occur where some moral concepts develop independent of cultural input. Moral development researchers have focused extensively on attunement (Piaget and Kohlberg) and maturation (Turiel).
in life (e.g., as discussed above in regards to both degree and type of use of the three ethics).

Furthermore, children and adolescents are surrounded by adults (parents, employers, teachers, counselors, media stars, etc.) who provide them with a sense of what is right and wrong and what is valuable in the world. Research with adults will provide us with an understanding of the constellation of ethics that predominate in a culture. In turn, this will illuminate the moral goals toward which adults are seeking to guide children’s moral development (even if children may change the goals, adults may differ on the goals, and adults may not be entirely successful in passing goals on to children).

**Collaborative work**

A final research suggestion is to aim for collaborative work across developmental and cultural research traditions. This might take such forms as joint design of studies, the application of coding systems from more than one research tradition, or theoretical writings taking the shape of a dialogue. Such collaborative work might serve to provide a more complex interpretive understanding of the moral psychology of diverse cultural and age groups. It might also serve as a next step in reformulating and refining theory and method in a way that would draw upon both developmental and cultural expertise.

Daniel Kahneman (2003), the Nobel Prize recipient, stated that “one of the lessons I have learned from a long career is that controversy is a waste of effort” (p. 729). He advocates what he terms “adversarial collaboration” among researchers who hold different perspectives (see Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001, for an example and step-by-step guidelines on how to engage in adversarial collaboration). In moral psychology, too, collaborative work (of a more or less adversarial nature) among researchers with different approaches and areas of expertise would be a helpful, creative, and innovative enterprise.

**Conclusion**

“Morality is the indispensable minimum, that which is strictly necessary, the daily bread without which societies cannot live,” wrote Durkheim (1893/1984, p. 13). To Durkheim’s valuable work on the influence of culture on morality, Piaget (1932/1965) added his developmental perspective focusing on “the moral judgment of the child,” as he titled his influential book. In moral psychology, the cultural and developmental perspectives have remained largely on separate sides since this early social science work. Researchers on both sides have carried out influential and insightful work, but border crossings have been few and fraught with unfruitful tension.

More than a century after Durkheim, when people increasingly live in a globalized and multicultural world, it is time to see people’s moral lives through both developmental and cultural lenses. Persons aged 7, 17, and 47 often differ in their moral reasoning even if they share a common culture. Persons from diverse cultures such as India, Kenya, and the US often differ in their moral concepts even if they are the same age. The cultural–developmental approach offers the possibility of integrating both of these valuable insights in future theoretical and methodological work in moral psychology.
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