Moral Development in a Global World
Research from a Cultural-Developmental Perspective

Edited by
Lene Arnett Jensen
Theorizing and researching moral development in a global world

Lene Arnett Jensen

In recent decades, an argument for multiplicity has gained traction in the study of human psychology. Instead of a focus on one kind of self, one kind of intelligence, and one kind of creativity, for example, researchers have described multiple selves (Kagitçibaşi, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), intelligences (Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, 1985), and creativities (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Lubart, 1999). Moral psychology, too, has seen calls for the inclusion of more than one kind of moral reasoning (Colby & Damon, 1992; Damon & Colby, in press; Dien, 1982; Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1989; Shweder, 1990) in lieu of conceptualizations of morality as a unitary structure (Kohlberg, 1984) or domain (Turiel, 1983). More often than not, the arguments for multiplicity have been inspired by consideration of culturally diverse individuals and groups.

What has so far received less attention is the development, from childhood into adulthood, of some of these multiplicitious psychological phenomena. This is because it takes time to build knowledge about new constructs, such as “interdependent self” (Triandis, 1995), “naturalistic intelligence” (Gardner, 2004), “spiritually-oriented creativity” (Lubart & Sternberg, 1998), and “Ethic of Community” (Jensen, 1995; Shweder, 1990). It also takes novel theoretical thinking to capture the development of a multiplicitious phenomenon (Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, et al., 2003). Additionally, when it comes to policy, it may seem more straightforward to work toward one goal than to figure out how to balance or select among two or more.

Nonetheless, a new focus in moral psychology is how the development of diverse kinds of reasoning occurs across the life course and the extent to which developmental trajectories vary across cultures. This is the focus of the theory known as the “cultural-developmental approach” (Jensen, 2008, 2011, 2012). This approach introduces the theoretical concept of a template. The template for moral development charts trajectories across the life course for three kinds of moral reasoning, the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. The cultural-developmental approach is not a one-size-fits-all model, however. The developmental trajectories are proposed as a template in the sense that they accommodate the different hierarchies of the ethics held by culturally diverse peoples. For example, there is a more pronounced emphasis on the Ethic of Community in Taiwan than in the United States and a stronger emphasis on the Ethic of Autonomy in the United States than in Taiwan (Miller, Fung, Lin, et al., 2012; see also Li, 2011, 2012). These different hierarchies interact with development. Thus the Ethics of Community and Autonomy are likely to emerge at different points in childhood in Taiwan and in the United States, to develop along somewhat different slopes, and to reach different endpoints in adulthood. The cultural-developmental approach, then, aims to capture how moral development and culture comodulate. From this perspective, ontogenetic development is not determinative, but neither is there a limitless cultural range.

The purpose of this book is to present the cultural-developmental approach to moral psychology, new research findings with highly diverse age and cultural groups that test and expand the theory, and four different research instruments for collecting and coding cultural-developmental research on morality. The international group of contributing authors represents anthropology, human development, linguistics, and social psychology. The authors bring a range of questions and methods to focus on the cultural-developmental nature of human morality. The hope is that the book provides a fresh conceptual approach to moral psychology along with concrete research tools for future scholarship. Perhaps, too, it may inspire ideas for how to address the development of multiplicity for other human psychological characteristics.

Here, I will begin with an overview of the cultural-developmental approach. I will then highlight a set of insights and issues that emerged across the chapters. This will include both how findings support cultural-developmental predictions and how they give rise to intriguing and fruitful new research ideas. The highlights, of course, represent a selection. Each chapter elucidates a number of additional findings on its own. In light of their specific findings, the authors of each chapter also discuss where they see a need for future scholarship.

The cultural-developmental approach

The cultural-developmental approach builds on a review of a large set of valuable findings from different research traditions. The findings come from traditions as varied as structural-developmental and domain theory (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932/1965; Turiel, 1983), cultural psychology and anthropology perspectives on morality (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990; Trommsdorff & Chen, 2012; Whiting & Edwards, 1988), and research on the origins and development of prosocial emotions and norms (e.g., Padilla-Walker & Carlo, 2014; Thompson, 2012; Vaish & Tomasello, 2014; Waneken & Tomasello, 2006). These findings have been synthesized — and sometimes reinterpreted — to propose the cultural-developmental approach. Thus it is not a case of throwing
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cut the baby with the bathwater, to use a fairly common idiom. Rather, it is a
call to recognize that babies are instantly immersed in different cultural envi-
ronments, and as they grow into adulthood they become increasingly culturally
diverse. All babies may be moral (Bloom, 2013), but they are not particularly
diverse in their morality. Adults from different cultures, however, are diverse.
In short, the cultural-developmental approach proposes that there is universality
and also increasing multiplicity with development.

As mentioned, the cultural-developmental approach introduces a template
that charts developmental trajectories across the life course for the three Ethics
of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity — a tripartite differentiation originally
proposed by Shweder and his colleagues (Jensen, 1995; Shweder & his
colleagues, 1997). Briefly, the Ethic of Autonomy involves a focus on the self as an
individual. Moral reasons within this ethic include the interests, well-being, and
rights of individuals (self or other) and fairness between individuals. The Ethic of Community focuses on persons
as members of social groups, with attendant reasons such as duty to others,
and concern with the customs, interests, and welfare of groups. The Ethic of
Divinity focuses on people as spiritual or religious entities, and reasons encom-
pass divine and natural law, sacred lessons, and spiritual purity. Research has
shown the presence of these three ethics among varied age and cultural groups
(Arnett, 2001; Guinea & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Jensen,
1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2008; Padilla-Walker & Jensen, 2014; Rozin, Lowery, Imada,
1999; Vasquez, Kelner, Ebenbach, et al., 2001). As we will see later, too, the present chapters substantiate their presence
and differentiation in highly diverse samples.

The cultural-developmental approach describes moral development in terms
of consistencies and changes in the degree of use of the three ethics across
the life course. For example, does overall use of the Ethic of Community go
down, remain stable, go up, or fluctuate with age? It also speaks to the specific
types of moral reasons used within an ethic. Do children use different Ethic of
Community reasons as compared to adolescents or adults?

In the standard manual for coding oral and written moral reasoning (Coding
Manual: Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, Jensen, 2004; see
Appendix A in this volume), each reason is coded into one of the three ethics,
allowing for an assessment of the degree to which a person uses each of the
Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. Each reason is also coded into
one of numerous subcategories. The manual provides thirteen to sixteen subcate-
gories for each ethic, such as “Self’s Psychological Well-Being” and “Rights
for Autonomy,” “Duty (to others)” and “Social Order or Harmony Goals” for
Community, and “Scriptural Authority” and “Conscience (when God-given)”
for Divinity. Apart from ensuring careful and comprehensive coding of all of a
person’s moral reasoning, the use of subcategories allows for an assessment of
the specific type of moral concept used within an ethic. Distinguishing not only
among the three ethics but also among types means that highly diverse concepts
can be given consideration. For example, the Chinese concept of shame (Fung,
1999) and the Indian concept of role-based obligations (Miller, 1994) would
both be coded into the Ethic of Community. However, they would be coded
into the different subcategories “Virtues (community-oriented)” and “Duty
to (others),” respectively. Likewise, a child’s invocation of parental authority
(Piaget, 1932/1965) and an adult’s concern with social coordination (Zimba,
1994) would be coded as Ethic of Community reasons but with the former
exemplifying the subcategory “Important Socially Defined Person’s Authority”
and the latter “Social Order or Harmony Goals.”

The three questionnaires that have been developed based on the standard cod-
ing manual also allow for assessment of both degree and type of usage of the
three ethics. The Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS), assesses moral reasoning in regard to unspecified actions judged to be either: right or
wrong (Guerra & Giner-Sorolla; see Appendix B in this volume). The Ethical
Values Assessment (EVA) measures the extent of endorsement of value state-
ments that reflect the three ethics (Jensen & Padilla-Walker; see Appendix C
in this volume). Both of these questionnaires come in standard and short ver-
sions. The Three Ethics Reasoning Assessment (TERA) assesses reasoning in
regard to a selection of specific moral issues, namely, abortion, divorce, suicide,
and suicide in the case of terminal illness (Jensen; see Appendix D in this
volume). Reasoning for other specific issues, however, could be assessed using
the same format.

The development of Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity

In regard to the development of the three ethics, Figure 1.1 shows the template
of trajectories for each ethic from childhood into adulthood. As illustrated, the
argument is that Ethic of Autonomy reasoning emerges early in childhood and
that the degree to which persons use this ethic stays relatively stable across
adolescence and into adulthood. The specific types of Autonomy reasons that
persons use are likely, however, to change with age. A substantial body of
research has shown that from early on, children in different cultures focus on
harm to the self and the interests of the self (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al.,
1983; Snarey, 1983; Walker, 1989), as well as the needs and interests of other
individuals (Bloom, 2013; Carlo, 2006; Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1994; Turiel,
2002; Warnken & Tomasello, 2006). As persons in different cultures grow
into adolescence and adulthood, some consideration of the welfare of the self
and other individuals remains (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, et al., 1995; Gilligan,
1982; Vasquez, Kelner, Ebenbach, et al., 2001; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, et al.,
1995; Zimba, 1994). However, in a consistent manner adolescents and adults
also begin to speak of reasons such as individual rights and equity – even if these do not prevail across cultures (Killen, 2002; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Piaget, 1932/1965; Snarey, 1985; Walker, 1989; Zinb, 1994).

The proposal, then, is that Autonomy reasoning stays relatively stable across the life course but with some changes in types of Autonomy reasoning. However, it is noteworthy that in cultures in which there is a very strong push for collectivity or submission to divinity, there may be somewhat of a decline in Autonomy reasoning with age. In such cultures, considerations of the needs, desires, and interests of individuals – especially the self – would be seen as either irrelevant or even morally objectionable, and hence by adulthood such considerations might diminish.

The Ethic of Community, according to the cultural-developmental approach, rises throughout childhood and into adolescence and adulthood both in degree of usage and in the diversity of types of reasons. Findings have consistently indicated that younger children in diverse cultures invoke Community reasons such as family interests and customs (Kohlberg, 1984; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990; Thompson, 2012). Cross-cultural research with the domain approach also shows this, even as domain researchers have regarded the reasoning as “conventional” rather than moral (Turiel, 1983, 2002). Moral reasoning related to the family is likely to find continued expression past childhood and probably even more so in the course of adolescence and adulthood as a person’s awareness of and experiences with diverse types of family considerations increase, such as duty to family in addition to family interests and customs (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). By late childhood and adolescence, Community reasons that pertain to social groups other than the family are added (Carlo, 2006; Whiting & Edwards, 1988), including concern for friends (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006) and peers and authority figures in places such as school and work (Schlegel, 2011). Cross-sectional and longitudinal findings have shown that, by late adolescence or adulthood, even more Community reasons are added, such as a focus on societal organization (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, et al., 1995; Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland, et al., 2002; Nisan, 1987; Walker, 1989; Zinb, 1994).

Turning to the Ethic of Divinity, for which much less research on moral reasoning is available, the proposal is that its use will often be low among children but will rise in adolescence and become similar to adult use. Diverse religions have ceremonies in early or midadolescence that confer moral responsibility on adolescents and link that responsibility to knowledge of religious teachings (Mahoney, Pargament, Murray-Swank, et al., 2003). Adolescence appears to be a notable time for the development of religiosity or spirituality, even in societies in which affiliation with religious institutions is low (Trommsdorff, 2012). Research has also indicated that adults, including adults from relatively secular communities (McAdams, Albaugh, Farber, et al., 2008; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, et al., 1995), often explain their moral behaviors in terms of Divinity concepts (Colby & Damon, 1992; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990).

This potential infusion of Divinity reasoning in adolescence, however, may especially characterize religious cultures that emphasize scriptural authority or cultures in which people conceive of supernatural entities (e.g., God) as largely distinct from humans (e.g., omniscient and omnipotent). In these communities, the culturally articulated concepts pertaining to supernatural entities are of such an abstract nature that they may be readily translated into moral reasoning only by adolescents, whose cognitive skills allow for more abstraction than do those of younger children (Adelson, 1971; Keating, 1990; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1972; see also review in Trommsdorff, 2012).

In cultures where scriptural accounts of supernatural or transcendent entities are less salient or where people regard such entities as less distinct from humans, however, it is possible that Divinity concepts are more accessible to and hence more used by children in moral reasoning (Saraswathi, 2005). In some Hindu Indian communities, for example, religious devotion finds expression in tangible and recurrent activities (e.g., bathing, dressing, and feeding the gods); there are many places within and outside the home for worship (e.g., household and roadside shrines, temples); and there are a variety of persons seen to have godlike status or special connections with the gods (e.g., gurus, sadhus [renouncers], temple priests) (Jensen, 1998; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990). In such cultures, children may reason about moral issues in terms of Ethic of Divinity concepts from fairly early on because these concepts are tied repeatedly to specific everyday activities and objects. Then, in the course of adolescence and adulthood, additional Divinity concepts may
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become part of a person’s moral reasoning. In Chapter 2 of the present volume, Pandya and Bhagaokar address the question of whether the Ethic of Divinity emerges early in Indian children. They use quantitative analyses to examine the degree to which the children reason in terms of Divinity and in-depth qualitative analyses to elaborate on the specific types that they bring up. In Chapter 4, Kapadia and Bhagaokar focus on adolescents and adults from the same Indian community, including their use of the Ethic of Divinity.

The comodulation of development and culture

The developmental trajectories in Figure 1.1, as noted, are intended to be a template that accommodates the different hierarchies of ethics held by culturally diverse peoples. The argument is that in order to make reasonably specific predictions about the development of each of the three ethics, we need to know not only about ontogeny but also about culture. In other words, the slopes and endpoints of the developmental trajectories are dependent on how the ethics are hierarchized within a culture.

For example, I have conducted research with Americans from religiously liberal and conservative cultures for more than two decades. On the basis of interview, questionnaire, and ethnographic research, as described in Chapter 8, I have found that religiously liberal adults emphasize the Ethics of Autonomy and Community, but not Divinity. Religiously conservative adults, in comparison, reason substantially in terms of the Ethics of Divinity and Community, but they deemphasize the Ethics of Autonomy. On the basis of these findings, I have proposed different developmental trajectories of moral reasoning within the two religious cultures (Jensen, 2008, 2011). I have illustrated these in Figures 1.2A and 1.2B. Within religiously liberal groups, as shown in Figure 1.2A, the expectation is that children, adolescents, and adults frequently will use the Ethic of Autonomy. Community reasons will be rarer among children but will then become quite common among adolescents and adults. Divinity will be used infrequently at all ages, and if it emerges, this will only occur in the course of adolescence. Figure 1.2B shows predictions for religiously conservative groups. The expectation is that these children, adolescents, and adults will use Autonomy infrequently. There may be some decrease over the life course because of the strong emphasis among religious conservatives on renouncing self-interest. With respect to Community, the expectation is that its prevalence will rise steadily from childhood to reach a high level in adulthood. The Ethic of Divinity will be low among children but will then rise markedly in adolescence and remain high throughout adulthood.

Chapter 8 of this volume includes a description of research with children, adolescents, and adults from religiously liberal and conservative American cultures that aimed to test and extend the predictions proposed in Figures 1.2A and 1.2B. In Chapter 3, Vainio also addresses these predictions in regard to religiously liberal and conservative adolescents from Finland. Furthermore, Chapter 7 by Hickman and DiBianca Fasoli includes a linguistic analysis of conversations between young children and parents from a religiously conservative American congregation. It aims to compare the moral reasoning of the two age groups and also to delve into the ways that parents and children respond to one another. As it turns out, the parents regularly sought to reroute their children’s reasoning from a focus on Autonomy to Divinity considerations.
As scholars addressing cultural issues have long observed, cultural communities include heterogeneity among groups and individuals (Gramsci, 1971; Saltzman, 1981). Variation also exists among cultural communities, including their degree of heterogeneity, intergroup contest, and change over time (Strauss, 1992; Weisner, Bradley, & Kilbride, 1997; Whiting & Edwards, 1988). Finally, access to power varies both within and among cultures.

New insights and ideas across chapters
As described earlier, every chapter examines its own set of hypotheses or questions. Across chapters, however, a set of collective insights emerges. I will highlight three. They include findings that support the cultural-developmental approach as well as intriguing new observations.

Widespread presence and differentiation of the three ethics
First, as mentioned briefly, the chapters in this volume substantiate the presence and differentiation of the three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity in highly diverse samples. With respect to age, the samples ranged from 6 to 85 years. Also, across chapters, samples came from a total of nine countries and four continents. These samples also varied widely on religion, socioeconomic status, and rural versus urban residence. Across chapters, interrater reliabilities for interview responses coded with the standard coding manual for the three ethics ranged from 0.78 to 0.97. The researchers using the CADS and EVA questionnaires obtained reliabilities in the range of 0.64 to 0.91. These reliabilities speak to the robustness of the tripartite differentiation.

Recognition of the robustness of the three ethics does not preclude a finer-grained focus. In fact, attention to types of reasons that are characteristic of particular groups (or individuals) can be very fruitful. As described previously, all three questionnaires for assessing use of the three ethics also allow for assessment of subcategories. Furthermore, the standard coding manual for the Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity allows researchers to add subcategories to encompass new and distinctive reasons. Similarly, the EVA and TERA questionnaires include open-ended questions that provide participants with the option of adding ethical values and reasons not included on the closed-ended sections. In this volume, every chapter includes discussion of existing or new types of reasons in addition to the overarching focus on the three ethics. For example, in Chapter 8 I discuss the emphasis on the Ethic of Divinity subcategory “Scriptural Authority” that is characteristic of Protestant American samples of religious conservatives. This specific type of reason is a cornerstone of the ethical edifice of Divinity constructed by members of this cultural community. Pandya and Bhangaokar propose a distinctive Divinity subcategory of “Paap”

This chapter, then, speaks to not only the commodification of moral development and culture but also a process whereby that commodulation takes place.

Other predictions follow from the cultural-developmental approach. One is the expectation of a particularly early and strong emergence of the Ethic of Community within collectivist cultures. Taiwanese toddlers, for example, have been shown already to give repeated expression to community-oriented concepts such as shame (Fung, 1999; Miller, Fung, Lin, et al., 2012). Furthermore, one might expect that Community considerations would come to exceed Autonomy and Divinity concepts in the course of adolescence and adulthood in such cultures. Studies with Indian adults, for example, have documented an elaborate emphasis on Community concepts such as duty, beneficence, social custom, and familial relations (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990). In Chapter 4, Kapadia and Bhangaokar pick up on these lines of research by comparing adults to adolescents on Ethic of Community reasoning and also by delving into the extent to which the two age groups resolve moral dilemmas through a process of autonomous decision making or interpersonal and role-based negotiation.

In cultures that afford young people in their twenties a prolonged period of identity exploration, also termed emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2004), the cultural-developmental prediction is for an upsurge in the Ethic of Autonomy. The hallmarks of emerging adulthood—indecent independence making, financial self-sufficiency, and accepting responsibility for oneself—all center on Ethic of Autonomy considerations. Some research with American emerging adults supports the prediction (Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001). In this volume, Chapters 5 and 6 further test this proposal. In Chapter 5, Padilla-Walker and Nelson examine the moral reasoning of American emerging adults from a religiously conservative community of Latter-Day Saints (LDS, or Mormons). As they note, this sample constitutes an interesting test because of the potential pull toward Autonomy for American emerging adults and the simultaneous pull toward Divinity in LDS culture. Guerra and Giner-Sorolla, in Chapter 6, look at the use of the three ethics among younger and older emerging adults from five countries. Specifically, they compare emerging adults from Brazil, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

In sum, the cultural-developmental approach provides a developmental template that can be merged with knowledge of one or more cultures to generate new and well-defined hypotheses. Although it should be clear from the preceding research examples, I would like to note that the cultural-developmental approach defines culture as symbolic, behavioral, and institutional inheritances that are shared and coconstructed by members of a community (Goodnow, 2010; Heine, 2012; Shweder, Goodnow, Hatano, et al., 2006). Culture is not synonymous with country or ethnicity, for example, but rather describes communities whose members share key beliefs, values, behaviors, routines, and institutions.
for their sample of Indian children. As they explain, this Hindu concept encompasses not only a concrete notion of divine punishment but also a much broader metaphysics pertaining to *karma* and purity of one's soul. In sum, this volume supports the differentiation among Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. The extent to which research focuses on the three main ethics, existing subcategories, or new subcategories hinges on the questions asked by the researchers.

**The cultural-developmental trajectories: support and surprise**

A number of chapters in this volume also support the trajectories laid out in the cultural-developmental template. As predicted, the Ethic of Autonomy is lower among adults than among children or adolescents in cultures that emphasize familialism and communalism (Kapadia & Bhangaokar, Chapter 4, this volume) or submission to divinity (Hickman & DiBianca Fasoli, Chapter 7, this volume; Jensen, Chapter 8, this volume). Autonomy reasoning also decreased with age among religiously liberal Americans rather than remaining steady as predicted (Jensen, Chapter 8, this volume). This is rather striking since most major developmental theories of moral development, from Piaget to Kohlberg to Turkel, have posioned Autonomy reasoning at the endpoint of moral development. After all these years, room remains for more examination of the actual extent of adult use of the Ethic of Autonomy—even in cultures where Autonomy ranks high.

Speaking of which, three chapters add further evidence that the Ethic of Autonomy may be particularly high among people in their late teens and twenties who live in cultures where there is a period of emerging adulthood. The emphasis and precedence of this ethic were observed by Guerra and Giner-Sorolla for four of the five cultures they examined: emerging adults in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom reasoned more in terms of Autonomy than in terms of the other two ethics. The interesting, if not entirely surprising, exception was Japan, where Autonomy was equal with Community.

Hickman and DiBianca Fasoli also found that Hmong emerging adult immigrants in the United States emphasized the Ethic of Autonomy, whereas their parents did not. As the authors poignantly explain:

They are dealing with the competing demands of Hmong moral models handed to them by their parents and relatives versus those that are more prevalent in American society (such as their non-Hmong peers) and more typical of American emerging adults in particular (see Jensen, 1995). This is an important dynamic for understanding the moral worlds of these migrant youth, and it suggests a more complicated picture of the development of moral identity (see Hardy, Walker, Olsen, et al., 2013). (Chapter 7, this volume)

Finally, even among LDS emerging adults, Padilla-Walker and Nelson found evidence for considerable attention to the Ethic of Autonomy, even as the Ethic of Divinity was generally rated as significantly more important. These two authors engaged in an extensive exploration of how the two ethics were related in the thoughts and behaviors of their sample. I return to this question later in a discussion of relations among ethics.

The Ethic of Community, as predicted by the cultural-developmental approach, was found to be higher among adults than among children and adolescents. This was the case among Indian participants (Kapadia & Bhangaokar, this volume) and among both religiously liberal and conservative participants in the United States (Jensen, Chapter 8, this volume). There is clearly a need, however, for more research. The present findings are cross-sectional. They are also limited to three cultural groups, even if those are notably diverse.

With respect to the Ethic of Divinity, the thesis that an infusion of Divinity reasoning takes place in adolescence in religious cultures that emphasize scriptural authority and abstract conceptions of the supernatural was supported in Jensen’s findings with American evangelical children, adolescents, and adults. Hickman and DiBianca Fasoli, too, observed low use of the Ethic of Divinity among American evangelical children but high use among their parents, and they surmise that adolescence must be when the shift occurs.

In a different religious tradition, Pandya and Bhangaokar examine the cultural-developmental proposal (described earlier) that the use of Divinity in moral reasoning may emerge at a fairly young age in cultures such as those in India where religion suffuses everyday life. They found that Divinity reasoning in Indian children is common, and just as common as Autonomy reasoning. This certainly supports the thesis. Unexpectedly, however, they also found that third graders used Divinity significantly more than sixth graders did. Furthermore, Kapadia and Bhangaokar, who studied adolescents and adults from the very same city and context in India, found low use of the Ethic of Divinity as compared to use of the Ethics of Autonomy and Community. These findings would seem to call for replication, preferably with comparable stimulus materials across age groups of children, adolescents, and adults.

As Pandya and Bhangaokar write, there is a “lacuna in contemporary moral psychology” in research on Divinity considerations (see also Trommsdorff, 2012). It is a lacuna that at a minimum goes back to Piaget, who argued that any references to religion and the supernatural mask the structure of genuine moral reasoning. Consequently, he left all such references by his samples of children and adolescents in Geneva uncoded (Edwards, 1981). I would argue that attention to Divinity considerations in people’s moral lives has been on the rise (e.g., de Waal, 2013; Markus & Conner, 2013) and that the present chapters contribute to this emerging scientific focus. The inclusion of the Ethic of Divinity in the cultural-developmental approach provides a theoretical starting point for additional research.
behavioral outcomes that are salient to emerging LDS adults, including prosocial behavior, cohabitation, religious faith, and sexual exploration. Hickman and DiBlanca Fasoli, too, address intersections. Rather than the quantitative approach of Padilla-Walker and Nelson, they take a qualitative one in which they delve deeply into the reasoning of the participants at both the group and individual levels. They look for ways that two or three ethics are used together, are in conflict with one another, or are interwoven to an extent to which differentiation seems to run counter to participants’ emic worldviews. This latter emic issue is one that researchers coding for the three ethics are particularly likely to ponder because they typically work with culturally diverse groups. One of the strengths of Hickman and DiBlanca Fasoli’s chapter is that the authors take this cultural consideration very seriously.

Conclusion

The purpose of this book, as stated at the outset, is to provide a theoretical approach and concrete research ideas and tools to examine moral development as a multiplicitous phenomenon. The present authors have advanced this purpose. Their methods and findings can also serve as inspirations for future work. For example, there is clearly a need for longitudinal and sequential research on the cultural-developmental trajectories to better understand the roles of ontogenetic development and culture. Such longitudinal research is now under way with the Indian children of Chapter 2, who are now in early adolescence. There is also a need for new kinds of research on cultural-developmental processes. The present examples of research with child-parent dyads and on the differentiation between public and private spheres of morality are two avenues. Currently, research is comparing adolescent-parent dyads from rural and urban Thailand on their reasoning about public and private moral issues (McKenzie, 2014). There are many other possibilities, however, including research tailored to other contexts such as peers, service and civic organizations, and media.

Richard Shweder, who authored the foreword to this volume, and Joan Miller and Gisela Trommsdorff, who each provided commentaries, offer still other ideas for future work. Each author’s insights are based on decades of experience in the field.

I, like many of my colleagues (Jensen, 2015), am continuously struck by just how fast “fields” — the academic and the cultural ones — are changing. I think the universal aspirations of many theories of the last century are giving way to something more flexible that recognizes both universality and multiplicity. Furthermore, culturally insular communities are rapidly changing in the wave of globalization (e.g., Hermans, 2015; Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Silbereisen & Chen, 2010; Trommsdorff, 2000). Isolated cultures are a phenomenon of yore. Culture, too, is becoming something more flexible that involves both

The broadening and deepening of moral development

As I have argued elsewhere, the study of development in diverse cultures consistently leads to the discovery of new concepts (Jensen, 2012). It broadens our understanding of human psychology. Obviously, starting with a focus on three kinds of ethics rather than one already represents broadening, as discussed at the outset. In these chapters, the bridging of cultural and developmental perspectives spawns a broadening in regard to additional moral phenomena. Vainio, for example, shows that a much broader array of issues than what has traditionally been included within the moral domain (e.g., Turriell, 1983) is discussed by her diverse Finnish participants as being moral. Kapudji and Bhanagkar, as briefly noted, detail how moral decision making may be either relatively autonomous or may entail considerable interpersonal negotiation and calibration. In other words, they differentiate two processes for reaching moral judgments. Jensen distinguishes two new “spheres” of morality, the public and the private, in which the former describes moral reasoning that is applied to people in general and the latter comprises moral reasons that one applies to one’s own moral behaviors. One key finding is that this distinction is critical to understanding the nuanced nature of the division between religiously liberal and conservative groups in the United States — sometimes referred to as the “culture wars.” This volume, then, broadens our research focus not only on moral reasoning but also on moral issues, moral decision making, and moral spheres.

While the study of moral development in diverse cultures expands our range of psychological concepts, it also deepens them. One step toward deepening our understanding of these ethics comes from probing their intersection. Some past research has addressed this. For example, Arnett, Ramos, and Jensen (2001) showed positive correlations between Autonomy and Community among American emerging adults and discussed participants’ emic (or indigenous) views of their developmental relation and intersection. Guerra and Ciner-Sorolla (2010) also found correlations among the three ethics and discussed how those were dependent on culture. Jensen (1995) described how all three ethics were invoked by middle and older American adults. Vásquez, Keltner, Eberbach, et al. (2001) highlighted how the history of the Philippines lends itself to invocation of all three ethics, and that is also what they found.

This volume includes chapters that push the focus on intersections further. Padilla-Walker and Nelson differentiate three patterns of “negotation” between the Ethics of Autonomy and Divinity among their LDS participants: congruence, dominance, and conflict. They examined the patterns of negotiation in a number of ways, including the relative degree to which their participants valued each of the two ethics and the strength and direction of the correlation between the ethics. They also conducted regression analyses to determine how each of the three patterns of negotiation was associated with a range of
stability and hybridity. Thus I titled the present volume “Moral Development in a Global World” in an attempt to direct attention to the dynamic and divergent ways that morality develops across cultures in a time of globalization.

REFERENCES


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